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Abstract 
    
   There were two special cases when researching on Japan’s colonial 
economic history: China and Thailand. They were the only two nations that 
maintained relative political and economic autonomy within the Greater 
East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere until the end of the war. And this 
particularity was surely reflected in their policies towards Japan, 
especially economic policies. This dissertation selects three cases: Zhang 
Xueliang’s regime in Manchuria from 1929 to 1931; the Nanjing 
Government from 1934 to 1937; and the Phibun’s administration from 1941 
to 1942. In these cases, despite their huge military gap with Japan, both 
China and Thailand demonstrated sufficient economic flexibility and well 
maintained their own economy from Japan’s exploitation. 
   Therefore, the research question in this dissertation could be 
summarized as: how did China and Thailand protect their economic 
interests from Japan’s excessive pressure or exploitation?  
   There are some previous studies on this issue, but these works ignore 
China and Thailand’s proactive interference and manipulation of bilateral 
currency relations. This dissertation argues that currency played a crucial 
role in their relations with Japan. Although China and Thailand were 
inevitably influenced and restricted by Japan regarding security and 
diplomacy, both of them maintained considerable autonomy in currency 
policies. From the late 1920s to mid-1930s, China experienced tremendous 
changes in the silver price and monetary system, which affected Japan 
significantly. In the early 1940s, Thailand also took a hedging policy 
between gold-dominated states and Japan to protect its national interests. 
Ultimately, Japan’s influence on the international financial market was so 
weak, which gave the possibility for China and Thailand to exert their 
currency power. 
   Therefore, this dissertation gives a hypothesis that: China and 
Thailand successfully promoted their position in negotiations with Japan 
through the exercise of currency power, and it helped to protect their 
economic interests. 
   The existing studies mainly concern about the currency power of strong 
states, including dominant states and middle powers. However, weak 
states have long been ignored in this field. Therefore, this dissertation 
mentions two new forms for weak states to perform currency power: 
counterbalancing policy, which is used by China; and hedging strategy, 
which is used by Thailand. Counterbalancing policy means to balance (or 
offset) other’s economic advantages by making use of currency relations to 
change the unbalanced or abnormal economic situation. It tends to be 
risk-neutral, and only want to balance the influence or reduce the benefits 
of its opponents. Hedging strategy refers to maintain relationships with 
12 
 
two competitive currencies or currency blocs simultaneously, and refuse to 
cut off currency relations with anyone of them completely. Its preference is 
risk-avoidance, aiming at increasing the freedom of action or reducing 
vulnerability in a changing situation. Furthermore, they may get some 
side-payments by this strategy. In the Zhang Xueliang case, the existing 
studies provide some explanations about how Zhang Xueliang protected 
the economic interests from Japan’s excessive pressure or exploitation. 
This dissertation argues that the rapid change of gold-silver ratio since 
1929 helped Zhang to adopted effective economic policies from limited 
financial resources. Through the manipulation of gold-silver ratio, Zhang 
Xueliang successfully exercised his currency power. During this process, he 
not only brought damages to Japan’s South Manchuria Railway Company, 
but also promoted China’s domestic railway network and industrial 
policies. 
   In the Nanjing Government case, the existing studies provide some 
explanations about how the Nanjing Government protected the economic 
interests from Japan’s dumping policy in China and the Southeast Asia. 
However, the existing studies do not elaborate on the effects of currency 
reform in Sino-Japanese trade relations. Therefore, this dissertation 
argues that Japan’s factor played an essential role in the decision to 
perform currency reform, especially on the trade competition in China 
mainland and Southeast Asia. In order to regain trade advantages in 
China and recover the overseas Chinese trade network, it greatly promoted 
the currency reform in 1935. Through this currency reform, the Nanjing 
Government successfully exercised its currency power. 
   In the Phibun administration’s case, the existing studies analyze some 
strategies that Thailand used to cope with Japan’s excessive demands on 
economic aspect. However, as an important part of Japan-Thailand 
economic relations in the beginning of Pacific War, the details of economic 
negotiations in Bangkok and Tokyo in the first half of 1942 and Thailand’s 
negotiating strategies had not been fully studied. These negotiations 
basically set out the principles of Thailand’s economic policy towards 
Imperial Japan during the whole Pacific War. Therefore, it is necessary to 
study the details of these two negotiations and further explore the 
negotiating tools and chips of the Thailand government. By using Japanese 
and Thai literatures, this dissertation finds that gold issues were the main 
topics in these negotiations, and had played an important role in 
Thailand’s economic policy towards Japan. Thailand used the gold 
standard to wrestle with Japan and behaved more inclined to adopt the 
gold standard rather than the yen standard, so as to request for more side 
payments and hedge the risk of incorporating into the yen bloc. Through 
the negotiations on gold issues, the Phibun administration successfully 
exercised its currency power. 
13 
 
Chapter 1  
Introduction 
 
1. Problem Consciousness 
1.1 Problem Consciousness：Two Special Cases of China and Thailand 
   Japan’s colonial expansion includes two main aspects: military and 
economy. Through the establishment of industrial capital, Japan has 
continuously transformed into an imperialist state and then achieved 
control over the colonies.1 As Japan's sphere of influence continued to 
expand, especially after the breakout of Pacific War, it hoped to establish 
exclusive control over the Far East.2 However, in this process, there were 
two exceptional cases: China and Thailand.  
   Why China and Thailand were unique? It should be noted that they 
were the only two nations that maintained relative political and economic 
autonomy within the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere until the end 
of the war. In Japan’s strategic design, the whole East Asia could be 
divided into three parts: formal Japanese empire, China, and Southeast 
Asia.3 Southeast Asia could be further divided into Kou district (甲地区) and 
Otsu district (乙地区), or occupied areas (占領地) and cooperative areas (協力
地).4 Among all these regions, only China and Otsu district (Thailand and 
French Indochina) could have a certain extent of autonomy. However, 
Indochina was completely controlled by the French Vichy government and 
lacked political independence, and it was finally occupied by Japanese 
army in March 1945. Therefore, it could be concluded that China and 
Thailand were the most special cases in East Asia.  
   This specificity was undoubtedly reflected in their policies towards 
Japan, especially economic policies. This dissertation attempts to select 
three cases: Zhang Xueliang’s regime in Manchuria from 1929 to 1931; the 
Nanjing Government from 1934 to 1937; and the Phibun’s administration 
from 1941 to 1942. In these cases, despite their huge military gap with 
Japan, both China and Thailand demonstrated sufficient economic 
flexibility and well maintained their economic interests from Japan’s 
exploitation. 
   Therefore, the research question in this dissertation could be 
summarized as: how did China and Thailand protect their economic 
                                                             
1
 波形昭一『日本植民地金融政策史の研究』早稲田大学出版部、1985年、22頁。 
2
 A・W・グリスウォルド著、柴田賢一訳『米国極東政策史』ダイヤモンド社、1941年、199頁。 
3
 山本有造『「大東亜金融圏」論 (1940年代日本植民地帝国の諸相)』1997年、8頁。 
4
 巌谷二三男『中攻: 海軍陸上攻撃機隊史（上巻）』出版協同社、1956年、225頁；川西正鑑『東亜地政
学の構想』実業之日本社、1942年、327-328頁。 
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interests from Japan’s excessive pressure or exploitation?  
   There are some previous studies on this issue, but these works ignore 
China and Thailand’s interference and manipulation of bilateral currency 
relations. This dissertation argues that currency played a crucial role in 
their relations with Japan. Although China and Thailand were inevitably 
influenced and restricted by Japan regarding security and diplomacy, both 
of them maintained considerable autonomy in currency policies. From the 
late 1920s to mid-1930s, China experienced tremendous changes in the 
silver price and monetary system, which affected Japan significantly. In 
the early 1940s, Thailand also took a hedging policy between 
gold-dominated states and Japan to protect its national interests. 
Ultimately, Japan’s influence on the international financial market was so 
weak, which gave the possibility for China and Thailand to exert their 
currency power.  
   Therefore, this dissertation gives a hypothesis that: China and 
Thailand successfully promoted their position in negotiations with Japan 
through the exercise of currency power, and it helped to protect their 
economic interests. 
   Currency Power refers to manipulating international currency relations 
in order to influence the preferences of other states. Through the narrative 
of Chinese and Thai cases, it may be possible to construct a more complete 
framework of the Japanese colonial economic history. From the perspective 
of China and Thailand, we can more fully understand the limits of Japan’s 
imperialist policies and the complexity of economic competition during 
wartime.  
 
1.2 Problem Consciousness：Currency Power of Weak States 
   Was it possible for China and Thailand to exercise some currency power? 
In previous studies, currency power is always backed by strong political 
and military strength, and it always works through currency 
internationalization or construction of a specific currency system.  
   However, this dissertation argues that currency power is not exclusive 
to strong states, and weak states can also make use of international 
currency relations to influence the preference of strong states. 
   Above all, how to define the word “weak states”? It requires a 
classification between different types of states. The existing studies 
introduce the following methods of division: statistical definition, perceived 
power definition and statecraft-based definition5; the functional model, the 
behavior model and the hierarchical model.6 Wei Min points out that all 
these methods are all connected with how to measure the weakness.7 The 
                                                             
5
 J. H. Ping (2017). Middle Power Statecraft: Indonesia, Malaysia and the Asia-Pacific. Ashgate Publishing Limited, 
p.51. 
6
 A. Chapnick (1999). The Middle Power. Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, 7(2), 73-82. 
7
 韦民：《小国与国际关系》，北京：北京大学出版社 2014 年版，第 30-31 页。 
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classification criteria adopted in this dissertation are the influence of 
different states on the international system. Therefore, this dissertation 
divides international actors into two categories: strong states and weak 
states. Also, strong states can be further divided into dominant states and 
middle powers.  
   The dominant states can determine and influence the development of 
the international system. Then although the middle powers cannot 
determine the structure or direction of the system, they have played an 
essential role in supporting or stabilizing the system.8 For weak states, 
many studies argue that they can do nothing but obey the rules of the 
system, and they have to behave in a “given type of behavior.”9 Thus the 
weak states are “no more than a dispensable and non-decisive 
increment.”10 Moreover, it is hard for them to “act alone or in a small group, 
making a significant impact on the system.”11 So, they were also unable to 
change the basic contours of this context.12 
   However, this understanding of weak states is incomplete. Michael 
Handel argues that weak states show some weaknesses and vulnerability 
in some areas, but they “have also demonstrated a remarkable capacity to 
survive despite all the dangers they faced due to their lack of power.”13 
Christina Schneider further mentions that it is necessary to take into 
account the influence of the international system when viewing the weak 
states, and some weak states can possess big “bargaining power” in the 
international system.14 Tatsuo Urano emphasizes that weak powers “do 
not seek to maximize the benefits, but pursue the minimization of 
damage.”15 Therefore, this article also hopes to characterize weak states 
positively, and argues that they can develop capabilities to compensate for 
their deficiencies when trapped into hard times.16  
   In the three cases of this dissertation, China was in a weak and split 
situation, and neither the Zhang Xueliang regime nor the Nanjing 
government could mobilize the resources of whole China. Besides, although 
the Thai Phibun administration has maintained its nominal independence, 
the Japanese army has already stationed in Thailand. Therefore, China 
and Thailand indeed had little influence over the Far East system, and 
                                                             
8
 O. Höll (Ed.). (1983). Small States in Europe and Dependence (No. 6). W. Braumüller, Austrian Institute for 
International Affairs, p.240. 
9
 R. Vayrynen (1971). On the Definition and Measurement of Small Power Status. Cooperation and Conflict, 6(1), 
p.91;  
10
 D. Vital (1971). The Survival of Small States: Studies in Small Power/Great Power Conflict. Oxford University 
Press, p.9. 
11
 R. Keohane (1969). Lilliputians' Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics. International Organization, 
23(2), p.196.  
12
 B. Thorhallsson & A. Wivel (2006). Small States in the European Union: What Do We Know and What Would 
We Like to Know?. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 19(4), p.654. 
13
 M. I. Handel (2016). Weak States in the International System. Routledge, pp.6-7. 
14
 C. J. Schneider (2011). Weak States and Institutionalized Bargaining Power in International Organizations. 
International Studies Quarterly, 55(2), p.331. 
15
 浦野起央『国際政治における小国』南窓社、1992年、17-18頁。 
16
 M. I. Handel (2016). Weak States in the International System. Routledge, p.7. 
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both of them were indeed in a state of semi-colonization. Therefore, they 
could be classified as weak states here. However, as mentioned above, they 
flexibly utilize limited resources and international changes to maintain 
their national interests, which in turn showed us how weak states could 
impressively exercise their currency power. 
 
2. Previous Studies of Currency Power  
   Currency power is also called monetary power, monetary diplomacy, or 
international monetary diplomacy in other studies. The basic definition of 
currency power is to manipulate international currency relations in order 
to influence the preferences of other states. 
   The current theoretical studies on currency power mainly focus on the 
first two types of countries: dominated states and middle powers. Both 
types of countries generally exercise their currency power within a specific 
international system. The dominant states will use their leadership within 
the system to force other countries to accept their policies. However, middle 
powers always tend to make use of the shortcomings of a system to force 
dominant states to make some concessions. However, the currency power of 
weak states is almost ignored.  
 
2.1 Currency Power of Dominant States 
   A dominant state is a state “whose leaders consider that it can, alone, 
exercise a large, perhaps decisive impact on the international system.”17 
Therefore, their currency power is mainly reflected in the structural level, 
including three parts: currency dependence; currency as a symbol; 
currency manipulation.18  
   First, Jonathan Kirshner’s argues that currency dependence is usually 
“manifested through the creation of formal or informal currency zones, 
areas or blocs.”19 The dominant state will derive its power from the 
structure and the very existence of this system, such as the institutional 
arrangements or direct coercion and punishment.20 It looks like a 
hierarchy system, but David Lake mentions that “it can be presumed that 
the control acquired by the dominant state has at least some measure of 
legitimacy.”21 Matthias Kaelberer holds that international monetary 
systems are originally unequal, and the “dominant state’s currency acts as 
the core currency and price standard of the system, so they do not need to 
worry about the burden of domestic macroeconomic adjustments, which 
                                                             
17
 R. Keohane (1969). Lilliputians' Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics, p.196. 
18
 K. N. Waltz (1979). Theory of International Politics. Waveland Press. Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, p.53. 
19
 J. Kirshner (1995). Currency and Coercion: the Political Economy of International Monetary Power. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, pp.13. 
20
 ibid,p.117. 
21
 D. A. Lake (2009). Hierarchy in International Relations. Cornell University Press, p.73. 
17 
 
endow them with huge bargaining power”.22 And the dominant states will 
“use this power to shape the outcomes of international bargaining.”23 
Therefore, Andrew Walter emphasizes that the “key” currency can helps to 
play a predominant role in a specific economic system 24 
   Second, currency can also act as a symbol and then help to shape some 
identity. Eric Helleiner argues that “territorial currencies were viewed as 
something that might encourage identification at a deeper psychological 
level.”25 Therefore, many colonizers strive to promote their currencies in 
colonies, so as to cultivate a unified “currency imagery, currency language, 
currency experiences and currency trust.”26 In addition, the Euro 
particularly shows the role of currency in shaping regional identity. 
Thomas Risse holds that “The Euro makes Europe real and reifies it as a 
political order, since it provides a visible link from Brussels to the daily 
lives of the citizens.”27 RobertoLuna-Arocas argues that “in the process of 
changing to the new currency the pro-European attitudes are far more 
advanced than any real information citizens may have.”28 Also, it helps to 
strengthen the political status of Germany and France. 
   Third, currency manipulation means to affect the stability and value of 
target currencies.29 It requires a country to have a large number of 
international currency assets, or control the form and issuance of 
international money.30 It is mainly manifested in the times of gold 
standard, silver standard, or gold-exchange standard. The dominant states 
will influence the policies of other states by manipulating reserves and 
prices of these commodities. Milton Friedman argues that America’s silver 
purchase plan since late 1933 led to a large outflow of Chinese silver. Then 
China experienced serious deflation and financial crisis, which ultimately 
forced it to abandon the silver standard system.31 Also in the 1930s, 
Japan’s foreign exchange operations and international settlements were 
highly dependent on the Anglo-American markets, which urged Japan to 
build a yen-centric settlement institution to deal with the assets freeze 
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made by Britain and America.32  
 
2.2 Currency Power of Middle Powers 
   A middle power is a state which can “engage in linkage strategies with 
larger states to decrease their vulnerability at relatively low cost and with 
relatively high return.”33 Although they are not the leaders of the system, 
they are crucial for the maintenance and survival of the system. Thus they 
can flexibly use their crucial position and shortcomings of the system to 
exercise their currency power. Moreover, this kind of power is mainly 
reflected in three dimensions: currency interdependence; institutional 
limits; countervailing monetary power. 
   First, as mentioned above, the dominant states exercise their currency 
power by forming a formal or informal monetary system. However, this 
kind of such a system is not without its limitations. Indeed, “even currency 
areas with asymmetric rules that are led by great powers create not so 
much currency dependence as currency interdependence.” 34  Cooper 
emphasizes that dominant states may also “depend on other states to 
sustain the system for insulation from the larger currency world.”35 Under 
some conditions, such as possessing large gold reserves, these follower 
states can possess more “bargaining power than leaders with respect to 
particular issues.” 36  Kirshner use the term “systemic disruption” to 
describe this phenomenon, and he argues that some middle powers can 
threaten to be pegged with another currency to improve their bargaining 
power against dominant states.37 However, these middle powers do not 
want to destroy the whole system, but only to extort “side payments” (利得
の譲渡). However, it is vital for them to control the degree of tension in 
bargains and negotiations, so as not to excessively deteriorate their 
relations with dominant states.  
   Second, middle powers can also make use of the institutional limits to 
affect the preference of dominant states. Cooper argues that not all rules 
are in favor of dominant states in a currency area. Moreover, as time went 
by, some favorable rules also began to become unfavorable for these 
dominant states.38 Therefore, it is necessary for middle powers to find the 
institutional loopholes and then make use of them. For example, there was 
declining confidence on dollar since 1960s, but America cannot get the 
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acquiescence of its allies, especially Japan and West Germany, to achieve 
the depreciation of the dollar. Robert Gilpin argues that “Japan and West 
Germany believed that an overvalued dollar was helpful to promote their 
export-oriented policies”.39 Another case is that although Germany and 
France are the leaders of the European Monetary Union, they have to 
strictly obey the rules of the EMU. 
   Third, “countervailing monetary power” is mainly adopted by some 
EMDs (emerging market and developing states), such as the BRICS or G20. 
Kevin P. Gallagher mentions that these states can concentrate their power 
through “coalition building in institutions”, such as signing currency swap 
agreements or other currency cooperation plans. 40  It can prevent 
exploitations and financial sanctions from dominant states, and protect 
their autonomy and interests. William Zartman emphasizes that a 
coalition “gives particular bargaining power to otherwise weak or small 
states.” 41  Radhika Desai argues that BRICS has established a new 
development bank in 2014, which created pool reserves for cooperation and 
co-financing, and it would be a “coordinated challenge to western 
supremacy in the world economy from developing countries.”42 
 
2.3 Limitation of Previous Works and Originality 
   As mentioned above, current studies mainly concern the currency 
power of strong states, including dominant states and middle powers. 
However, weak states have long been ignored in this field.  
   Therefore, the author summarized the limitation into 3 points: 
   First, the exercise of currency power always requires a certain amount 
of financial resources and a considerable ability to take the risk. These 
strong states are generally risk-seeking states, and their objectives of using 
currency power tend to coerce or attack other states. However, for many 
weak countries, they do not have so many financial resources and do not 
want to take too much risk. Therefore, this dissertation argues that the 
preferences of some weak states are risk-neutral or risk-avoidance, and 
their goal is merely to balance the influence of strong powers or to 
minimize their losses.  
   Second, the previous studies ignore some other forms to perform 
currency power. This dissertation mentions two new forms for weak states: 
counterbalancing policy, which is used by China; and hedging strategy, 
which is used by Thailand. Counterbalancing policy means to balance (or 
offset) other’s economic advantages by making use of currency relations to 
change the unbalanced or abnormal economic situation. They tend to be 
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risk-neutral, and only want to balance the influence or reduce the benefits 
of its opponents. Hedging strategy refers to maintain relationships with 
two competitive currencies or currency blocs simultaneously, and refuse to 
cut off currency relations with anyone of them completely. Their preference 
is risk-avoidance, and they hope to increase their freedom of action or 
reduce vulnerability in a changing situation. Furthermore, they may get 
some side-payments by this strategy. 
   Third, from the perspective of empirical research, most of the scholars 
focus on the cases of sterling, US dollar, French franc and Euro, but pay 
little attention to the relations within Japanese yen bloc.43 Therefore, this 
dissertation attempts to make up for this deficiency and tries to explore 
how the weak countries in Asia use currency power to counter the mighty 
Japanese empire at the time. 
   So we can summarize the studies of currency power as the chart below: 
 
 Currency Power 
Strong States Weak States 
Dominant states Middle powers 
Forms  currency dependence 
currency 
manipulation 
currency as a symbol 
currency interdependence 
institutional limits 
countervailing power 
counterbalancing 
policy 
hedging strategy 
Objectives attack, coerce Balance 
offset 
minimize losses 
Risk 
Preference 
risk-seeking risk-neutral risk-avoidance 
Table 3 the Studies on Currency Power (made by the author) 
 
   As can be seen from the chart above, this dissertation wants to make 
contributions to the right part. Moreover, the theoretical originality of this 
dissertation is mainly reflected in the following aspects: 
   First, it supplements the studies on “currency power of weak states” 
theoretically and empirically. On the one hand, this dissertation introduces 
two new forms to exercise currency power: counterbalancing policy and 
hedging strategy. On the other hand, it focuses on the long-neglected 
currency relations within the yen bloc. 
   Second, by comparing China and Thailand’s cases, it also reveals the 
differences within the weak states. There are two most significant 
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differences between Chinese and Thai cases: for one thing, Thailand and 
Japan are allies, but China not; for another, China’s successful use of 
currency power occurred just before the war, while Thailand took place 
during wartime. These differences will help us to have a deeper 
understanding of the background and motivations of weak states' policies. 
   Third, it is interesting to find that the weak states’ currency power is all 
related to their active currency reform and significant financial changes in 
the international market. It seems to reveal the source of the weak states’ 
currency power and how to find a window of opportunity to exercise this 
power. 
 
3. Previous Studies of Chinese and Thai Cases 
   How did China and Thailand protect their economic interests from 
Japan’s excessive pressure or exploitation? This dissertation attempts to 
select three cases: Zhang Xueliang’s regime in Manchuria from 1929 to 
1931; the period of Nanjing Government from 1934 to 1937; and the 
Phibun’s administration from 1941 to 1942. There have been some prior 
studies on these cases, but currency relations haven not been treated as 
the main independent variable. 
 
3.1 Previous Studies on Zhang Xueliang Case 
   It was necessary to put Manchuria’s economy under the full control of 
Japan to make it as stable markets and the sources of raw materials, thus 
laid a solid foundation for the “total war” (総力戦).44 Therefore, Japan 
strived to control the Manchurian currency and promoted the 
Korea-Manchuria Financial Integration, thus maintained its special 
interests in Manchuria. In the late 1920s, Japan almost dominated 
Manchuria’s economy and finance with the help of South Manchurian 
Railway (満鉄). After Zhang Zuolin (張作霖) was murdered in 1928, his son 
Zhang Xueliang( 張 学 良 )announced the replacement of all flags in 
Manchuria (易幟) and further deteriorated its relations with Japan.45 So 
how did Zhang Xueliang protect the economic interests from Japan’s 
excessive pressure or exploitation? 
   First, some studies focus on Zhang Xueliang’s cooperation with Nanjing 
Government. Nishimura and Mizuno argue that Zhang Xueliang sought for 
the financial unification with inner China, thus improved his relative 
position towards Japan.46 Jing Youyan mentions that Zhang Xueliang and 
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the Nanjing government jointly established a bank in Shenyang to fight 
against the financial influence of Japan.47 From 1928 to 1931, Zhang 
maintained close communication with the Nanjing Government and sought 
for its help.48 
   Second, some studies concentrate on Zhang Xueliang’s plan to build 
China’s own railway network, and point out that he hoped to reconstruct 
the economic structure of Manchuria through the construction of railways 
and ports. Wang Weiyuan argues that Zhang stepped up the construction of 
state-owned railways to combat South Manchurian Railway, which was the 
core economic institution of Japan.49 Hu Yuhai holds that railway 
construction was the first place in Zhang Xueliang regime, and Manchuria 
would not be peaceful unless the South Manchurian Railway were 
defeated.50  
   Third, other studies focus on the importance of Zhang’s currency reform 
since 1929, and his main contribution was to rectify the chaotic monetary 
system in Manchuria. At that time, there was fierce competition between 
the Chinese and Japanese currencies, and Japan’s Bank of Korea (朝鮮銀行) 
actively promoted the circulation of gold notes(金票) in this region. Chen 
Zhiming points out that Zhang’s currency reform has restricted the 
expansion of Japanese financial power and safeguarded the interests of the 
people and businesspeople in Manchuria. 51  In the meantime, Zhang 
Xueliang also built some new banks to unify the issue of currency, and Ma 
Shangbin holds that these new banks were precisely to confront Japan’s 
financial institutions in Manchuria.52 Jing Youyan further emphasizes 
that currency reform has promoted the stability of prices, which stimulated 
the development of light industry.53 
   The existing studies provide some explanations about how Zhang 
Xueliang protected the economic interests from Japan’s excessive pressure 
or exploitation. However, there are some insufficiencies in these studies. 
First, the Nanjing government only played a supporting role in Zhang 
Xueliang's foreign policy, rather than a significant role. Second, the 
existing studies do not explore deep into the underlying causes of why 
railway construction can be smoothly promoted. In addition, a neglected 
phenomenon is that Zhang’s currency reform has been intentionally slowed 
down, and this phenomenon has not been thoroughly studied.  
   Therefore, this dissertation wants to explore what was the most 
important policy tool of Zhang Xueliang when dealing with economic 
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relations with Japan. Moreover, this dissertation argues that the rapid 
change of gold-silver ratio since 1929 helped Zhang to adopted effective 
economic policies from limited financial resources. Through the 
manipulation of the gold-silver ratio, Zhang Xueliang successfully 
exercised the currency power. 
 
3.2 Previous Studies on Nanjing Government Case 
   Since the early 1930s, Japan had occupied the Chinese market by its 
dumping policy, which had also severely damaged the development of 
Chinese domestic industries. Also, Japan’s dumping policy had also 
declined the overseas Chinese trade network(華僑通商網)in Southeast 
Asia.54 It had changed the trade pattern of East Asia and affected the 
overseas income of the Nanjing government. So how did the Nanjing 
Government protect the economic interests from Japan’s excessive 
pressure or exploitation? 
   First, some studies focus on China's social movements of promoting 
domestic products and boycotting Japanese goods. Pan Junxiang 
introduces that China strived to build a formal association and marketing 
network for domestic products, and established a series of China 
Merchandise Corp (中国国貨公司) in major cities across the country.55 Diao 
Chenlin argues that the commodity sales in this period reflected a strong 
color of “nationalism,” which strived to promote the import substitution in 
China. 56  Zhao Xiaogeng and Ma Min emphasize that the Nanjing 
Government revised the Provisional Standards for China Merchandise (中
国国貨暫定標準) in 1932, and it defined the concept and scope of domestic 
products in detail. It divided domestic products into seven categories and 
issued official certificates to domestic products which met the standards.57  
   Second, the Nanjing government tried to resist Japanese products and 
protect domestic industries through the adjustment of tariff policies. Kubo 
Toru argues that China obtained tariff autonomy since the early 1930s, 
which strengthened its management of the economy. The Nanjing 
government hoped to introduce protective tariffs since 1932 and requested 
amendments to the unequal Sino-Japanese Tariff Agreement.58  Zheng 
Youkui mentions that China had adopted higher tariffs for Japan since 
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1933, especially Japanese food, clothing and daily necessities. 59  Kim 
Ji-Hwan particularly emphasizes that China substantially adjusted the 
import tariffs on cotton products in 1933, which was exactly Japan's 
principal export-oriented industry. The primary goal of this policy was to 
promote the development of China’s national textile industry.60 In addition, 
many anti-dumping laws and regulations were passed during this period.61 
Yang Jinmin analyzes how protective tariffs promoted the development of 
domestic industries, especially cotton, tobacco, flour, paper and printing, 
match and sugar industries.62  
   Third, some studies begin to focus on the effects of the Nanjing 
Government’s currency reform in 1935. It is believed that the currency 
reform reduced the exchange rate of the legal tender, which promoted 
Chinese exports and curbed Japanese imports. Lee Yu-ping mentions that 
China’s currency reform was partly to deal with Japan's trade dumping, 
but this standpoint has not been adequately discussed. 63  Shiroyama 
Tomoko also points out that the currency reform has improved China's 
trade situation and made up for a large number of trade deficits.64 Also, 
Luo Hong xi further argues that it was a milestone in the history of China's 
foreign trade. It has dramatically reduced the risk of foreign trade and 
increased the confidence of Chinese exporters.65 However, it should be 
noted that the current studies emphasize that the main motivation for 
currency reform is to overcome the financial crisis and ensure stable prices. 
Thus the trade issue is not the primary concern of this currency reform, but 
an incidental result.66 
   The existing studies provide some explanations about how the Nanjing 
Government protected the economic interests from Japan’s excessive 
pressure or exploitation, but there are still some insufficiencies. Although 
China strived to promote domestic products, it still could not resist cheaper 
Japanese goods. Also, China's tariff and anti-dumping policies can easily 
arouse dissatisfaction with Japan and other Western countries, so there 
were many practical difficulties in implementation. Moreover, Japan has 
bypassed these policies through massive smuggling. 
   As for the issue of currency reform, the existing studies do not elaborate 
on its role in Sino-Japanese trade relations. Therefore, this dissertation 
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argues that Japan’s factor has played an essentical role in the decision to 
perform currency reform, especially on the trade competition in China 
mainland and Southeast Asia. In order to regain trade advantages in 
China and recover the overseas Chinese trade network, it greatly promoted 
the currency reform in 1935. Through this currency reform, the Nanjing 
Government successfully exercised its currency power. 
 
3.3 Previous Studies on Phibun Case 
   At the beginning of the Pacific War, Thailand had many expectations for 
the Japanese-Thai alliance and made every effort to meet the demands of 
the Japanese side. Then Thailand began to realize that the alliance was 
not a mutually beneficial relationship, and there was a risk of being 
“Manchukuo-ized.” 67  Therefore, Thailand had to work to protect its 
economic survival from excessive demands or overexploitation at the hands 
of the Japanese. From January to June in 1942, Thailand’s urgent 
economic problems were the massive loss of dollar, pound reserves and 
access to western markets, as well as Japan’s requirement for a sharp 
depreciation of the baht to coincide with Japan’s “Greater East Asia 
Financial Sphere (大東亜金融圏)” policy. Then from July 1942 to August 1945, 
Thailand was obliged to provide substantial military loans as an ally, but 
these war-induced economic problems, such as severe inflation and 
economic stagnation, created widespread resentment and poverty among 
the general population. So how did Thailand maintain its economy when 
faced with Japan’s excessive demands or exploitation?  
   First, some studies focus on Thailand’s independence in dealing with 
economic affairs. William L. Swan argues that “the Thais could keep track 
of their financial affairs thus allowing them to pursue active policies to 
remedy their economic and monetary problems brought on by the war,”68 
which ensured Thailand’s control over its financial affairs.69 Also, Peter G. 
Warr and Bhanupong Nidhiprabha also mention that Thailand firmly 
opposed the inclusion of Japanese advisors into the Thai National Banking 
Bureau, which protected Thailand’s autonomy in financial affairs. 70 
Therefore, it assured that Thai-Japanese economic relations were 
mediated on a relatively equal basis between the two governments. 
   Second, some studies mention the importance of some crucial 
“pro-Japanese” politicians, especially Prime Minister Phibun and Minister 
of Finance Wanit, for they have played an important role in coordinating 
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Thai-Japanese economic relations. 71  Benjamin Batson mentions that 
“Phibun promoted the rise of Thai nationalism and militarism, and also 
helped to mediate the Thai-Japanese economic relations.” 72  Nishino 
Junjiro mentions that Wanit “resisted the unfavorable exchange rate 
agreement stubbornly till the end.”73 Therefore, he did help to “put up 
sincere and partially successful resistance to the ever-escalating Japanese 
demands on the Thai economy.”74 Moreover, the actions of these Thai 
leaders showed that “they endeavored to alleviate the bad results caused 
by Japan’s economic exploitations.”75  
   Third, some studies on the details of bilateral economic coordination 
and negotiations shed light on the efforts of the Thai government to 
safeguard the economy. Yoshikawa Toshiharu mentions the importance of 
Thailand’s bureaucratic cooperation with Japan (対日協力機関), especially 
the Economic Affairs Division (経済課) of the Department of Alliance (同盟国
連絡事務局 ). He stresses that “these departments fought against the 
Japanese army for three and a half years, and tried to protect Thailand’s 
interests.” 76  Also, Murashima Eiji argues that Thailand requested 
economic compensation from Japan when negotiating the amount and 
additional conditions of military loans every half year to maximize 
Thailand’s national benefit from the alliance.77 Because these loans were 
crucial for Japan’s advance in Southeast Asia. 
   The existing studies analyzed some strategies that Thailand used to 
cope with Japan’s excessive demands on the economic aspect. However, as 
an important part of Japan-Thailand economic relations at the beginning 
of Pacific War, the details of economic negotiations in Bangkok and Tokyo 
in the first half of 1942 and Thailand’s negotiating strategies have not been 
thoroughly studied. These negotiations set out the principles of Thailand's 
economic policy towards Imperial Japan during the whole Pacific War. 
Therefore, it is necessary to study the details of these two negotiations and 
further explore the negotiating tools and chips of the Thailand 
government.  
   By using Japanese and Thai literature, this dissertation finds that gold 
issues were the main topics in these negotiations, and have played an 
important role in Thailand's economic policy toward Japan. Thailand used 
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the gold standard to wrestle with Japan and behaved more inclined to 
adopt the gold standard rather than the yen standard to request for more 
side payments and hedge the risk of incorporating into the yen bloc. 
Through the negotiations on gold issues, the Phibun administration 
successfully exercised its currency power. 
 
4. Organization of Dissertation and Methodology 
4.1 Organization of Dissertation 
   The research question in this dissertation is: how did China and 
Thailand protect their economic interests from Japan’s excessive pressure 
or exploitation? Therefore, chapter one and chapter two introduce the 
background, research status, and try to establish a theoretical framework. 
From chapter three to five are case studies, and these three chapters give a 
detailed elaboration on the currency power of China and Thailand. The last 
chapter is the conclusion, which mainly focuses on the originality, research 
results, and the direction for further studies. 
   Chapter one elaborates on the problem consciousness, namely why 
China and Thailand are unique, and why the currency power of weak 
states is an area worth studying? Then, this chapter makes a detailed 
literature review of the previous studies of currency power and three cases. 
Moreover, it also introduces the organization and methodology of this 
dissertation. 
   Chapter two mainly talks about how China and Thailand maintained 
their autonomy in currency affairs and keenly grasped the limits of Japan’s 
currency power. Then this chapter introduces two new forms to exercise 
currency power: counterbalancing policy, which is used by China; and 
hedging strategy, which is used by Thailand. Counterbalancing policy 
means to balance (or offset) other’s economic advantages by making use of 
currency relations to change the unbalanced or abnormal economic 
situation. Hedging strategy refers to maintain a relationship with two 
competitive currencies or currency blocs simultaneously, and refuse to cut 
off currency relations with anyone of them completely.  
   Chapter three is the first case of China’s currency power, and it focuses 
on how Zhang Xueliang made use of the gold-silver ratio to exercise 
currency power. Although the collapse in silver price since 1929 caused 
great harm to China, some scholars and politicians also viewed it as an 
important turning point to develop the Manchurian economy. Zhang 
Xueliang took delaying tactics in negotiations about freight rates with 
Japan, so as to further weaken the power of South Manchuria Railway and 
strived for opportunities to promote its own railway project. In addition, 
Zhang also made use of the soaring gold-silver ratio to promote 
Manchuria's exports and restricting imports from Japan, thus he expanded 
his financial resources and facilitated the development of domestic 
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industries in Manchuria. 
   Chapter four is the second case of China’s currency power, and it 
concentrates on how the Nanjing Government exercised its currency power 
through currency reform in 1935. At that time, Japan’s dumping policy 
severely damaged China’s economy and overseas Chinese trade network in 
Southeast Asia. Through the currency reform in 1935, it reduced the 
benefits under Japan’s preferred dumping policies, further cultivating 
Chinese domestic industries and reconsolidating its economic relations 
with Southeast Asia.  
   Chapter five is the Thai case, and it mainly talks about how Phibun 
administration made use of the gold issues to exercise its currency power. 
Its hedging strategy can be divided into two stages: First, Thailand 
released mixed information in Bangkok and Tokyo negotiations in the first 
half of 1942, and behaved more inclined to adopt the gold standard rather 
than the yen standard. Therefore, Thailand could request for more side 
payments because of Japan’s concerns. Second, after it changed to yen 
standard, Thailand still urged for gold acquirement to hedge the future 
risks of yen, and maintained potential relations with the Anglo-American 
currency area. 
   Chapter six is the conclusion. This dissertation can supplement the 
studies on “currency power of weak states” theoretically and empirically, 
and it also introduces two new forms to exercise currency power: 
counterbalancing policy and hedging strategy. In addition, by comparing 
China and Thailand’s cases, it also reveals the differences within the weak 
states, and these differences will help us to have a deeper understanding of 
the background and motivations of weak states' policies. For further 
studies, it is necessary to explore more cases about currency power of weak 
states, and then summarize more effective methods to use this power. 
 
4.2 Methodology 
   First, this dissertation will do detailed literature research about 
Japanese, Chinese, Thai first-hand and second-hand materials. Japanese 
materials mainly include documents of MOFA, NIDS (防衛省防衛研究所), 
NAOJ (国立公文書館 ); speeches, interviews and memoirs of the people 
involved; old newspapers such as Asahi Shinbu, Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shinbun 
and Kokumin Shinbun; some journal articles; electronic archives in Japan 
Center for Asian Historical Records. Then Chinese materials come from 
some archives, such as Second Historical Archives of China(中國第二歷史檔案
館), Liaoning Provincial Archives(遼寧省檔案館), and electronic newspapers 
and journals from 1911 to 1949 (中華民国旧報刊). Thai materials mainly 
include archives in National Archives of Thailand and library of 
Chulalongkorn University, and some reports in Bangkok Times and 
Bangkok Chronicle are also used. 
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   Second, this dissertation will take an inter-disciplinary approach, and 
mainly adopt the research methods of economic history and international 
political economy. For one, this dissertation needs much narrative of 
Japanese colonial economic history, so process tracing is necessary for the 
analysis of three cases. Also, it can help to trace how the causal 
mechanisms work in the cases. For another, the theoretical part will 
mainly refer to the IPE theories of currency power, and then put forward 
new supplements on this basis. 
   Third, this dissertation will also use the method of comparative 
research. It is mainly reflected in the comparison between Thailand and 
China. As mentioned above, there are two most significant differences 
between Chinese and Thai cases: for one thing, Thailand and Japan are 
allies, but China not; for another, China’s successful use of currency power 
occurred just before the war, while Thailand took place during wartime. 
These differences will help us to have a deeper understanding of the 
background and motivations of weak states’ policies. 
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Chapter 2 
Weak States and the Exercise of Currency Power 
1. Japan’s Currency Power and Its Limitation 
   A strong currency is always accompanied by a strong power, and the 
maintenance of a strong power relies on the functions of a strong currency. 
During the colonial era, the competition for strategic resources and 
geographical depth became the core of international relations.78 In this 
process, the fighting for master currency (支配通貨) was very crucial to 
ensure the exclusive possession of markets and raw material resources.79 
   An international currency can bring many benefits economically, such 
as earning numerous international seigniorage, facilitating the transfer of 
international wealth, unilaterally enjoying the low costs to participate in 
international economic activities, and having completely independent 
monetary policies. In political perspectives, it can also help to shape some 
special political power, such as the symbolic power, dependence power and 
coercion power.80 During the rising process of great powers, they always 
tend to actively promote the internationalization of its national currency, 
so as to maintain the international expansion of currency privileges. 
   The success of sterling depended on Britain’s effective control of its 
colonies and a sterling-centric bloc economy also ensured the hegemony of 
the British Empire.81 When examining Japan’s colonial history, there was 
also a yen-aggression process accompanied by the military aggression.82 
Along with the promotion of the Continental Policy, Japan attempted to 
establish a yen-centric economic bloc and the later so-called Great East 
Asia Financial Sphere (大東亜金融圏).83 Also, the currency or financial factor 
was one of the most crtitical pillars in the ruling system of the Japanese 
empire.84 This kind of currency power is an effective means to influence 
the preferences and behaviors of other states by making use of 
international currency relations, thus achieving its economic and strategic 
aims.  
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   Japan’s currency power in colonial times has been discussed by many 
scholars. The most essential methodology is the imperialism (帝国主義) or 
so-called state monopoly capitalism (国家独占資本主義) approach.85 Some 
works use imperialist theories to explain the strategic aims of the yen order. 
Shibata Yoshimasa uses the term “currency imperialism (通貨帝国主義)” to 
explain Japan’s economic policies in wartime, and it is a kind of 
institutional tool to strengthen Japan’s cooperation with the occupied 
areas.86 Yuzo Yamamoto argues that it is an assimilationist (同化主義) 
policy by the Japanese empire. As a continental empire, the currency 
policies of Japan have many differences from these maritime empires and 
concentrate more on power and mandatory domination.87  In addition, 
Kyoji Asada uses the “three pillars” (三本柱) framework to explain the 
ruling system of the Japanese empire, which includes land, railway and 
finance. Kikuchi Michio further indicates that Japan’s capitalism has 
developed into the stage of imperialism. Thus the currency and foreign 
exchange policies serve for its aggressive foreign policies and war 
preparations.88  
   By all these means, Japan strived to promote the currency unification 
and circulation of Japanese currencies (日系通貨 ) within East Asia. 89 
However, the yen bloc is quite different from the sterling or gold bloc. “Most 
of the members of the latter two have the power of remaining outside if 
they choose, but the yen has an overpowering dominance and the 
arrangements have been made with an eye to the needs of Japan”.90 In 
this period, the yen emphasized more on the maintenance of its strategic 
benefits. After the Washington Naval Conference in the early 1920s, the 
new Far East and Pacific order which led by America has been 
established.91 Therefore, the promotion of Japan’s New East Asia Order 
was a challenge to the current order and regional framework. As an 
essential policy tool, the Japanese yen significantly served for its strategic 
goals, and its currency power was mainly manifested in two aspects. 
   First, Japan aimed to establish an international payment and 
settlement system based on yen to ensure the supplies of strategic 
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resources during wartime.92 It helped Japan to construct the East Asia 
regional economy (広域経済) based on the Greater East Asia Financial 
Sphere. From the perspective of currency, the regional economy was to 
build a currency “community of destiny” (運命共同体) or a currency bloc.93 
The currency ties essentially aim to maintain stable linked exchange rates 
between the regional hegemon and other states. The yen-centric currency 
order also aimed to build a community of destiny based on yen, and then 
formally set up the East Asian currency and exchange rate system, 
promoting the currency and capital flows in this region.94 It helped to 
reduce the costs of Japan's expanding colonial system, and eventually 
construct a new model of behavior and interaction within the Greater East 
Asia Financial Sphere. 
   Second, the selections of currency system will further affect the balance 
of power in this region. The currency itself has strong political meanings, 
and the international currency structure affects the distribution of power 
among states. In a way, the institutional elements even gradually become 
an important part of the international power structure.95 As the core area 
in competing for Asian hegemony, the currency options of Asian states 
would inevitably affect the balance of power among America, Britain, 
Japan, and other major powers. Therefore, the construction of yen bloc and 
the Greater East Asia Financial Sphere were also meant to find a new 
source of power in addition to the traditional political and military powers. 
Japan has taken some political and economic means to establish and 
maintain the yen-centric currency order in East Asia, and try to eliminate 
the potential challenges caused by other currencies.  
   In the existing studies, currency power seems to belong to Japan 
exclusively. However, it is necessary to realize that the currency power of 
strong states was still limited, and some weak states can also use currency 
power to influence the policy preferences of their stronger opponents. Only 
in this way can we have a complete understanding of the economic history 
in this period. 
   The limits of Japan’s currency power were mainly reflected in its weak 
influence on the international financial market. In the era of the 
commodity money system, Japan’s economy was severely affected by 
changes in international gold and silver prices. Then under the managed 
currency system, the US dollar and sterling remained dominance in 
international settlements due to their links with gold. In the international 
foreign exchange and financial markets, there were still enormous 
                                                             
92
 Warren S. Hunsberger, The Yen Bloc in Japan's Expansion Program, Far Eastern Survey, pp.258. 
93
 日本学術振興会『支那の通貨と貿易: 満蒙支経済第二特別委員会支那通貨特別分科会報告』有斐閣、
1942 年、314 頁。 
94
 松井栄一「広域経済における通貨と為替」、『国際経済研究』昭和 16 年 4 月号、93-101 頁。 
95
 Men Honghua, Wing of Hegemon: the Strategic Values of International Institutions, China Opening Herald, 
2005(5), p.47-48. 
33 
 
demands for US dollar and sterling.96  As yen was a relatively weak 
currency, it was necessary for Japan to hold a large number of foreign 
exchanges (mainly dollar and sterling) or gold reserves in order to 
maintain the stability of yen during wartime.   
   Therefore, some countries could take advantage of Japan’s weak 
position in the international monetary system and then strive for favorable 
status in future negotiations. The two most representative cases are China 
and Thailand from the late 1920s to early 1940s. By flexibly manipulating 
international monetary relations, these two countries made Japan suffer a 
lot.    
 
2. Sources of China and Thailand’s Currency Power 
   How did China and Thailand to exercise their currency power? The 
paramount premise was to find where this power came from. China’s 
currency power mainly came from three things: its long-adopted silver 
standard system; its autonomy in currency affairs; and the assistance from 
western powers. Thailand’s currency power also came from three aspects: 
its autonomy in currency affairs; the ingenious balance between military 
cooperation and economic non-cooperation; and the emergence of two 
competitive currency blocs. 
2.1 Sources of China’s Currency Power  
   The Chinese currency has entered an era of chaos and dramatic 
changes since the early 1900s, especially the excessive issue of 
banknotes.97 With the outbreak of the civil war among warlords, this 
phenomenon became more prominent, and the confidence in China's 
various currencies has fallen sharply. It is reflected in the chart below: 
 
（Unit：Yuan） 
Year Banknote issuance Year Banknote issuance 
1921 95,948,965 1929 350,236,497 
1922 114,975,436 1930 412,968,588 
1923 140,489,048 1931 393,367,870 
1924 151,470,874 1932 451,590,418 
1925 205,006,026 1933 535,190,932 
1926 228,962,163 1934 622,522,223 
1927 262,164,410 1935 867,984,374 
1928 308,818,375 1936 1633,106,095 
Table 4 Banknote Issuance in China’s Banking Industry (1921-1936)98 
   In addition, many foreign banks were issuing large amounts of 
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banknotes in China, especially Japan. When European countries were busy 
with World War One, Japan further expanded its financial power in China 
via Yokohama Specie Bank and Bank of Korea. Therefore, China’s financial 
sovereignty has suffered a lot and was at a disadvantage with Japan’s 
competition during this period. So how did China change its passive 
position and find ways to exercise its currency power? This dissertation 
points out three primary sources of power. 
   First, China’s currency power came from its long-adopted silver 
standard system. Although the discussion on currency reform has been 
going on for some time, China still adopted the silver standard system 
until 1935.99 Since Japan did not adopt the silver standard and cannot 
influence the international silver price, it was passively affected by the 
silver price changes and China’s silver policies.100 In addition, China made 
significant silver policy adjustments from the late 1920s to mid-1930s, 
which provided a crucial window of opportunity to exercise currency power 
on Japan. It is worth mentioning that there was a crash of silver price since 
1929, and it led to a reversal of the competitive situation between China 
and Japan in Manchuria.101 
   Second, China has maintained its autonomy in currency affairs. In 
Zhang Xueliang regime, the currency policies were under the control of 
newly established Northeast Administration Committee(東北政務委員会) 
and the Provincial Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces (東三省官銀号). 
Moreover, these two institutions could make decisions independently 
without being restrained by Japan. For another, the Nanjing government 
was also highly concerned about the autonomy in currency affairs. In its 
currency reform in 1935, although Japan strongly hoped that the legal 
tender (法幣) could be linked to the Japanese yen, China decided to link it to 
the British pound and US dollar in order to ensure that economic policies 
were not restricted by Japan.  
   Third, China strived for the assistance of Western powers, especially 
Britain and the United States. And this is mainly reflected in the case of 
the Nanjing government. China’s currency system was changed decisively 
in 1935. The Nanjing government decided to abandon the silver-standard 
and adopted the managed currency system. In this process, China earned 
huge supports from Britain and America, and the legal tender was linked 
to the sterling and then dollar. It ensured the success of this reform and the 
stability of the new legal tender. 102  Therefore, China’s economic 
cooperation with Britain and America has accelerated a lot, especially in 
the exports of industry products and capital. As one of the most critical 
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fuses of this currency reform, the assassination of Wang Jingwei in 
November 1935 has dramatically strengthened the critical attitudes 
towards the Non-resistance policy. Also, the currency reform reflected the 
changes in China’s diplomatic routes, which transferred from “Compromise 
to Japan”(対日妥協)to “Cooperation with Britain and America” (英米提携).103 
Japan came to realize that China’s currency system has become a core 
issue of the East Asian economic war, and a major variable to influence the 
peace and war (治乱) in East Asia.104 
 
2.2 Sources of Thailand’s Currency Power 
   From January to June in 1942, Thailand’s urgent economic problems 
were the massive loss of dollar, pound reserves and access to western 
markets, as well as Japan’s requirement for a sharp depreciation of the 
baht to coincide with Japan’s “Greater East Asia Financial Sphere (大東亜金
融圏)” policy. At this time, Thailand seemed to be in a desperate situation in 
the currency and financial fields, but how did Thailand change the passive 
position and find ways to exercise its currency power? This dissertation 
points out three critical sources of power. 
   First, Thailand also strived to maintain its autonomy in currency 
affairs, and it was reflected in the rise of Thailand’s economic nationalism. 
As mentioned above, Thailand firmly opposed any Japanese advisers or 
key personnel entering the newly formed Bank of Thailand, so as to ensure 
its independence on financial affairs.105 And the first governor of Bank of 
Thailand Prince Viwat said that this central bank was set up to protect the 
Thai economy against Japanese pressure. “As the establishment of central 
banks was the means by which Japan exercised control over the economies 
of most of the countries it occupied,” thus the Bank of Thailand must be 
organized under Thai control.106 Also, Prime Minister Phibun said that 
“we should move a step forward and bring the control of Thailand’s 
commerce from foreign to Thai hands.”107 
   Second, Thailand has maintained an ingenious balance between 
military cooperation and economic non-cooperation. On the one hand, 
Thailand maintained military cooperation with Japan and promoted 
combined operations ( 協 同 作 戦 ) with the Japanese army. 108  The 
Japan-Thailand Combined Cooperation Agreement stimulated that the 
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Japanese army was allowed to pass through the territory of Thailand, and 
provided many conveniences for Japan, including aviation, air defense, 
transportation, communications, meteorological detection, factory facilities, 
anti-spy, and intelligence sharing. 109  On this basis, Thailand could 
maintain its sovereignty and reputation and became the only sovereign 
independent state in Southeast Asia.110 Therefore, in order to ensure 
Thailand’s military cooperation, Japan tended to make some compromises 
in the economy. And this is why Thailand was able to actively and 
aggressively negotiate economic relations with Japan at the beginning of 
the Pacific War.111 
   Third，Thailand has keenly noted the changes of international situation. 
After entering the Second World War, the characteristics of the world 
economy has changed to “bloc economy, the disappearance of free trade, 
and severe trade restrictions.”112 “A pattern of blocs and linkages formed 
the basis for the wartime economy” and many states adopted a strict 
foreign exchange management policy, which featured some kind of 
“inconvertibility”.113 During this period of time, two competing currency 
blocs emerged: the yen bloc and the gold-dominated states (金支配国家). 
Therefore, Japan was very worried about Thailand’s financial relations 
with America and other gold-dominated states. Such an international 
situation gave Thailand the possibility to use hedging strategies. Thailand 
maintained relationships with two competitive currency blocs 
simultaneously, and refused to cut off currency relations with either of 
them completely. 
 
3. Counterbalancing Policy: Definition and China’s Choice 
3.1 The Definition of Counterbalancing Policy 
   In this dissertation, the counterbalancing policy means to balance (or 
offset) other’s economic advantages by making use of currency relations to 
change the unbalanced or abnormal economic situation. The 
counterbalancing policy tends to be risk-neutral, and hopes to balance the 
influence or reduce the benefits of its opponents. In addition, it always has 
some longer-term policy implications and hopes to cultivate competitive 
domestic industries in certain domains. 
   In Oxford English Dictionary, the word counterbalance means “to weigh 
against; to counterpoise; to balance or neutralize the effect by a contrary 
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power or influence.”114 However, the counterbalancing act can be divided 
into “hard balancing” and “soft balancing”, and this dissertation 
emphasizes more on the soft balancing.115 The counterbalancing policy 
refers to use “non-military tools to delay, frustrate and undermine” strong 
states, especially by some economic statecrafts.116 Paul supplements that 
counterbalancing policy “refers to the restraint of a threatening power 
using institutions, limited ententes and economic sanctions to delegitimize 
its policies.”117  
   Under the logic of counterbalancing policy, weak states try to avoid 
direct conflicts with strong states and by adopting economic or other soft 
policies. This policy has lower strategic expectations and lower 
ambitions.118 And the counterbalancing behavior is mainly manifested in 
the domestic or limited international field. The exercise of this policy 
mainly includes three stages. 
   First, it is necessary to find out the underlying reasons for the economic 
advantages of opponents. Their economic advantages may come from a 
particular policy, institution, organization, or some changes in the 
international situation. Therefore, the most important thing is to find the 
reason and then try to change it. In the case of Zhang Xueliang, he realized 
that the key to Japan’s economic advantage in Manchuria was the South 
Manchurian Railway, so he always focused on how to weaken this 
organization. In the case of Nanjing Government, Chiang Kai-shek also 
realized that the key of Sino-Japanese economic competition in Asia lay in 
Japan’s dumping policy, so he concentrated on how to reduce Japan’s 
benefits under its preferred dumping policies. For the weak states, their 
financial resources and risk resistance capacities are all limited, so they 
can only set up goals and policies more precisely and finitely through 
looking for these underlying reasons. 
   Second, it is crucial to think about how to make use of currency 
relations to counterbalance the advantages of the opponents. For weak 
states, it is difficult for them to exercise currency power like strong states, 
so they need to find some indirect or modest ways.119 They usually take 
two approaches: one is to regulate international currency relations through 
their own currency reforms, and the other is to search for opportunities in a 
changing international financial market. For one, currency reforms always 
refer to a re-adjustment of the exchange rate relations between two states, 
and the exchange rate relations will further affect competition policies. 
However, there is also a risk here, namely whether the reformed currency 
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system can maintain its credit and stability. For another, the changes in 
international financial markets can help to break the status quo and may 
create some opportunities which are favorable for weak states. Especially 
in the era of the commodity money system, the changes of gold and silver 
prices have profoundly affected the economic relations among related 
states.120  
   Third, while counterbalancing the advantages of the opponents, it is 
also important for weak states to cultivate strength and competitiveness, 
as the window of opportunity will not last long for them. As currency policy 
is closely related to industrial policy, weak states can take advantage of 
changes in international currency relations to promote their industrial 
development strategies.121 An under-valued currency is good for 
export-oriented strategy, so the export sectors and some supported 
industries will benefit from this strategy. An over-valued currency is good 
for import-substituting strategy, and the import-substitution sectors and 
the protected industries will benefit from this strategy.122 It is reflected in 
the two Chinese cases. Zhang Xueliang and Chiang Kai-shek not only 
wanted to counterbalance the economic pressure of Japan, but also hoped 
to take the opportunity to develop China’s domestic industries and 
accumulated economic strength. 
   The countries which adopt counterbalancing policies are usually 
risk-neutral. Therefore, they always avoid excessive damage to the 
interests of their opponents’ interests, but at the same time they will not 
easily give up their current policies. These states usually have a relatively 
clear goal. Compared with the magnitude of the risks, they pay more 
attention to whether their anticipated goals can be achieved. They will not 
pursue economic survival through constant concessions, because they have 
more pursuits beyond survival. 
 
3.2 China’s Choice to Use Counterbalancing Policy 
   From the late 1920s to mid-1930s, the confrontation in Sino-Japanese 
economic relations has risen rapidly, and there were even some extreme 
opinions for breaking off all bilateral economic relations with Japan(経済絶
交).123 Some famous Chinese newspapers, such as News (新聞報), Times (時
報), Business Monthly (商業月報) and Bank Weekly (銀行週報), gave a detailed 
description of this anti-Japanese economic movement. Many Chinese 
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industries have expressed their determinations to cut off economic 
relations with Japan and established a committee to issue related plans 
and outlines.124 
   However, this movement did not develop as easily as expected. For one, 
after the fierce anti-Japanese movement from 1927 to 1928, the trade 
volume between China and Japan has not decreased but has increased 
substantially.125 In some places, Chinese businesspeople who sold 
Japanese products even came into fierce conflicts with anti-Japanese 
citizens. So it could not be ignored that Japan had long been China’s 
largest trading partner and far surpassed Britain and the United States. 
Also, China’s exports to Japan were mainly raw materials, but imports 
from Japan were mainly industrial manufactured goods.126 Therefore, 
although the sentiment of boycotting Japanese goods was very high, it was 
not realistic to cut off the economic relations with Japan in the short term.  
   For another, the Nanjing Government also seemed not in favor of this 
radical boycott movement. The Chinese Ministry of Industry and 
Commerce said in one telegram, “the fundamental policy is to improve the 
level of domestic products, and the Ministry is working on a plan to 
promote domestic products. The actions towards foreign countries should 
be beneficial to reality, which means to avoid radical behaviors.”127 
Moreover, the Executive Yuan of Republic of China issued a document to 
every provincial government requesting to stop checking and detaining 
Japanese goods in order to avoid diplomatic disputes.128 It indicated the 
Nanjing government’s principle of not expanding the conflicts. 
   Therefore, it might be a better choice for China to think about how to 
slow down Japan’s aggression and control over the Chinese economy and 
revitalize its domestic industries at the same time. This policy goal was 
consistent with the logic of the “counterbalancing policy.” So China was 
trying to avoid direct confrontation with Japan and looked for other 
economic tools to weaken Japan, which seemed like soft balancing. 
   Based on this logic, China had tried to negotiate with Japan to recover 
its tariff autonomy since 1928, so as to reverse the unbalanced economic 
competition between China and Japan.129 However, the negotiations did 
not go on so well. Although China and Japan concluded a tariff agreement 
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on May 6, 1930, Japan imposed many additional conditions and demanded 
that the tariffs for many items should remain unchanged for three years. 
In addition, China gave preferential tariffs on many Japanese goods. 
During this period, the average tariffs for Japanese exports to China were 
between 7.5% and 17.5%, but the average tariffs for Chinese products 
exported to Japan were around 70%. Many scholars believed that this tariff 
agreement was only beneficial to Japan and did not help to protect Chinese 
domestic industries.130 Therefore, as another important means to balance 
trade and economic relations, the exchange rate or currency relation 
became another focus for China’s leaders. Both Zhang Xueliang and the 
Nanjing government hoped to counterbalance Japan’s economic invasion 
and control through currency means.  
 
4. Hedging Strategy: Definition and Thailand’s Choice 
4.1 The Definition of Hedging Strategy  
   In this dissertation, hedging strategy refers to maintain relationships 
with two competitive currencies or currency blocs simultaneously, and 
refuse to cut off currency relations with either of them completely. The 
hedging strategy tends to be risk-avoidance, and it hopes to increase the 
freedom of action or reduce vulnerability in a changing situation. 
Furthermore, it may acquire some side-payments by adopting this strategy. 
   Kuik Cheng-Chwee points out that that “the notion of risks is the key to 
understanding hedging as a human behavior…in the realm of 
international politics, risks can be categorized into three major genres: 
security, economic and political…these risks are especially harmful to 
small states, and in part because they lack resources to absorb structural 
shocks”.131 It indicates that the states which take hedging strategy tend to 
be risk-avoidance since they are extremely vulnerable. Evelye Goh further 
argues that hedging is “defined as a set of strategies aimed at avoiding a 
situation in which states cannot decide upon more straightforward 
alternatives such as balancing, bandwagoning, or neutrality. Instead they 
cultivate a middle position that forestalls or avoids having to choose one 
side at the obvious expense of another.” 132  Unlike strong states, the 
objective of these weak states is not to strive for more benefits, but to 
reduce losses as much as possible. 
   Kei Koga introduces six types of hedging by a different combination of 
“balancing” and “bandwagoning”: namely economic hedging, diplomatic 
hedging, conventional hedging, politico-military hedging, soft hedging and 
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security hedging. 
 
 Economic balancing 
 
Military balancing Diplomatic balancing 
Economic 
bandwagoning 
—— Conventional 
hedging 
Soft hedging 
Military 
bandwagoning 
Economic hedging —— Security hedging 
Diplomatic 
bandwagoning 
Diplomatic hedging Politico-military 
hedging 
—— 
Table 5 Types of Hedging
133 
   According to this chart above, a hedging strategy must be a combination 
of cooperative and competitive factors.134 On the one hand, the weak states 
can acquire a “re-assurance” by adopting cooperative attitudes, especially 
in security or economic aspects.135 On the other hand, they may also get 
some side payments by showing some competitive attitudes. For weak 
states, it is necessary to guarantee that the cooperation is more than the 
competition, and the competitive factors do not exceed the tolerance of the 
strong states.  
   So how does this hedging strategy work? First, the most important 
thing is to send mixed signals. 136  In actual operations, since the 
transmission of “competitive” signals tends to be more clear and powerful 
than “cooperative” signals, it is necessary to control the balance between 
these two signals.137 Weak states mainly use three kinds of signals to 
exercise their hedging strategies in currency relations, namely currency 
peg, reserve currency, and payment currency. Currency peg refers to an 
exchange rate policy that central banks may peg their currencies to a 
single foreign currency or a basket of currencies.138 Reserve currency is “a 
currency that is held in significant quantities by many governments and 
institutions as part of their exchange reserves,” and it has close relations 
with the choice of the currency peg.139 Then the payment currency is the 
currency used in actual international payments. These three signals can 
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adequately reflect the degree of currency cooperation and economic 
relations between two countries. For weak countries, they generally avoid 
releasing the same signals in all three aspects, because a mixed signal is a 
better choice. 
   Second, the weak states will actively strive for the best results through 
negotiations. They will make up a reasonable goal for themselves, and will 
not let their desires exceed their capacities. Generally, their demands can 
be easily met by strong states, and these strong states are willing to give 
these favors in exchange for their support. In return, weak states may 
release some cooperation signals: such as pegging with this currency, 
increasing the share of this currency in reserves, or using this currency 
more in international payments. Weak states do not pose a strategic threat 
to others, so it is easy for them to get compromises from strong states when 
they take a low profile. Moreover, this phenomenon will be more apparent 
when great power competition intensifies, because these great powers are 
spare no effort to win the support of weak states. 
   Third, in some cases, the demands of a weak state are not only to reduce 
losses, but also to serve its country’s development strategy. Murashima Eiji 
made a detailed study of Thai-Japanese negotiations on military expenses 
from 1942 to 1944. He argues that Thailand mainly requested for Japan’s 
aid of machines since 1943, which aimed for recovering and developing its 
economy.140 Thailand even hoped to build a self-sufficient economy and 
became the economic center of Southeast Asia.141 However, these requests 
were obviously too high and ultimately failed to realize. 
 
4.2 Thailand’s Choice to Use Hedging Strategy 
   Some academic studies use flexible diplomacy or bamboo diplomacy to 
describe Thailand around the Pacific War.142 It can be seen as a 
manifestation of Thailand’s hedging strategy, which flexibly adjusts its 
relations between Japan and Anglo-American influence. In existing studies, 
this hedging strategy seems to be more apparent in 1941 or after 1942. 
However, Thailand’s hedging strategy in 1942 might be ignored to a certain 
extent. 
   In 1941, Thailand actively used the hedging strategy before the Pacific 
War. On the one hand, Thailand was reported to sign a secret military 
agreement with Britain and America in January 1941, and the articles 
included: “Thailand agrees to cooperate with Britain and America for the 
protection of their common interests; if Thailand is invaded, Britain and 
America will give military assistance; Britain and America recognize the 
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neutrality of Thailand; Britain and America will assist Thailand to recover 
lost territories from Indochina, and so on.”143 This message indicated that 
Britain and America made great efforts to draw Thailand into the orbit of 
the Anglo-American powers.144 On the other hand, Japan clearly stated 
that Thailand would not play into the hands of Britain and America. Japan 
“tried to call the attention of Thai people to their obligations in the East 
Asia Mutual Co-prosperity Sphere, and the Far East should stand on its 
own feet, and needed an immediate drive against the joint Anglo-American 
offensive.”145 Therefore, both sides were fighting for Thailand’s support 
fiercely, which provided a window of opportunity for hedging. For one, 
Thailand developed secret relations with both sides. For another, Thailand 
government issued a communique in June, which stated that “Thailand 
will stand firm to the policy of good and equal friendship with all countries, 
and Thailand has not been subjected to the pressure from any country.”146 
As a result, Thailand maintained its vague stance and avoided making 
choices between the two powers. 
   Then after 1942, Thailand began to aware that Japan might not win the 
war, and Thailand would suffer a lot from its alliance with Japan. So the 
Prime Minister Phibun turned to a “non-cooperation” (対日非協力) policy 
towards Japan since 1943.147 Moreover, his successor Pridi began to 
establish a “two-track diplomacy,” which “developed secret communication 
with Britain, the United States and China” while maintaining its military 
alliance with Japan.148    
   In the above two periods, the primary purpose of Thailand's hedging 
strategies was to hedge its risks in security and diplomatic fields. As a 
result, Thailand not only maintained its sovereign independence during 
the wartime, but also avoided the punishment of being a defeated country 
after the war. However, it should be noted that Thailand also actively used 
the hedging strategy at the beginning of the Pacific War, namely in 1942. 
And its main goal was to hedge the economic risks brought by the war and 
Japanese-Thai alliance.    
   Although Thailand signed a military alliance treaty with Japan on 
December 21, 1942, the currency cooperation between the two countries 
has progressed very slowly. The root cause was that Thailand was 
concerned about the risks of being fully integrated into the Japanese yen 
bloc. One risk was whether the Japanese yen would remain strong and 
stable. The other risk was whether its economy would be entirely 
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controlled by Japan and became Manchukuo-ized. Therefore, the most 
effective means was to maintain potential relations with gold-dominated 
states. First, no matter how the banknotes and bills of exchange develop, 
gold reserves are still necessary.149 So it could help to maintain the credit 
of Thai baht. For another, it would make Japan worry about the potential 
links between Thailand and the Anglo-American powers, thus made some 
economic concessions in exchange for Thailand’s “firm” support and 
commitment. 
   This policy choice of Thailand was manifested to some extent in 
December 1941. The Minister of Finance Phya Manaca Raja Sevi moved 
the first reading of the bill to amend the Currency Act. He stated that the 
Thai government was desirous of minting gold coins in order to maintain 
the country’s finance on a sound and stabilized basis.150 So it is not 
difficult to understand why Thailand did not choose to peg the baht to the 
Japanese yen, but instead restored the gold standard system in February 
1942. 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
149
 森七郎（1986）『日本通貨制度論』文人書房、224 頁。 
150
 “The National Assembly: Gold Coins for Thailand”, The Bangkok Times: Weekly Mail, 1941.12.06, p.23. 
45 
 
Chapter 3 
Gold-Silver Ratio and Zhang Xueliang’s Economic Policies 
before Manchurian Incident (1928~1931) 
 
 
1. Japan’s Advantages in Manchurian Economy    
1.1 Japan’s Control of Manchurian Economy via South Manchuria Railway 
   In 1890, Japan’s Prime Minister Yamagata pointed out that, “a state’s 
independence and self-defense includes the sovereignty line (主権線) and 
the interest line (利益線). It is not sufficient just to defend the sovereignty 
line, and we must also advance to the interest line.”151 It became the 
theoretical basis of the later Continental Policy and the Greater East Asia 
Co-Prosperity Sphere. From Manchurian Incident to the aggression in 
Southeast Asia, Japan’s military strategy advanced step by step.  
   In Japan’s Manchurian policy, the most important institution was the 
South Manchuria Railway which was established in 1906. Its functions 
were similar to Britain’s East India Company, which aimed to implement 
Japan’s continental policy by local surveys, railway constructions and 
economic development in the South Manchuria Railway Zone (満鉄附属
地).152  Under the supervision of the Japanese government, the South 
Manchuria Railway strived to control railways, mines, ports and industries 
in Northeast China, and further expanded its command on administration, 
politics, and education in this region.153 
   By the end of the 1920s, Manchuria’s control and advantages over 
Manchuria’s economy were mainly reflected in the following three aspects: 
control of transportation routes; control of minerals and resources along 
the railways; supporting Japanese merchants and promoting the dumping 
of Japanese goods.154 
   First, the so-called Manchuria-Mongolian railway network had always 
been the focus of the previous Japanese administrations. By 1923, the total 
length of Manchurian railway network was only 2555 miles, which was 
controlled by China, Japan and Russia. The South Manchuria Railway 
believed that the railway network in Manchuria was developing slowly, 
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and the railway density was only one-tenth of that of mainland Japan, 
which was not conductive to the economic development in this region. 
Therefore, it was necessary to vigorously promote the construction of 
Manchurian railway network. The “Promotion of the 
Manchurian-Mongolian Railway Network” stated that it was urgent to 
accelerate a 720-miles railway construction plan, which included Taoqi 
Line, Changfu Line, Kaichao Line, Jihui Line and Baikai Line.155 Since 
the early 1920s, Japan successively constructed the Zhengtong Line, 
Zhengtao Line, Taoang Line under the loans from the Industrial Bank of 
Japan, Bank of Korea and Bank of Taiwan.156 
   After obtaining understanding and cooperation from Feng Warlord 
leader Zhang Zuolin (張作霖), Japan’s railway plan had been promoted 
continuously. By the end of 1930, the proportion of railways in the 
Manchuria was as follows: 
Unit: kilometer 
Country Line Length Proportion 
Japan 8 2,340 37% 
Soviet Union 2 1,790 28% 
China 11 1,407 26% 
Britain 1 523 9% 
Total 22 6,304 100% 
Table 6 the Proportion of Different Railways in Manchuria157 
   It seems that Japan maintained a dominant position in Manchurian 
railway network during this period, especially in South Manchuria. 
However, Japan also strived to absorb cargo transportation in North 
Manchuria by paying lots of shipping rebates. Japan transported the goods 
in North Manchuria to Changchun (長春) by large carriages (馬車) and then 
continued transporting through the South Manchurian Railway.158 At the 
same time, the SMR also promoted the water-land transshipment through 
its controlled Dalian (大連) Port and Yingkou (営口) Port.159 Moreover, 
Japan has built the Ganjingzi (甘井子) Port, which specialized in the 
transportation of coal. 160  It helped Japan absorb more cargo 
transportation for international trade and further damage the railways 
controlled by China and Soviet Union. Therefore, the SMR began to occupy 
the dominant position in both land and water transportation. 
   Second, Japan acquired the control of minerals and resources along the 
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railways. According to the statistics, the South Manchuria Railway also 
invested heavily in mining, which was second only to railways in terms of 
total investment.161 The main mining minerals included coal, oil shale, 
iron, aluminum, gold, copper and clay minerals.162     
   The coal mines operated by the SMR mainly included Fushun (撫順) 
Mine, Yantai (煙台) Mine and Fuxin (阜新) Mine, which contained more than 
900 million tons of coal reserves. In addition, there were more than 5 
billion tons of oil shale reserves in Fushun Mine, which could be further 
processed into heavy oil, paraffin, volatile oil and other important 
products.163 The Japanese Army and Navy also actively cooperated with 
the SMR to strengthen research and development of oil shale, which aimed 
to ensure a stable energy supply for Japan.164 As a whole, these raw 
materials were important strategic resources for Japan who was about to 
enter the wartime economy.  
   Besides, it is also worth mentioning that the SMR tried to control iron 
mines and iron industry, especially the Anshan (鞍山) Iron Mine. Within the 
radius of 16 kilometers of Anshan Iron-Smelting Institute, there was an 
extremely rich iron ore reserve. 165  In cooperation with Zhang Zuolin, 
Japan successfully purchased 13,724,558 square meters of land in 1917 
and 1,199,513 square meters in 1918, which aimed for the development of 
iron industry.166 With the continuous improvement of smelting technology, 
the iron production expanded largely when entered into the 1920s, which 
was showed in the chart below: 
Unit：ton 
Year Pig Iron production Iron Coke production 
1919 31,600 73,100 
1920 75,300 107,000 
1921 57,200 86,200 
1922 66,747 78,900 
1923 73,460 101,400 
1924 94,501 141,500 
1925 89,675 116,600 
1926 106,327 217,100 
1927 192,890 —— 
Table 7 Annual production of Anshan Iron-Smelting Institute167 
   Third, the SMR also strongly supported Japanese merchants and 
promoted the dumping of Japanese goods, including building lots of 
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commerce museums, trade centers and importer associations.168 In 1916, 
Japan promoted the establishment of Changchun ( 長 春 ) commerce 
museum, which was one of the most important commerce museum directly 
managed by the SMR. In addition to this, there were also Tieling (鉄嶺) and 
Jinzhou (錦州) commerce museums.169   
   At the same time, Japan also issued subsidies to various chambers of 
commerce to help Japanese businesspeople make better economic decisions, 
including Dalian, Changchun, Andong, Fengtian, Yingkou, Harbin and 
Tieling. Since 1927, according to the policy of the new president Yamamoto 
Jotaro, the SMR would vigorously expand the sales of Japanese goods and 
strengthen the commercial strength of Japan, especially by setting up lots 
of trade centers. And these trade centers greatly promoted the 
development of Japanese business in Manchuria.170 
   Besides, the SMR actively promoted the establishment of importer 
associations since 1928, thereby bringing together Japanese retailers to 
promote the import of Japanese goods. These associations could promote 
the convenience of transportation and reduced purchasing price. Moreover, 
it could help drive the rationalization of store layout and total amount of 
sales.171 From 1928 to 1930, a total of 17 importer associations were 
established, covering cities and towns in Manchuria. With the support of 
the SMR, these organizations quickly occupied the Chinese market and 
severely hit China’s domestic goods and enterprises. 
 
1.2 Zhang Zuolin’s Independence Awareness and the Origin of 
Counterbalancing Policy 
   The South Manchuria Railway quickly expanded its economic influence 
in Manchuria, and it was inseparable from the support of Feng Warlord 
Zhang Zuolin. However, after Zhang announced the autonomy of the three 
Northeast provinces (聯省自治 ) in 1922, his sense of independence 
intensified rapidly. Zhang announced in May 1922 that “all political affairs 
in the three Northeast provinces should be dominated by themselves. All 
the railways should be managed by the governor of the three Northeast 
provinces. And any claims for railway rights will not be recognized.”172 
Therefore, while maintaining cooperation with SMR, Zhang Zuolin began 
to promote the so-called “self-built and self-operated” railway plan. By 
1926, the authorities of three Northeast provinces had officially proposed 
their own railway construction plans.173 
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   At the same time, Japan began to express concern about Zhang Zuolin’s 
attitudes since the mid-1920s, and criticizing Zhang’s lack of 
understanding and sincerity in Japan’s interests in Manchuria.174 While 
cooperating with Japan, Zhang Zuolin always paid attention to retaining 
the possibility for recovering China’s benefits and rights (利権回収) in the 
future, and it became more and more obvious and aggressive since the 
mid-1920s.175 The Japanese side also began to recognize that these were 
not accidental incidents, but a systematic plan under the manipulation of 
Zhang Zuolin. 176  Also, it could be considered as the origin of the 
counterbalancing policy. 
   During this period, Zhang Zuolin’s counterbalancing policy also focused 
on offsetting the control of the SMR, especially in railway issues. In 1924, 
the Northeast Three Provinces Transportation Committee (東三省交通委員会) 
was established, and it stipulated that “all transportation agencies and 
projects in the three Northeast provinces should be managed by this 
committee.”177 Then by 1926, a total of 17 railways were being built or to 
be built, including Taoang Line, Fenghai Line, Kaihai Line, Jinchao Line, 
Chaochi Line, Chaore Line, Datong Line, Tongkai Line, Changfu Line, 
Fushi Line, Jidun Line, Huhai Line, Mihai Line, Ninghai Line, Fuyu Line, 
Sanyi Line and Binhei Line.178 Among them, the railways which were fully 
funded and managed by the Chinese have increased a lot. 
   And it was worth mentioning that the construction of the Fenghai (奉海) 
Railway, which was the first independent trunk railway in the Northeast 
China. Its construction started in 1925, and ended in September 1927. The 
SMR carefully calculated that it would result in a direct loss of 
approximately 360,000 yen per year.179 In addition to economic losses, it 
would also lead to the transfer of goods and minerals to the Fenghai 
Railway, and further weaken the influence of the transportation route of 
“South Manchurian Railway-Dalian Port”, which might cause a permanent 
damage for Japan. 
   In addition, it is also necessary to pay attention to the construction of 
the Jihai (吉海) Railway, which started in June 1927. The SMR was very 
sensitive and resentful to this railway. Because once the Jihai railway was 
opened, it would cooperate with the Fenghai Railway as a trunk line 
connecting Fengtian Province and Jilin Province. These two railways 
would be in parallel with the South Manchurian Railway and would 
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largely dilute the influence of the SMR.180 Moreover, the Jihai Railway 
completely abandoned Japan’s loans and fully adopted Chinese funds.181 
   From the correspondence between the Feng warlords and the Nanjing 
Government, the Datong ( 打 通 ) Railway also triggered a strong 
dissatisfaction in Japan.182 The Datong Railway was not only a parallel 
line with South Manchurian Railway, but also facilitated the direct 
connection between South and North Manchuria.183 The SMR believed 
that Zhang Zuolin’s purpose was to prevent the SMR’s influence from 
expanding westward and to strive for the control of transportation in the 
northern and western Manchuria.184 
   With the advancement of “self-built and self-operated railways”, Zhang 
Zuolin also hoped to promote the development of mining and other 
industries along the railways, which seemed to further damage Japan’s 
core interests in Manchuria gradually. In a document called “Industry 
Revitalization in Three Northeast Provinces”, Zhang Zuolin mainly 
emphasized four key points as follows: 
 
(1) Adding more mining supervisors, and preparing 15 million yuan for 
developing state-owned mines. 
(2) Adding more industry supervisors, and rewarding Chinese domestic 
industries.  
(3) Adding more railway supervisors, and promoting the construction 
of railway network. 
(4) Preparing 5 million yuan to build a training factory to cultivate the 
craftsmanship of the unemployed and the nomads.185 
 
   Furthermore, the Fengtian Provincial Government proposed the policy 
of “rewarding domestic products” in 1925, which was interpreted by Japan 
as a move for Japan-bashing and boycotting Japanese goods.186 At the 
same time, Zhang Zuolin was also preparing to set up industrial promotion 
associations and industrial funds in the three Northeast provinces to give 
strong support to the development of commerce, agriculture, fisheries, 
mining and forestry.187 
   However, Zhang Zuolin’s counterbalancing policy was almost limited to 
the conception, and there were tons of difficulties along the process. 
Moreover, the predominant thing was that Zhang lacked the means to 
effectively damage Japan and the South Manchuria Railway. Therefore, 
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while Zhang Zuolin’s anti-Japanese policies continued to escalate, Japan 
made a very strong response, namely the negotiations on new 
“Manchurian-Mongolian Five Railways (満蒙五鉄道)” since 1927. The final 
agreement stipulated that the SMR had the right to build five new 
railways, and China should shorten the length of its domestic railways and 
cooperate with the SMR on transportation.188 
   Therefore, the SMR consolidated its control over Manchuria. However, 
Zhang Zuolin was suddenly assassinated and his son Zhang Xueliang 
replaced him as the leader of the Feng warlords. Since 1929, major changes 
had taken place in the international financial market, which gave Zhang 
Xueliang a major opportunity to damage the SMR and Japan. He seized 
this opportunity and further developed the counterbalancing policy toward 
Japan. 
 
2. The Change of Gold-Silver Ratio since 1929 and Its Impacts  
2.1 The Change of Gold-Silver Ratio and Its impacts on the Railways  
   In the 1920s, gold and silver had different meanings. Gold was widely 
regarded as a “currency”, while silver was only considered as a 
“commodity”. However, China was still one of the few silver standard 
countries at that time, so it was necessary for Japan to consider the subtle 
changes in the “gold-silver ratio” when dealing with Sino-Japanese 
economic relations.189 
   Since the crash of silver price in 1929, the gold-silver ratio had also 
undergone major changes, which brought great challenges and 
opportunities for both Chinese and Japanese governments. At that time, 
the South Manchuria Railway adopted the gold notes standard (金円建て) in 
freight rates(運賃) settlement, while the Chinese railways adopted the 
silver standard. The crash of silver price led to a sharp decrease of freight 
rates in Chinese domestic railways, which caused a large number of 
transportation services to be transferred to Chinese railways network. In 
due course, it seriously hit the earnings of the SMR and put it into a 
dilemma of managing the current business model.190 Therefore, Zhang 
Xueliang viewed it as a crucial opportunity to fight against the South 
Manchuria Railway, and gradually transferred the de facto control of 
transportation, economy and industry back to the hands of Chinese. 
   
Year 
 
1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 
Gold-Silver Ratio 
 
29.38 32.88 36.22 35.26 38.24 53.38 71.30 
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Table 6 the Changes of Gold-Silver Ratio from 1925 to 1931191 
 
   The South Manchuria Railway had always been influenced by silver 
price changes since its establishment.192 However, there had been no such 
sharp silver price fluctuations like 1929. As mentioned above, it made the 
freight rates of Japanese railways increase rapidly. The farmers and 
enterprises in Northeast China began to use China’s state-owned railways 
to transport agricultural products and minerals. At that time, railway 
transportation, as well as ports and mines, accounted for around 63.5% of 
the total earnings of the South Manchuria Railway, so it has been damaged 
seriously and its profits had been significantly reduced.193 
 
Year Revenue (yen) Expense (yen) Profit (yen) 
1929 240,998,062.130 195,492,205.090 45,505,857.040 
1930 188,104,062.660 166,430,600.710 21,673,461.950 
1931 187,054,401.670 174,455,781.950 12,598,619.720 
1932 245,940,674.490 184,652,949.540 61,287,724.950 
Table 7 Revenues and Expenses of the South Manchuria Railway194 
 
   In addition, as Japan lifted the gold embargo in the early 1930, the 
gold-silver ratio continued to expand, which further reduced the 
competitive advantage of Japanese railways. The Consul Arakawa Mitsuo 
(荒川充雄) realized that this might be an important means for China to 
absorb freight and passenger transportation. Not only did China take 
advantage of changes in gold-silver ratio, it also took the initiative to 
further reduce the freight rates on its state-owned railways.195 Some 
employees of South Manchuria Railway also regarded it as China’s planned 
and organized action to oppress Japanese railways, causing them to end up 
with bigger deficits.196 
   In order to reduce costs, the South Manchuria Railway chose to take 
massive layoffs. In 1930, a total of 899 employees were laid off, and this 
figure further rose to 2014 in 1931.197 The reduction of personnel also 
began to weaken South Manchuria Railway’s control of the Northeast 
China.  
   During this period, the bilateral competition between the SMR and 
Chinese state-owned railways became highly obvious and fierce.198 This 
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competition was prominently manifested in two aspects: one was passenger 
and freight transportation, and the other was transportation routes. The 
passenger revenue of Japanese railways dropped by 34.3% in 1930 and 
continued to drop by 20.3% in 1931. Besides, the freight income of 
Japanese railways dropped by 22.9% in 1930 and continued to drop by 9% 
in 1931.199 More importantly, Zhang Xueliang continuously built his own 
branch lines and new ports, which was in an attempt to replace the 
water-land transshipment routes controlled by Japan.200 
   Consequently, Japan felt that its core interests in the Northeast China 
were seriously challenged Japan’s, and also realized that the key to this 
problem lay in the changes on gold-silver ratio and the freight rates gap 
between China and Japan. Therefore, Japan started to negotiate with 
Zhang Xueliang on the freight rates issue, but Zhang refused to make 
adjustments quickly. Shortly before the Manchurian Incident, Japan 
realized that the negotiations could not achieve any results, and 
announced that the South Manchuria Railway adopted the silver standard 
in its settlements.201 But in the end, Japan completely solved this problem 
through war.     
 
2.2 The Change of Gold-Silver Ratio and Its impacts on the Trade Relations  
   At that time, the Northeast Three Provinces was the main driving force 
for China’s export, which accounted for one-third of total national exports. 
And since 1920, the Northeast China had achieved a stable trade surplus. 
The details are in the table below: 
  Unit: haikwan tael (海関両) 
Year Import Export  Trade Surplus 
1911 94,797,846 103,733,492 +8,935,646 
1912 102,232,018 100,166,041 —2,065,977 
1913 125,683,660 113,041,999 —12,641,661 
1914 112,409,981 109,331,936 —3,078,045 
1915 108,111,646 130,084,502 +21,972,856 
1916 129,555,872 130,807,129 +1,251,257 
1917 158,562,010 161,120,501 +2,558,491 
1918 177,219,156 166,856,166 —10,362,990 
1919 231,303,593 212,008,762 —19,294,831 
1920 205,129,451 225,926,429 +20,796,978 
1921 218,187,674 234,407,892 +16,220,218 
1922 196,432,072 274,661,906 +78,229,834 
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1923 207,055,228 293,928,940 +86,873,712 
1924 200,648,460 269,018,093 +68,369,633 
1925 244,721,505 312,368,194 +67,646,689 
1926 276,840,619 370,742,398 +93,901,779 
1927 268,913,586 408,036,179 +139,122,593 
Table 8 Import and Export Trade Statistics of the Three Northeast Provinces
202 
   The import goods in the Northeast China mainly included cotton fabrics, 
steel, cigarettes, machines and sugar, and the main export goods were 
soybean, bean cake, coal, soybean oil, millet, sorghum and other 
agricultural products. The gold-silver ratio change was soon reflected in 
the import and export status in the Northeast China. At that time, the 
Chinese scholars were also discussing the challenges and potential 
opportunities for China’s foreign trade. 
   First, China’s import had suffered a serious decline. Since the Chinese 
market had been largely occupied by foreign goods, it led to a substantial 
increase in prices.203 Many Chinese importers went bankrupt, and the 
living cost for ordinary people also increased significantly.  
   Second, many people also stressed that the exchange rate decline was 
also a good opportunity to promote China’s export. The Northeast China 
accounted for one-third of China’s total exports, which indicated that there 
was much space to further develop its foreign trade in the future. Some 
government officials also proposed policies to reward exports, the 
representative of Heilongjiang (黒竜江) Provincial Government Lu Guangji 
( 盧広績 ) said we should took this opportunity to promote domestic 
production and reward exports. He put forward two specific 
recommendations: one was to reduce freight rates on all state-owned 
railways to promote exports; and the other was to reduce various taxes and 
fees in the export of Chinese products, so as to further enhance their 
competitiveness.204 The trade statistics of the Northeast China from 1929 
to 1931 is shown in the following table: 
Unit: haikwan tael (海関両) 
Year Import Export  Trade Surplus 
1929 322,402,597 422,873,301 +100,470,704 
1930 296,649,375 389,989,760 +93,340,385 
1931 218,948,972 473,868,941 +254,919,969 
Table 9 Import and Export Trade Statistics of the Three Northeast Provinces
205 
   As can be seen from the table above, due to the impact of the Great 
Depression, the export amount in 1929 and 1930 did not increase very 
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quickly. But in 1931, the exports of Northeast China increased significantly, 
and the reduction of imports was also very obvious. 
   However, the trade status in Japan was just the opposite, and many 
Japanese imports to Manchuria suffered great damage. The approximate 
reduction was shown in the table below: 
 
Reduction rate Items 
around 80% cotton fabrics, aquatic products, matches, cosmetics 
around 70% wheat, medicine, rayon, clothes 
around 60% ginseng, iron products, toys, lamps, umbrellas 
around 50% vegetables, canned food, paper, vehicles, ships 
around 40% dye, cotton thread 
around 30% Japanese sake, oil, wax, rubber tires, wood products 
around 20% ale, sulfuric acid 
around 10% cement 
Table 10 the Reduction Rate of Manchuria’s Main Imports from Japan206 
   As can be seen from the above table, the cotton textile industry received 
the most damage, while the cement industry was the least affected. 
Furthermore, the Sino-Japanese Tariff Agreement was also signed in 1930, 
which further increased Japan’s pressure in the export area. Therefore, 
some Chinese domestic enterprises began to supplement the vacancies left 
by Japanese companies.207 At the same time, China’s soybeans and cotton 
began to export to Japan in large quantities, contributing most of the trade 
surplus with Japan. 
   Therefore, although the gold-silver ratio change had some negative 
impact on the economy of Northeast China, it had greatly improved China’s 
trade conditions. Northeast China’s exports had seen significant growth 
since 1931, while Japan’s exports had seen a marked decline during this 
period. Moreover, it was also an important opportunity to develop Chinese 
domestic industries and enterprises, and then Zhang Xueliang introduced 
a series of policies to promote the realization of this goal. 
 
3. Zhang Xueliang’s Choice of Maintaining the Silver Standard System 
3.1 The Debate on Currency System and Zhang Xueliang’s Choice 
   It seemed that Zhang Xueliang unexpectedly got a policy tool to damage 
the SMR, but things were not so easy. While the falling silver price brought 
opportunities to Zhang Xueliang, it also brought a lot of economic problems. 
Indeed, the traditional silver standard system caused a significant level of 
economic losses for both international trade and currency exchanges at 
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that time, and many Qianzhuang(錢莊) and Yinhao(銀號) (old-style Chinese 
private banks) could not avoid a series of repeated bankruptcies in turns. 
At the same time, Japan tried to exploit this opportunity to stockpile a 
large amount of agricultural products from Northeast China.208  
   Therefore, at that time, there were a large number of voices in the 
Northeast China that required the abolition of the silver standard and the 
transition to the gold standard or gold-exchange standard. Ma Yingchu 
argued that the “the silver price will continue to fall, and it is difficult for 
China to raise the silver price by itself, so the only way to get rid of the 
current crisis is to adopt the gold-exchange standard and stabilize the 
currency as soon as possible.”209 And he also stressed the differences in 
each province, so “it is possible to take the lead in implementing the gold 
standard in the more economically advanced provinces, so that they can 
enjoy the benefits brought by the gold standard as soon as possible.”210 
What he referred to was the three Northeast provinces, because the export 
of these provinces accounted for one-third of the whole China, which was 
conducive to accumulating adequate foreign exchange reserves. 
   In addition, Zhang Jiulie also believes that it was necessary to switch to 
the gold standard as soon as possible. On the one hand, Northeast China 
was relatively developed in economy, and the amount of foreign trade was 
also extremely large, so it was appropriate to adopt the gold standard 
system. On the other hand, the choice of currency system should be 
consistent with the largest trade partner, so it was necessary for Northeast 
China to adopt the same gold standard system as its largest trade partner, 
Japan.211 And it should be noted that the Financial Consolidation 
Committee of Northeast Provinces of China (東三省金融整理委員会) published 
a report on the currency system, which systematically introduced the 
shortcomings of the silver standard system and the benefits of 
gold-exchange system, such as: 
 
(1) The drawback of the silver standard system is that the silver 
price is volatile. At present, all countries have used the gold standard 
system except China, which makes China’s international trade in a 
difficult situation. Therefore, the future currency system of the three 
Northeast provinces must not adopt the silver standard, and should 
no longer continue to follow the old rules. 
(2) The special benefits brought by the gold standard might be: stable 
international exchange; developed international trade; active foreign 
investment; facilitating the repayment of external debts and 
recovering the rights of railways and mines; ensuring the currency 
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stability and further expelling foreign currencies.  
(3) The advantages for Northeast China to adopt the gold standard 
system: the three provinces have already used gold and silver 
currencies simultaneously, so it is not difficult to adopt the gold 
standard system; the three provinces maintain the trade surplus 
status, so it is not necessary to accumulate a large amount of gold 
reserves; the circulating currencies in the three provinces are mostly 
banknotes, so it is easy to recall them; there is very little silver 
deposits in the three provinces, so it is not so hard to deal with them; 
there are many gold mines in the three provinces, so it will be more 
convenient for storing gold reserves.212 
 
   Therefore, it seems that it was necessary for the Northeast China to 
adopt the gold standard to solve the current economic dilemma. And Zhang 
Xueliang was also fully aware of the serious economic drawbacks 
fundamentally rooted from the existing silver standard system. However, 
he did not take an immediate action to change the silver standard system. 
On the contrary, he intentionally delayed Northeast China’s transition 
toward the gold standard and audaciously determined to accept the bad 
consequences caused by the crash of silver price. If so, why did Zhang 
Xueliang make this kind of irrational decision? Also, based on the same 
logical reasoning, why did he intend to delay the transformational process 
to the gold standard or the gold exchange standard system? 
   It could be concluded that Zhang Xueliang was faced with two difficult 
choices at that time: abandoning the silver standard so as to minimize the 
negative effects of falling silver prices, or maintaining the silver standard 
as a means to combat the South Manchuria Railway? The former option 
focused on maintaining the financial and currency stability in the 
Northeast China and solving the immediate difficulties. However, the 
latter emphasized the exclusion of foreign control and eliminated the 
structural obstacles for Chinese domestic industries. Indeed, the financial 
issue had long plagued the Feng Warlords since the 1920s, but Japan was 
obviously a bigger threat for Zhang Xueliang. Therefore, it might have 
been a better choice for him to maintain the silver standard and further 
weaken the SMR’s economic control over the Northeast China. 
   A document from the Liaoning Provincial Government clearly showed 
that China has already made freight rates as the main tool to fight against 
Japanese railways: 
 
   “China's state-owned railways face fierce competition from Japan, 
so China's freight rates should be lower than Japan's, thus they can 
have advantage in absorbing more transportation. It is an important 
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method to combat Japan. At the same time, low freight rates can also 
reduce the burden on Chinese businessmen and farmers, and further 
promote the development of China's industry and economy.”213 
        
   Zhang Xueliang realized that he unexpectedly possessed a tool in his 
policy tool box to counterbalance Japan’s economic control. Some public 
opinions also began to emphasize China’s big opportunity brought about by 
changes in gold-silver ratio.214 Besides, the Northeast Transportation 
Committee (東北交通委員会) further reduced freight rates and tariffs, and 
only charge 30% of the fare for farmers.215 Zhang Xueliang also 
emphasized that it was strictly prohibited to collect any additional charges 
or harsh taxes except legal freight rates.216 He paid close attention to the 
situation of the South Manchuria Railway and was determined to recover 
the counterbalancing policy originated from his father.217 
 
3.2 The Debate on Industrial Policy and Zhang Xueliang’s Choice 
   As mentioned above, the effects of gold-silver ratio change was twofold. 
Although it caused great harm to the Chinses economy, Zhang Xueliang 
flexibly made use of the gold-silver ratio change to counterbalance the 
influence of the South Manchuria Railway and further promoted his own 
railway construction plan. This part also emphasized the duality of 
gold-silver ratio change, especially in trade and industry policies. 
   The change of gold-silver ratio substantially reflected the fluctuation of 
China’s exchange rate. In addition to affecting railway incomes, another 
obvious impact was reflected in China’s trade and industrial policies. The 
silver prices seemed to be difficult to rise again in the short term, which 
meant that the Northeast China was likely to maintain a low level of 
exchange rate. This exchange rate change was reflected in Zhang 
Xueliang’s industrial policy and became another weapon to counterbalance 
Japan’s economic control over Northeast China. 
   The industrial policy is generally divided into two categories: the 
export-oriented strategy and import-substituting strategy. 218  The 
export-oriented strategy focuses on exports to international markets, 
especially those based on domestic resource endowments, then using the 
capital accumulated by foreign trade to develop other industries. Under 
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this strategy, the government is more inclined to depreciate the currency in 
order to gain an export advantage in the international market. 
   The import-substituting strategy focuses on protection and enhances 
the competitiveness of domestic products through policy measures such as 
tariffs and subsidies. It is conducive to the initial development of domestic 
products and related infant industries. Under this strategy, the 
government tends to choose a policy mix of currency appreciation and tariff 
protection.219 
   The details of these two industrial policies are shown in the table below: 
 
Industrial policy Policy tool Beneficiary 
department 
Exchange rate 
policy preference 
import-substituti
ng strategy 
Currency appreciation; 
Protection; 
Fiscal and financial 
supports to industry; 
Increasing loans 
import-substituting 
departments; 
protected industries; 
Manufacturers for 
the domestic market; 
Consumers  
Currency 
appreciation 
export-oriented 
strategy 
Currency depreciation; 
Selective liberalization; 
Financial and fiscal 
supports to export 
industry; 
Targeted industrial 
policies 
 
 
Export departments; 
Supported industries 
Currency 
depreciation 
Table 11 the Industrial Policy and Exchange Rate Preference
220
 
   Therefore, from the table above, there was nearly no possibility to exert 
import-substituting strategy in Northeast China. On the one hand, China 
had not yet achieved tariff autonomy and could not implement a protective 
economic policy. On the other hand, the Chinese currency was in a state of 
depreciation, which was not conducive to the acquisition of raw materials 
and intermediate products overseas. Therefore, an export-oriented strategy 
was more in line with the reality of the Northeast China. To a certain 
extent, the construction of Chinese railway network also helped to 
implement this export-oriented strategy. Moreover, the expansion of 
foreign trade could also help to accumulate capital for the development of 
domestic industries and enterprises. And it could also be viewed as a 
means of counterbalancing the influence of Japanese goods and Japanese 
companies. 
   After the crash of silver price, in addition to discussing the reform of 
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currency system, many people began to explore the industrial policies that 
Northeast China should adopt. A famous economist Dai Ailu stressed that 
“foreign goods have flooded the Chinese market, so the crash of silver price 
has led to rising domestic prices. However, at this time, China can use the 
low exchange rate to export large quantities of raw materials abroad and 
develop domestic industries. It can help to solve the current problems and 
might be the fundamental way out for the Chinese economy.”221 It was 
actually the prototype of the export-oriented strategy. 
   At the same time, some scholars also stressed that the export-oriented 
strategy should also be well managed and regulated. Zhu Binyuan said 
that, “the development of export trade should be moderate. For one, it is 
reasonable to speed up the export of some self-sufficient products, such as 
beans, silk and tea; for another, exports of essential goods should be 
prohibited, such as coal.” 222  He emphasized that it was also very 
significant to avoid the outflow of important strategic resources while 
promoting exports. 
   In addition, Zhu Jiayu emphasized five industries that should be paid 
special attention in the Northeast China: a large-scale soybean company; 
some mining companies; some paper-making factories; canned beef 
companies and some chicken farms. He believed that China had great 
advantages in these industries and could quickly establish a dominant 
position in these domains.223 
   Therefore, it was reasonable for Zhang Xueliang to adopt some kind of 
“export-oriented strategy” at the time, and Zhang did take a series of 
policies to develop domestic industries. And it could also help to 
counterbalance Japan’s economic control in this region. To a certain extent, 
it had also strengthened Zhang Xueliang’s determination to maintain the 
silver standard system, because it would not only promote the export in the 
short term, but also provide an opportunity for industrial development and 
upgrading. 
 
3.3 Zhang Xueliang’s Currency Reform and the Recover of 
Counterbalancing Policy  
   However, although Zhang Xueliang was faced with an unprecedented 
opportunity, he must reconsolidate the financial system on the basis of 
silver standard at first. Due to severe inflation and currency devaluation, 
many Chinese railway companies were unwilling to accept Fengpiao(奉票) 
and other Chinese silver banknotes in 1928.224 In addition, if the currency 
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continued to depreciate, Chinese export companies were also unprofitable 
in the international market. If it was still impossible to curb 
hyper-inflation, the advantages brought out by gold-silver ratio change 
would also be neutralized.  
   After taking office as the leader of the three Northeast provinces, Zhang 
Xueliang quickly discussed with Zhang Zuoxiang (張作相) about the means 
to consolidate the Fengpiao in 1928. The currency consolidation plan 
included seven aspects: 
 
(1) Issuing 10 million yuan of bonds as a fund for recalling the 
circulating Fengpiao. 
(2) Reorganizing the Provincial Bank of the Three Northeast Provinces 
(東三省官銀号) to the central bank of Northeast China, and further 
unifying the currency issuance. 
(3) Issuing a unified silver certificate (銀元券)within the three 
provinces, so as to replace various banknotes. 
(4) Zhang Zuolin’s legacy of 5 million yuan will be used as a reserve 
fund for the exchange of Fengpiao. 
(5) Establishing the Fengpiao Consolidation Committee. 
(6) Disarming 100,000 soldiers to reduce military expenses and 
currency issuance. 
(7) All public and private transactions will be mainly carried out by 
banknotes, and large-scale silver coin trading and speculation 
activities are strictly prohibited.225  
 
   The most noteworthy thing was the reorganization of the Provincial 
Bank of the Three Northeast Provinces in 1929, and it played an important 
role in the subsequent work on maintaining currency stability. The 
Liaoning Government226 drew up a proposed regulation to support the 
Fengpiao in June, especially emphasized “the Fengpiao should take a fixed 
price ratio with the silver dollar (50:1), and the Provincial Bank of the 
Three Northeast Provinces should prepare sufficient funds for recalling the 
excessive Fengpiao supply. The recalled banknotes will be burned down in 
Fengyutai (風雨台).” 227 In addition, the proposed regulation also stated 
that “the Fengpiao is the lifeline of Liaoning Province. And the government 
will spare no effort to maintain it at any circumstances.”228 
   At the same time, the Provincial Bank of the Three Northeast Provinces 
and three other bank giants also form a joint reserve fund to consolidate 
the credit of the silver banknotes. In addition, it was strictly forbidden to 
ship silver dollars out of the Northeast China, and any speculation 
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behavior would be severely punished.229  
   Zhang Xueliang’s measures had prevented the rapid decline in the 
credit of the Fengpiao, but the effects were still limited. Therefore, while 
maintaining the credit of Fengpiao, the new Joint Issuance Reserve Fund 
(聨合発行準備庫) also began to issue a new silver dollar (現大洋) exchange 
certificate in May 1929. According to the regulations of the Joint Issuance 
Reserve Fund, strict management and inspection would be implemented so 
as to ensure the credit of the new currency.230 For example, the issued 
exchange certificates needed to include 70% of the silver reserves and 30% 
of other asset reserves (article 4); all reserves needed to be supervised and 
inspected by bank branches, chambers of commerce and corporate bodies 
(article 6); all reserves are not allowed to be used for other purposes (article 
7); the Joint Issuance Reserve Fund should report to four member banks 
about the issuance amount and the reserve scale every week, and report to 
the Liaoning Provincial Government every month (article 16). These 
articles fully demonstrated the determination to stabilize the new 
currency. 
   In the first issuance, a total of 2 million yuan of silver dollar exchange 
certificates were issued, which were printed with “Three Northeast 
Provinces” (東三省) and “Joint Issuance Reserve Fund” on them.231 The 
silver reserves were 1.4 million yuan (70%), and other assets were 0.6 
million yuan (30%). Although the effects of the first issuance were not as 
fine as expected, the Liaoning provincial government strived to maintain 
the credit of the exchange certificate, and people’s understanding and 
expectation for the new currency gradually increased, so the next issuances 
were soon launched. 
   At the end of the 1929, a total of seven strict inspections were carried 
out on the Joint Issuance Reserve Fund. And they were showed as follows: 
 
 
 Date Issuance amount  Silver reserve Other assets 
1 1929.06.30 2,000,000 1,400,000 600,000 
2 1929.07.30 2,900,000 2,030,000 870,000 
3 1929.08.31 3,900,000 2,730,000 1,170,000 
4 1929.09.30 5,000,000 3,500,000 1,500,000 
5 1929.10.31 5,000,000 3,500,000 1,500,000 
6 1929.11.30 5,500,000 3,850,000 1,650,000 
7 1929.12.31 8,300,000 5,810,000 2,490,000 
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Table 12 Seven Inspections on the Joint Issuance Reserve Fund in 1929
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   In general, the Fund had implemented management of the reserves 
strictly, and the new currency basically maintained its credit and value. 
Some scholars even suggested making the silver dollar exchange certificate 
as the standard money, and Fengpiao as the fractional money, thus 
naturally eliminating the Fengpiao in circulation domain.233 It also means 
that Zhang Xueliang’s currency reform gradually transferred from 
“double-track approach” to “one-track approach”, and the silver dollar 
exchange certificate had replaced the Fengpiao as the core role in economic 
operation.234 At the same time, Japan also strengthened its attacks on the 
new dominating currency. For instance, some Japanese Exchanges strived 
to depress the value of the silver dollar exchange certificate, and encourage 
speculations on it.235 
   According to the twelve inspection reports in 1930 below, it could be 
seen that the reserve situation was relatively healthy and the size of the 
currency supply was still within acceptable limits. In 1930, the additional 
currency supply by the Joint Issuance Reserve Fund was mainly to 
subsidize the rural people and businesspeople, and the total issuance 
amount was strictly controlled within 15 million yuan.236 
 
 Date Issuance amount  Silver reserve Other assets 
1 1930.01.04 10,000,000 7,000,000 3,000,000 
2 1930.02.28 10,800,000 7,560,000 3,240,000 
3 1930.03.31 11,050,000 7,735,000 3,315,000 
4 1930.04.30 11,050,000 7,735,000 3,315,000 
5 1930.05.30 11,300,000 7,910,000 3,390,000 
6 1930.06.30 11,300,000 7,910,000 3,390,000 
7 1930.07.31 11,800,000 8,260,000 3,540,000 
8 1930.08.30 13,600,000 9,520,000 4,080,000 
9 1930.09.30 15,000,000 10,500,000 4,500,000 
10 1930.10.31 15,000,000 10,500,000 4,500,000 
11 1930.11.29 15,000,000 10,500,000 4,500,000 
12 1930.12.30 15,000,000 10,500,000 4,500,000 
Table 13 Twelve Inspections on the Joint Issuance Reserve Fund in 1930
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   By the 1930, Zhang Xueliang basically unified the financial system in 
Northeast China: 
 
(1) In official, private, and commercial sectors, the Northeast China 
has implemented the silver dollar (現大洋) standard system. 
(2) All the old local banknotes will be withdrawn and currency 
issuance will be unified.  
(3) The Provincial Bank of the Three Northeast Provinces will act as 
the national treasury (国庫) of Northeast China.238 
   
   In December 1930, the Liaoning Government issued the “Provisional 
Regulations on Finance Management in Liaoning Province”, which 
stipulated that “the silver dollar must be prohibited from leaving the 
province (article 1); the province’s finance is based on the silver dollar 
exchange certificates issued by the Provincial Bank of the Three Northeast 
Provinces and the Joint Issuance Reserve Fund (article 2); these exchange 
certificates can be redeemed and they should be strictly monitored by the 
provincial government (article 4).239 Therefore, it could be concluded that 
the financial consolidation and currency unification work in the three 
provinces had made great progress. 
   Zhang Xueliang promoted the currency unification on the basis of the 
silver standard system and then maintained financial stability in this 
region as a whole. It has curbed the growing trend of inflation and 
improved the credit and acceptance of Chinese silver banknotes, which 
created the basic conditions for China’s competition with Japanese 
railways. Under this basis, Zhang began to negotiate with Japan on 
railway issue, and gave full play of the currency power in this process. 
Moreover, a stable currency also provided the basis for Zhang Xueliang’s 
“export-oriented strategy”, which helped to drive export growth and the 
rise of specific industries. 
 
4. Counterbalancing Policy: the Railway Competition between China and 
Japan  
   As mentioned above, the change of gold-silver severely damaged the 
interests of the South Manchuria Railway. In addition, by effective 
currency reform, Zhang Xueliang curbed the growing inflation and 
improved the credit and acceptance of Chinese silver banknotes. 
Consequently, it caused a large number of transportation services to be 
transferred to Chinese railways network. Under such severe situation, the 
South Manchuria Railway offered to hold negotiations on railway issue 
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since January, 1931.240 Zhang Xueliang and Director Kimura Eiichi held 
several rounds of talks in Shenyang, but no consensus has been reached. 
Japan mainly had two concerns: first, Japan hoped to negotiate freight 
rates with China, so as to reduce the damage caused by the change of 
gold-silver ratio; second, Japan required China not to take this opportunity 
to develop its own railway plan and avoid challenging the core interests of 
the South Manchuria Railway in Northeast China.241 Facing with Japan’s 
aggressive attitudes, Zhang Xueliang did not want to reach an agreement 
with Japan too soon. He took a delay strategy during the negotiations and 
hoped to damage the SMR as long as possible.  
 
4.1 Delay Strategy in Freight Rates Negotiations 
   At that time, the president of SMR Sengoku Mitsugu appointed the 
Director Kimura Eiichi as the representative for the negotiations. He met 
with Zhang Xueliang for several times in early 1931 and conveyed the 
ideas of the SMR. 
   As mentioned above, the freight rates issue was the root cause of 
China-Japan railway competition, and the change of gold-silver ratio gave 
China a competitive advantage. Therefore, delay was the best strategy for 
China. As long as no agreement was reached, it would be a victory for 
China. 
   Some Japanese officials also seemed to be aware of this strategy. 
Consul-General Hayashi Kyujiro mentioned that, “Chinese representatives 
always talk about the current situation in an abstract manner without 
addressing specific issues.”242 Director Kimura clearly pointed out that 
Zhang Xueliang tried to avoid any talks, and his delay strategy (遷延策) 
undermined the vested interests of the South Manchuria Railway and 
intensified the opposition between China and Japan.243 
   Therefore, Japan proposed a detailed plan for dealing with the freight 
rates issue: 
 
   (1) The freight rates should be based on the currency of a third 
country. (American dollar) 
   (2) The freight rates must be negotiated in some districts. 
   (3) In principle, the freight rates and other fees should be kept the 
same amount in these districts. 
   (4) If it is necessary to reduce freight rates, China and Japan need 
to negotiate in advance.244 
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   From this plan, it was clear that Japan hoped to eliminate China’s 
advantage brought about by the change of gold-silver ratio. Japanese 
representatives also emphasized that it was precisely because of the 
change of gold-silver relations that has triggered the current problem, and 
China had the ability to make a proper adjustment to it. Chinese 
representatives seemingly acknowledged the necessity of negotiating 
freight rates, but they were still looking for methods to delay the 
negotiation process.245 
   First, Zhang Xueliang and many local media have always emphasized 
that the Committee of the Northeast Administration Committee (東北政務委
員会) was a local government and has no right to make the final decision.246 
And its railway budgetary power has already been handed over to the 
Nanjing Government.247 In the first meeting of Zhang and Kimura on 
January 22, Zhang deliberately shirked and said, “depending on the nature 
of the problem, he can reply on some problems, but some must be reported 
to the Nanjing Government for further instructions… it is an era in which 
public opinions must be valued, so politicians must formulate policies that 
satisfy citizens. Please understand about this.”248 The Japanese MOFA 
responded to Kimura on the results about the first meeting on January 27, 
“If China evades negotiations, please let them know that it may lead to 
disputes between Japan and Manchuria. Please try to proceed with the 
negotiations.”249 In the second meeting of Zhang and Kimura on February 
27, Zhang still emphasized that, “this negotiation is of great importance 
and I cannot make a decision by myself. I need to ask for the instructions of 
Nanjing government and then promote the negotiation.” 250 It seems that 
Zhang’s attitude did not change a lot. 
   Since then, Gao Jiyi (高紀毅) began to negotiate with Kimura as the chief 
representative of the Chinese side. He mentioned that Zhang Xueliang was 
different from Kimura, because Zhang must consider the political 
consequences and his relations with Nanjing Government before making 
any decisions. Nevertheless, Kimura did not dare to start a dialogue with 
Nanjing Government at the same time. He reported to the president 
Sengoku Mitsugu that it would not only complicate the issue, but also lead 
to Zhang'ss dissatisfaction.251 
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   However, it should be noted that Zhang Xueliang maintained close 
communications with Nanjing and sought for its help during the entire 
negotiation process.252 In March 1931, China’s Ministry of Railways has 
convened a national conference on freight rates, and suggested Northeast 
China to adopt lower freight rates to cope with Japan’s competition.253 The 
Northeast Transportation Committee (東北交通委員会) led by Zhang 
Xueliang had always maintained an independent and cooperative 
relationship with the Ministry of Railways (鉄道部) of Nanjing, and flexibly 
used its subtle relations with Nanjing to achieve the purpose of additional 
delay.254 
   Second, some Chinese representatives emphasized the inequality in 
Japan’s proposal on freight rates. They believed that the strength of 
Chinese railways lagged far behind that of the South Manchuria Railway, 
so it was unfair for them to adopt the same freight rates.255 However, while 
negotiating freight rates with Japan, Zhang Xueliang still proactively tried 
to further lower the current price to absorb more transportation.256 It 
indicated that the negotiation was only a matter of means rather than an 
objective for Zhang Xueliang.   
   Due to the repeated delays in negotiations, Japan also began to think 
about whether it claimed too much on freight rates. Japan decided to 
mitigate its tough attitude and adopt a conciliation policy.257 Japan tried to 
use “easing loan conditions” as a bargaining chip in exchanges for Zhang 
Xueliang’s concessions.258 However, they did not realize that Zhang’s goal 
was to counterbalance Japanese’s economic control in Manchuria, not 
making compromises. 
 
4.2 Delay Strategy in China’s Railway Plan 
   The change of gold-silver ratio would not only help Chinese railways to 
absorb more transportation, but also, more importantly, it would help 
China take this opportunity to promote its own railway construction plan. 
China’s railway nationalism greatly hurt Japan’s interests and sparked its 
strong dissatisfaction.259  
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   In Kimura’s negotiations with Zhang and Gao, he always concentrate 
on the importance of the so-called parallel line (並行線) issue, which aimed 
to compete with the South Manchuria Railway. And Kimura believed that 
these parallel lines had strong “political” and “diplomatic” meanings for 
Japan, especially the Datong Line and Jihai Line. However, Kimura’s 
threat did not play an obvious role. And the chief representation Gao Jiyi 
told Kimura that he was ordered to get rid of any “political” and 
“diplomatic” issues and could only conduct negotiations on railway services 
and business.260 Therefore, Gao Jiyi clearly classified the four negotiating 
requirements proposed by Kimura: (1) new lines; (2) parallel lines; (3) 
freight rates and railway competition; (4) railway loans. He believed that 
the (1) and (2) had high political and diplomatic implications, so he could 
not negotiate on these two items. Moreover, he also hoped that Kimura 
should try to avoid mentioning the parallel line issue again. 
   Therefore, it was clear that Gao Jiyi hoped to delay the negotiations on 
parallel lines. However, Kimura further pressured Gao and provided him 
with a report on parallel lines, which pointed out four reasons why the 
parallel line issue could continue to be discussed: 
 
(1) The parallel line issue is not originally a political and diplomatic 
issue. The root cause lies in the emotional alienation between the 
Chinese and Japanese peoples. 
(2) If you look at the parallel line issue more calmly, you may find a 
solution at the business level. The key is whether China and Japan can 
adjust the distribution of interests of the two lines so that the two lines 
can coexist. 
(3) There is actually a precedent between Japan and China to reach an 
agreement on similar issues. In 1927, Marshal Zhang Zuolin concluded 
a contract with the SMR President Yamamoto. Therefore, China and 
Japan can also conclude a combined transport agreement to avoid 
competition. 
(4) According to the principles of the first three items, it is possible to 
convert the parallel line issue from a political issue to a business issue. 
And the emotional alienation between two countries will also be solved 
accordingly.261 
 
   However, Gao Jiyi’s negotiating strategy did not change. He still 
focused on the basic principles and attitudes of the talks and did not 
quickly penetrate into the substantive areas. At the same time, the public 
media also learned from the lessons of Zhang Zuolin’s railway negotiations 
in 1927, and closely reported on Gao Jiyi and the negotiation process, 
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especially the News (新聞報) and Times (時報).262 On the one hand, it aimed 
to pressure Gao to avoid signing unequal treaties; on the other hand, it was 
also a bargaining chip for Gao Jiyi to further delay the negotiations on 
parallel line issues. During the negotiations on the railway plan, Chinese 
representative Gao Jiyi remained cautious and tried to narrow the scope of 
the negotiations. On the contrary, Japanese representative Kimura has 
been trying to expand the scope of the discussion.263 And it made the 
negotiations deadlocked as China wanted. 
   While delaying the negotiations on parallel lines, Zhang Xueliang hoped 
to build a Chinese railway network to further counterbalance the influence 
of Japanese railways in a real sense.264 He ordered that Japan should be 
prohibited from building railways and controlling the mines in Northeast 
China.265 In addition, Zhang also asked the Nanjing Government to help 
promote the railway plan.266 Also, the Nanjing government helped Zhang 
to negotiate with foreign construction companies (except Japanese 
companies) to obtain discounted prices.267 
   From April to September in 1930, the Northeast Transportation 
Committee carefully studied and developed the new Northeast Railway 
Network plan. After five months of research, the Committee mainly 
established plans for the construction of three major trunk lines: East 
Trunk Line, West Trunk Line and South Trunk Line. 
   The East Trunk Line started from the Huludao Port, and was based on 
the Beining Line, Shenhai Line and Jihai Line. Among them, 760 
kilometers of trunk lines had been already built, and 863 kilometers were 
still to be built. The details are in the table below: 
 
Starting and ending location Length  Remark 
Huludao Port to Shenyang 312 Beining Line 
Shenyang to Chaoyang 264 Shenhai Line  
Chaoyang to Jilin 184 Jihai Line 
 The above three lines had 
already been built, and the 
below were still to be built. 
Jilin to Wuchang 135  
 Wuchang to Fangzheng 175 
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Fangzheng to Yilan 93  
The total length of unbuilt 
railways was 863 
kilometers. 
Yilan to Huachuan 125 
Huchuan to Fujin 105 
Fujin to Tongjiang 65 
Tongjiang to Suiyuan 165 
Total 1623 
Table 14 the Details of the East Trunk Line
268  
   The West Trunk started from Huludao Port, and was mainly based on 
the Datong Line, Zhengtong Line, Zhengtao Line. Among them, 1549 
kilometers of trunk lines had been already built, and 415 kilometers were 
still unbuilt. The details are in the table below: 
 
Starting and ending location Length  Remark 
Huludao Port to Dahushan 180 Beining Line 
Dahushan to Tongliao 252 Datong Line  
Tongliao to Taonan 343 Sitao Line 
Taonan to Angangxi 220 Taoang Line 
Angangxi to Laha 139 Angqi Line, Qike Line 
The above lines had 
already been built, and the 
below were still to be built. 
Laha to Nenjiang 133 unbuilt 
Nenjiang to Heihe 282 unbuilt 
The total length of unbuilt 
railways was 415 
kilometers 
Total 1549  
Table 15 the Details of the West Trunk Line
269
 
   The South Trunk Line also started from Huludao Port, and was mainly 
based on the Jinchao Line. Among them, 159 kilometers of trunk lines had 
been already built, and 976 kilometers were still unbuilt. The details are in 
the table below: 
 
Starting and ending location Length  Remark 
Huludao Port to Jinlinsi 159 Beining Line and Jinchao Line 
The above lines had already 
been built, and the below were 
still to be built. 
Jinlinsi to Chengde 340  
The total length of unbuilt Chengde to Beiping（Tongzhou） 236 
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Chaoyang to Chifeng 160 railways was 976 kilometers 
Chifeng to Duoluonuoer 240 
Total 1135  
Table 16 the Details of the South Trunk Line
270
 
   The length of these three trunk lines was 4307 kilometers. Furthermore, 
another 4060 kilometers of branch lines were also to be built, thus the total 
length of the planned railway network was 8123 kilometers. “If this 
railway network plan is completed, it will be of great help to the economy 
and national defense for Northeast China.”271 
   At the same time, while promoting the railway construction plan, the 
Northeast Transportation Committee also vigorously promoted the 
connection and combined transport (聯運) among the Chinese domestic lines, 
especially in the East and West Trunk Lines. It greatly promoted the 
interconnection among China's own railways, and significantly improved 
the operational capacity of China's railways, and further promoted 
economic development along the routes.272 In mid-July 1930, four Chinese 
railways began to conduct combined transport, including Beining Line, 
Sitao Line, Taoang Line and Qike Line. Then since August 1st, Shenhai 
Line and Jihai Line also started the combined transport. Japan was aware 
that its purpose was to further absorb the transportation of the SMR and 
damage its interests.273 
   In order to speed up the railway construction plan, Zhang Xueliang 
asked Nanjing Government for financial assistance and requested to 
establish a Northeastern Railway Construction Fund (東北鉄道建設基金).274  
It further convinced Japan that Zhang has firmly established the ambition 
to promote his railway plan. At the same time, Japan also warned that “if 
China forcibly builds parallel lines and port projects, serious events will 
inevitably occur. Japan will use all means to prevent this from 
happening.”275   
   At this time, Japan seemed to be convinced that the negotiations could 
not move on in the direction that they wanted. Therefore, they sought to 
change the most basic thing: the gold-silver ratio. The South Manchuria 
Railway decided to move to silver standard form Siping(四平) to Yingkou 
(営口), which essentially reduced freight rates.276 In addition, other 
railway lines which still adopted the gold standard also drastically cut off 
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freight rates, so as to absorb more transportation.277 The bilateral railway 
competition between China and Japan was increasingly unable to 
coordinate. Later, the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident finally solved 
this problem. Since October 1931, Japan has completely broken China's 
railway plan, and its railway revenue has grown rapidly since then.278 
 
4.3 Huludao Port and the Railway Construction Plan 
   It should be noted that the three trunk lines all started from the 
Huludao (葫蘆島) port. As mentioned above, the South Manchuria Railway 
promoted the water-land transshipment through its controlled Dalian (大連) 
Port, Yingkou (営口) Port, Ganjingzi (甘井子) Port, which helped Japan 
absorb more cargo transportation for international trade and further 
damage the railways controlled by China. It meant that if China could not 
have its own port, it would still rely on Japanese-controlled ports for 
foreign trade. Therefore, the construction of Huludao Port became a key 
issue in Zhang Xueliang’s railway construction plan and economic 
development program. 
   On January 24, 1930, the Beining Railway Administration and Harbor 
Works Corporation of Netherlands signed the contract for the construction 
of Huludao Port. If this port was completed, thirteen 5,000-ton ships could 
be parked at the same time, and it was estimated that 1.5 million tons of 
cargo can be unloaded each year. Since Huludao Port had undergone two 
renovations since modern times, it already had a certain foundation.  
   The new construction project mainly included five items: breakwater, 
wharf, revetment dam, port bottom excavation and landfill. Moreover, 
although the contract stipulated that the total construction period was five 
years and six months, the Chinese side could activate the completed part in 
advance, and the Netherlands could not refuse China’s request.279 At that 
time, China’s public opinion emphasized that Huludao Port would bring 
qualitative changes to the Northeast economy, changing the foreign 
economic control in the Northeast China, and truly realized the autonomy 
of transportation routes.  
   On July 2, 1930, Zhang Xueliang hosted the grand opening ceremony of 
Huludao Port, and then Gao Jiyi delivered a speech on the reasons for the 
construction of Huludao Port. He said: 
 
   One of the most important reason to build this port is the so called 
“water-land connection (海陸襟帯)”. Although the railway network in the 
Northeast has made great progress, there are still three huge 
shortcomings to be solved. The first is China’s railway network lacks a 
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backbone or strategic stronghold; the second is the difficulty to achieve 
water-land transshipment; the third is the railways and ports of our 
“friends” (Japan) are highly exclusive, not international. All of this has 
led to tremendous restrictions on China’s endeavor to develop its own 
economy and its connectivity with the world economy.280 
 
   However, the essence of the counterbalancing policy was still to avoid 
direct confrontation. Therefore, Gao Jiyi also stressed in his speech that 
Huludao Port was not aimed to damage Japan’s interests. He said: 
 
   If you think that Huludao Port is to compete with the 
Japanese-controlled Dalian Port, I am afraid it is a mistake. The 
Northeast China has rich products and requires a large number of 
export ports. Therefore, whether Dalian or Vladivostok, it essentially 
acts as an important port for the export of Northeast products. We 
should not use political magnifying glasses to look at economic affairs. 
This is not the right thing to do.281 
 
   Gao Yiji’s speech did not eliminate the worries of the South 
Manchuria Railway and Japan. The Japanese side still regarded it as an 
important part of Zhang Xueliang’s “SMR Encirclement Plan” (満鉄包囲計
画) and might cause damage to Japan’s interests in Manchuria. Moreover, 
Huludao Port was much closer to the four major material distribution 
centers when compared to other ports, namely Angangxi, Jilin, 
Zhengjiatun and Shenyang. It indicated that the total freight rates of the 
goods shipped to the Huludao Port would be lower than others, which 
would speed up the concentration of goods to Huludao Port. 282  In 
particular, the distance between Huludao and North Manchuria was 
relatively closer, so it was also a severe shock to the SMR in absorbing 
the goods of the North Manchuria. 
   At that time, the strategy of the SMR in Manchuria was “One Line 
and One Port” (一線一港主義) or “Two Lines and Two Ports” (二線二港主義). 
The former referred to the South Manchurian Railway and Dalian Port, 
and the latter also contained Jihui (吉会線) Line and Luojin Port (羅津港). 
Thus the construction of Huludao Port clearly posed a threat to these two 
strategies. Although the construction of Huludao in 1931 was not so 
smooth, the construction was still in progress.283 In addition, Zhang 
Xueliang also continued to express support for Huludao Port and 
contacted with the Dutch company to request for speeding up 
construction.284 
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5. Counterbalancing Policy: the Development in Trade and Domestic 
Industries   
5.1 Export Encouragement Policy and the Capital Accumulation 
   Zhang Xueliang and other government leaders had repeatedly 
expressed their concern for exports and the international market. Gao Jiyi 
stressed that, “China is an agricultural country and has always lacked 
incentives and subsidies for international trade...although we still cannot 
make Huludao Port a complete free port, we need to ensure the full 
development of international trade in Huludao Port, thus promoting the 
internationalization of Chinese business.”285 Therefore, the construction of 
the Northeast Railway Network and the Huludao Port was also aimed to 
promote the “export-oriented strategy” to a certain extent. 
   As mentioned above, due to the impact of the Great Depression, the 
growth of trade statistics from 1929 to 1930 was not obvious, but in 1931, 
the export of Northeast China achieved tremendous growth. From the 
share of exports in 1931, we could see the main focus of the export 
encouragement policies during this period. The details were in the table 
below:  
 
Items Share 
Soybean 33.2% 
Bean pulp 15.9% 
Coal  9.6% 
Soya-bean oil 7.8% 
sorghum 3.2% 
Tussah silk 2.5% 
Other beans 2.4% 
Millet  2.4% 
Iron and steel 2.3% 
Groundnut  1.8% 
Cotton woven silk 1.7% 
Medicinal materials 1.6% 
Seed  1.6% 
Wood  1.3% 
Leather and fur 1.3% 
Salt  1.2% 
Others  9.2% 
Table 17 Principal Commodities Exported in 1931
286
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   As can be seen from the table above, the export trade was mainly 
concentrated in two areas: agricultural products and minerals. Among the 
agricultural products, the most important things were the so-called “three 
soybean products” (大豆三品). And the exported minerals mainly included 
coal and iron. At that time, the main opinions in the Northeast China also 
believed that the main focus of export trade should be on the agriculture 
and mining industry. Moreover, they also believed that once the export of 
agricultural products and minerals reached a certain level, the 
accumulation of capital would inevitably promote the prosperity of some 
industrial and commercial sectors in Northeast China.287 
   First, from the perspective of agricultural products, three soybean 
products account for nearly 60% of the total exports in Northeast China. 
Among them, bean pulp was mainly used as fodder, while soybean oil and 
soybean were mainly used as food. From 1908, the Chinese soybeans had 
occupied an important position in the international market. However, by 
the end of the 1920s, the soybean industry in the Northeast China 
encountered serious declines because of poor seeds, fertilizers and methods 
of planting.288 Due to the change of gold silver ratio, it was urgent to 
expand the soybean exports, so it was necessary to accelerate the 
improvement of soybean planting technology. In 1930, the competent 
authorities of agriculture in Northeast China informed that “it is necessary 
to instruct the farmers to improve planting techniques as soon as 
possible.”289 At the same time, the government also encouraged farmers to 
open up wasteland in Northeast China to expand the scale of agricultural 
production.290 
   By the low exchange rate incentives and technological improvements, 
soybean production in 1930 achieved a huge harvest. However, there were 
huge obstacles to the sales of these soybeans.291 One of the important 
reasons was the impact of the shrinking European market brought about 
by the Great Depression, which triggered a decline in soybean prices and 
soybean futures, causing losses to Chinese farmers. But it was not enough 
to explain why China was not able to expand its soybean exports in the 
potential Asian market. Some businessmen and scholars suggested that 
although the fall in silver price provided better trade conditions, there were 
some inherent institutional barriers in China that had curbed the rapid 
growth of exports. For one, the government had adopted higher railway 
freight rates for agricultural products in order to increase fiscal revenue; 
for another, there were a wide variety of exorbitant taxes and levies, 
especially export taxes. 
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   Therefore, the Liaoning Provincial Chamber of Commerce clearly 
stated: 
 
   The Northeast China has fertile soil and rich agricultural products. 
Therefore, the economic destiny of this region is highly dependent on 
the amount of agricultural production and trade volume every year. 
The remaining amount of agricultural products in 1930 is estimated at 
5.9 million metric tons, which are accumulated and could not be sold. 
The main reason for these unsalable agricultural products is that the 
freight rates of various railways are too high, which increased the 
production costs so much. As China is an agricultural country with 
many agricultural products, so the governments want to increase their 
fiscal revenue by raising the freight rates of agricultural products. 
However, this practice is harmful to farmers, making agricultural 
products unable to export smoothly and hindering the development of 
agriculture. An important remedy at present is that state-owned 
railways should reduce all or most freight rates of agricultural 
products. Therefore, in order to relieve the crisis in Northeast China, 
the reduction of the freight rates of agricultural products can no longer 
be delayed.292 
 
   It indicated that although the decline in silver price had given Chinese 
railways a certain price advantage, the freight rates of agricultural 
products were still too high as a whole, which was not conducive to 
stimulate exports. In 1931, the Chinese railways further lowered freight 
rates for farmers and agricultural products, and with the recovery of the 
European market, soybean exports in the Northeast China increased 
rapidly. The latest “Export Taxes Regulations” also reduced the soybean 
export tax by about one-fourth, further enhancing the competitiveness of 
Chinese soybeans in overseas markets.293 
   Second, in addition to agricultural products, the largest share of exports 
at the time was minerals, especially coal and iron. Among them, it was 
worth mentioning the rapid development of the Beipiao (北票) Coal Mine. 
Also due to changes of gold silver ratio, the coal mining industry under the 
control of China and Japan had also been affected differently. The 
Japanese controlled Fushun (撫順) Coal Mine used Japanese gold notes in 
settlement, which resulted in the average price of Fushun Coal being twice 
as high as that of Beiping Coal.294 At the same time, Gao Jiyi, director of 
the Beining Railway Bureau, organized Tonghui Company (通恵会社) to 
underwrite Beipiao Coal. It had greatly expanded the sales and market of 
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Beipiao Coal, and even with the momentum to replace the Fushun Coal.295 
According to the report of Beipiao Coal Mine, its revenue in 1930 was 1.5 
times higher than that in 1929. The details are in the table below: 
 
Items 1929 1930 
Coal production 406,527 ton 509,872 ton 
Cost per ton 4 yuan 4 yuan 
Coal sales revenue 1,820,000 2,300,000 
Total mine expenses 1,620,000 2,050,000 
Surplus 200,000 250,000 
Table 18 the Revenue and Expense Status of Beipiao Coal Mine
296
 
   Although the coal quality of Beipiao Coal Mine was excellent and 
developed rapidly, its tax burden was still very high. The general manager 
of Beipiao Coal Mine Yuan Dian ( 袁 滌 菴 ) asked the Northeast 
Administration Committee for tax cuts to enhance its competitive 
advantage. The Northeast Administration Committee agreed to his request 
and eventually gave a 30% tax cut.297 
   Under this background, there had been a wave of using “national coal” 
(国煤) in the Chinese society.298 It led to the emergence and expansion of a 
number of Chinese coal companies besides Beipiao Mine, such as 
Naizhishan, Huoshilin and so on. While ensuring domestic coal supply, a 
portion of these coals were also used for export. The details were in the 
table below: 
Unit: ton 
Name 1929 1930 
Mulin Coal Mine 314,000 322,600 
Heligang Coal Mine 120,000 170,000 
Xian Coal Mine 100,000 120,000 
Fuzhou Coal Mine 210,000 206,000 
Huoshilin Coal Mine 100,000 150,000 
Naizhishan Coal Mine 68,000 100,000 
Badaohao Coal Mine 60,000 60,000 
Table 19 the Coal Production of Some Non-Japanese Coal Companies in Northeast 
China
299
 
   The rapid development of agricultural products and mineral exports 
reflected the overall progress of agriculture and mining industry in 
Northeast China at that time, which would provide an important 
foundation for the development of other industrial and commercial 
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enterprises.  
   On the one hand, the export of agricultural products brought a large 
amount of foreign exchange income, which was conducive to investing in 
more industrial fields. At the same time, the opening up of a large number 
of wasteland had attracted a large number of economic immigrants, 
providing sufficient labor resources for the Northeast China. And in order 
to improve the efficiency of agricultural production, many advanced 
production technologies and large machineries were continuously applied 
into practice. The Northeast Administration Committee was clearly aware 
that “the development of industry and commerce depends on the 
development of agriculture”. 300  And coincidentally, the Nanjing 
Government also introduced a guideline called “Determining Agricultural 
Policy as the Basis for the Development of Industry and Commerce”, which 
stressed that importance of agriculture in China.301 With the development 
of agricultural production in Northeast China, it provided an important 
foundation for the development of textile, printing, leather, flour and oil 
industries in this region. 
   On the other hand, the development of mining exports also brought a 
certain amount of foreign exchange earnings, but more importantly, it had 
gradually broken Japan’s monopoly on the Northeast mining industry. 
Furthermore, it provided an important foundation for the development of 
the steel industry and smelting industry in the Northeast China. 
 
5.2 Development of Domestic Industries and New Constructive Movement 
of Northeast China 
   As mentioned above, Zhang Xueliang’s export-oriented strategy not only 
increased exports and foreign exchange earnings, but also provided a good 
foundation for the developments of related industrial and commercial 
enterprises. It had promoted the increase of domestic products and 
industrial upgrading in this region, and was also an important part of the 
“New Constructive Movement of Northeast China” (東北新建設運動) at that 
time. 
   Zhang Xueliang emphasized that, “the industrial construction is the 
most important thing if you talk about construction.”302 Therefore, the 
government gave strong support to the development of domestic industries. 
And it should be noted that the Liaoning Provincial Government released 
the “Liaoning Industrial Development Plan” and “Liaoning Mining 
Industry Reorganization Plan” in early 1931, which involved many aspects 
of industries, and also making Liaoning the center of the Northeast 
industry during that period.  
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   First, it was worth mentioning that the rapid development of iron 
industry, especially in Shenyang (沈陽). There were nearly 50 iron plants in 
Shenyang, of which the Northeast University Ironworks was the largest, 
followed by the Tycoon (大亨) Ironworks. Taking the Northeast University 
Ironworks as an example, its main businesses were: 
 
(1) Manufacturing various passenger and cargo vehicles, steel tools; 
(2) Repairing the locomotive, iron machinery, and electronical 
machinery; 
(3) Printing various securities, books, tickets, trademarks.303 
 
   With the development of Chinese railway network, these domestic 
ironworks helped to produce trains which were applied on the Jihai Line, 
Shenhai Line and other Chinese railways. At the same time, China had 
also built some important industrial machineries such as cranes, 
generators, drilling machines and blowers. At the beginning of 1931, the 
Northeast Transportation Committee also decided to establish a 
large-scale “Northeast Ironworks” in Shenyang, with a capital of 5 million 
silver dollar exchange certificates, and even planned to establish a branch 
factory in Jilin Province.304 
   Second, with the reduction of imported Japanese cotton fabrics and the 
increase of Chinese silk and cotton production, the cotton textile industry 
in Northeast China had also achieved rapid development. As the largest 
state-owned textile company in the Northeast China, the turnover of 
Liaoning Textile Factory (遼寧紡紗会社) increased significantly in 1929. An 
important reason was that the Provincial Bank of the Three Northeast 
Provinces (東三省官銀号) provided a large amount of funds to help it acquire 
a large amount of high quality raw cotton. At the same time, Liaoning 
Textile Factory had also increased 10,000 spindles to increase production 
capacity in 1930.305 The main textile factories in this period were also 
mainly concentrated in Shenyang, which were shown in the following 
table: 
 
Name 
 
Registered capital 
amount (Yuan) 
Product 
Liaoning Textile Factory 3,000,000 Cotton yarn, cotton cloth 
Chunyi Textile Factory 250,000 Pure silk 
Dongxing Dyeing Textile 
Company 
30,000 White homespun cloth 
Houshengfu 30,000 White homespun cloth 
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Tianzengli  20,000 Homespun cloth 
Zhichenyong 10,000 White homespun cloth; canvas 
Changshunhe 3,000 Homespun cloth 
Chongshenyuan 3,000 Homespun cloth 
Tongshunheng 1,000 Homespun cloth 
Juchengyong 1,200 Homespun cloth 
Zengshendong 1,000 Homespun cloth 
Tongyilong 2,000 Homespun cloth 
Yuanshunying 1,000 Homespun cloth 
Shunxingyuan 1,000 Homespun cloth 
Deyuanchang 1,000 Homespun cloth 
Tianchengyuan 2,000 Homespun cloth 
Fuxingyong 2,000 Homespun cloth 
Beihecheng 1,000 Homespun cloth 
Xingsheng Factory 3,000 Homespun cloth 
Other factories 35,000 Homespun cloth 
Total 3,667,200  
Table 20 the Main Domestic Textile Companies in Shenyang by 1931
306
 
   Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, the production and export of tussah 
silk (柞蠶糸) had also grown very fast. Among them, Andong County (安東県) 
was the center of the tussah silk industry, and 90% of its products were 
exported to Japan.307 In Andong, there were as many as 37 tussah silk 
factories, which showed the development of Chinese domestic industries. 
   Third, with the economic development and the massive increase in 
buildings in the Northeast China, the demand for bricks and tiles 
increased rapidly. It led to the rapid development of the ceramic industry 
in Northeast China, especially the Liaoning Zhaoxin Ceramic Company (遼
寧肇新窯業会社). Zhang Xueliang allocated 120,000 yuan from the Frontier 
Bank (辺業銀行) to support this company, and the Liaoning Provincial 
Government also waived its business tax for five years. With the support of 
the government, the Zhaoxin Ceramic Company developed faster than 
before, and was even called as the “model factory” in Northeast China.308 
In the past, the ceramic industry in the Northeast China was almost 
monopolized by Japan, but the rise of Zhaoxing Company broke this 
situation and triggered the vigilance of Japanese officials and 
businesspeople.309 
   Due to the government's tax exemption policy, the price of Chinese 
bricks was only half of Japan. The Zhaoxin Company set up more than 50 
distribution offices in the whole Northeast China, and almost regained half 
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of Japan’s market share. In addition, there were more than 70 other 
ceramic factories in Liaoning Province, and even established a ceramic 
association for mutual support and cooperation.  
   Fourth, due to the increasing production and demand of soybeans, it 
had also driven the rapid development of the oil industry, and the most 
representative place was Harbin in North Manchuria. Due to the 
increasing demand in the overseas market, Harbin’s oil industry had 
shown a prosperous situation. Since early 1931, the demand for soybean oil 
from Japan and Southeast Asia was particularly high, which helped to 
release the soybean stocks accumulated in 1930. About 1.7 million tons of 
soybeans were accumulated through the various railway lines in Northeast 
China. It not only drove the development of the oil industry, but also a huge 
commercial interest for the railway lines. During this period, a total of 
about 107 oil factories were in operation, bringing back long-lost prosperity 
in the oil industry.310 
   The Harbin Oil Association also hoped to export soybean oil through the 
Manzhuli (満州里) Port and directly transported to the Europe market by 
Siberia. It was the first time that Chinese businesspeople directly 
transported agricultural products to Europe for sale, without meddling of 
any foreign firms and traders. It meant that the recovery of the oil industry 
did not only lead to the economic development of North Manchuria, but 
also an important means to break the foreign monopoly of the agricultural 
product sales in this region.311 
   Fifth, the wheat and flour industry had also made significant progress, 
especially in Harbin. The government provided a special protection policy 
for the flour industry, exempting tariffs and reducing the freight rates of 
shipping wheat to Harbin. In addition, the Flour Association was also 
established in Harbin in 1930 to deal with the attack of foreign flour on the 
Chinese market and promote the development of domestic flour.312  
   Sixth, it was also worth mentioning the development of vehicle industry 
in the Northeast China. For one, there were many military industries that 
were transforming into civilian industries during that period, especially on 
tractors and cars. It was worth mentioning the Minsheng Factory was 
established on the basis of the Liaoning Mortar Factory, mainly 
manufacturing cars, bicycles and other machineries.313 In May 1931, the 
Minsheng factory built the first domestic truck, marking a huge leap in 
China’s domestic industry.314 
   For another, in addition to trunks, the development of rickshaws, 
bicycles and carts was particularly rapid. There were about 50 rickshaw 
factories in Shenyang, and rickshaws still played an important role in 
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short-distance transportation. Then the old-fashioned carts were also very 
popular in rural traffic and grain transportation of farmers, and there were 
still over a dozen factories in Shenyang. According to statistics, the annual 
production of carts, rickshaws and bicycles in Shenyang was about 3,500, 
with a total output value of about 150,000 yuan. The main vehicle factories 
in Shenyang are shown in the following table: 
  
 Name 
 
Registered capital 
amount (Yuan) 
Product Output  
Yongyixing 8,500 Carts  200 
Jushun  7,500 Carts 180 
Chunhe  7,000 Carts 150 
Hesheng  5,000 Carts 150 
Deshun   5,000 Carts 140 
Tongde 4,000 Carts 130 
Yongyuan  4,000 Carts 120 
Gongheda  2,000 Rickshaws  120 
Zhenxing  1,000 Rickshaws  60 
Wanli 1,200 Rickshaws  60 
Shuanglun  1,000 Bicycles  50 
Senji  1,000 Bicycles 60 
Other 70 factories 40,000 carts, rickshaws 
and bicycles 
2000 
Total 87,200  3420 
Table 21 the Main Vehicle Factories in Shenyang and their Outputs in 1931315 
 
   In addition to the above industries, the Northeast China had also made 
some progress in the printing industry, match industry, leather industry, 
wine industry, glass industry, timber industry and so on. China’s domestic 
industry found a path for development in a difficult international 
environment. 
   During this period, Zhang Xueliang made use of the currency power 
brought by the change of gold silver ratio, which severely damaged the 
interests of the South Manchuria Railway and safeguarded China's 
interests in railways. In addition, he also vigorously promoted 
export-oriented economic strategies through exchange rate changes and 
the reduction of Japanese exports to China. It not only promoted the 
exports and earned a lot of foreign exchanges, but also provided important 
financial support and market environment for the rise of Chinese domestic 
industries. 
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Chapter 4 
Currency Reform in 1935 and Economic Competition between 
China and Japan (1935~1937) 
 
 
1. Japan’s Economic Advantages in China in the early 1930s 
1.1 Withdraw from the Gold Standard and Japan’s Dumping Policy in the 
early 1930s 
   From 1880 to 1914, the gold standard system was developing rapidly 
around the world. And this system was essentially consisted of three 
characteristics: first, the convertibility between domestic currencies and 
gold based on the gold parity; second, the freedom of individuals to import 
and export gold; and third, a clear relationship between gold reserves and 
currency issuance. In the gold standard era, a considerable number of 
countries pursued the above basic principles. At the same time, countries 
basically maintain a fixed exchange rate system, and the balance of 
international payments was automatically completed through 
international gold transfers or price fluctuations.316 
   During this period, the gold standard system played an important role 
in the development of national economy and international trade. At the 
same time, it also brought some kind of “Gold Standard Mentality”(金本
位心理) that worshipped this system.317 However, the outbreak of the World 
War One caused a huge impact to the international gold standard system, 
and some major countries had stopped gold exchange and gold exports. The 
gold standard system was on the verge of collapse. 
   The paper-money standard system in the early post-war period brought 
serious inflation, which could be said to be a total failure. The world was 
eager for a reliable currency system, and it seemed that there was no 
better choice than the gold standard system. The “Gold Standard Mentality” 
worked again, and the United States officially lifted the ban on gold 
exports and became the first one returned to the gold standard in June 
1919. Since then, other countries continued to follow this trend, reaching a 
peak in 1927 and exceeding the pre-war scale.318 
   However, it should be noted that the rebuilt gold standard system had 
three new characteristics: First, the gold bullion or gold exchange standard 
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system was replacing the traditional gold coin standard system; second, 
the gold standard system during this period contained more regulatory 
factors, and gave more power to the government and the central bank; 
finally, many countries that returned to the gold standard in the 1920s 
faced a dilemma of insufficient gold reserves. As a whole, what was rebuilt 
during this period was a weakened gold standard system.319 
   At that time, this weakened system was once again hit by the Great 
Depression since 1929. Every country tried to cope with the economic crisis 
by building high tariff barriers and currency depreciation, and they 
continuously chose to abandon the gold standard system from 1929 to 1936, 
which led to the final collapse of the gold standard system. 
   During this period, there was also a fierce debate in Japan about the 
gold standard system. Although trapped in the Great Depression, the 
Hamaguchi cabinet which came to power in 1929 was still preparing for 
the lifting of the gold embargo and tried to restore the gold standard 
system.320 The lifting of the gold embargo was officially implemented on 
January 11, 1930, but did not bring the economic effects as wished. On the 
one hand, it caused a rapid increase in the exchange rate and a large 
outflow of gold, which brought a huge pressure on the Bank of Japan. By 
the end of June, there was a gold outflow of up to 230 million yen, which far 
exceeded expectations. On the other hand, it also led to a fall in domestic 
prices and a further economic austerity. By mid-1931, it had caused 
industrial panic, agricultural panic and bank credit panic in Japan, which 
forced Japanese leaders to rethink the gold policy.321 
   After the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident in September 1931, with 
the rapid expansion of military expenditures, Japan took this opportunity 
to turn to expansionary fiscal policy and inflation policy. In addition, 
Britain also announced the suspension of the gold standard system on 
September 21, which meant that the collapse of this system was inevitable. 
Therefore, the Inukai Tsuyoushi Cabinet announced the re-imposition of 
the gold embargo on December 13 and stopped the redemption of gold.322 It 
indicated that Takahashi Korekiyo’s fiscal and monetary policies began to 
dominate in Japan. It had brought about rapid fiscal expansion and the 
recovery of industrial and agricultural production, and domestic prices also 
began to rise again. 
   However, it should be particularly pointed out that Japan’s departure 
from the gold standard system led to a rapid decline in its exchange rate, 
which further caused major adjustment in its trade policy. And this 
adjustment did not only have a major impact on the Asia, but even on the 
global market.  
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   In the early 1930s, many countries had achieved a certain degree of 
currency depreciation after they abandon the gold standard system. 
However, the depreciation of the Japanese yen was as high as two-thirds, 
which was obviously higher than other countries: 
 
Country  Depreciation rate (%) 
Japanese (yen) 65.6 
America (dollar) 41.0 
Britain (pound) 38.3 
France (franc) 0.1 
Germany (mark) 2.5 
Table 22 Currency Depreciation of Some Major Countries in the early 1930s
323
 
   At the same time, combined with the over-production in Japan and the 
decline in labor costs, it was mature for Japan to expand exports and 
implement the dumping policy. It was also called “social dumping” in Japan, 
which specifically referred to Japan’s unfair competition policies in the 
international market by currency depreciation and ruthless exploitation of 
laborers in the 1930s.324 The table below showed the comparison of labor 
wages between Japan, Britain and the United States during this period of 
time: 
 
Country Industry type Male  Female  
The United States Industry  7.01~9.66 6.00 
Cotton industry 6.66 5.01 
Britain Industry  5.60~10.27 2.37~3.74 
Cotton industry 5.45~5,78 2.79~3.43 
Japan Industry  2.01 0.67 
Cotton industry 1.31 0.64 
Table 23 the Comparison of Labor Wages between Japan, Britain and the United 
States325 
   In order to promote the dumping policy, Japan had continuously taken 
measures to expand its overseas market. The Japanese Ministry of Finance 
believed that Japan’s current research and investigation of overseas 
markets was still inadequate. Therefore, the official and the private sectors 
should cooperate to promote the development and expansion of new 
overseas markets. Only through the expansion of overseas trade could 
Japan’s industry truly revitalize. 
   With the help of “social dumping” (ソーシャルダンピング ), Japan’s 
“exchange rate dumping” (為替ダンピング ) policy worked much better. 
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During this period, Japanese goods were quickly exported to the whole 
world, which had a huge impact on Asian, European and American 
markets. 326  Furthermore, the exchange rate changes seemed to have 
become Japan’s biggest weapon in the foreign trade.327  At that time, 
almost one-third of the global trade was reduced, but Japanese products 
continued to expand its market share, which caused great pressure on 
many countries. 
 
1.2 Silver Standard System and Dilemma of Chinese Textile Industry 
   Japan’s dumping policy was not only aimed to promote export in the 
context of domestic overproduction, but also hoped to destroy China’s 
domestic enterprises and establish the dominant position of Japanese 
companies in China. Faced with enormous pressure of Japan’s dumping 
policy, the Chinese side had also made some resistance and counterattack. 
After the Manchurian Incident, China’s movement of boycotting Japanese 
goods helped to protect the Chinese market and created an opportunity to 
promote the development of domestic enterprises.328  
   In addition, China’s silver standard system had also provided important 
support for the development of domestic enterprises until 1933. Silver had 
long been used as a currency in China, but it had only been viewed as a 
commodity in the international market. Therefore, China’s silver price was 
generally higher than the international silver price, which caused a large 
amount of silver flow into China. It had led to a continuous slight inflation 
status in China, which meant that not only did the domestic prices 
increase, but the bank’s credit scale also increased exponentially. 329 
   At that time, many Chinese industries, especially the textile industry, 
had relied heavily on bank mortgages and loans. With the help of bank 
loans, Chinese enterprises could survive and expand their scales. 330 
Therefore, the silver standard system, banks and Chinese enterprises had 
formed a healthy cooperative relationship for a long time. But there was a 
potential crisis here: once the bank’s loan stopped, these Chinese 
enterprises could not repay the debt or continue production, and would fall 
into a serious recession.331 
   However, this crisis soon came after America’s silver purchase policy in 
1934, and the silver standard system had unexpectedly turned into a major 
obstacle for the development of Chinese enterprises. As America massively 
purchase silver at a high price, a large amount of Chinese silver deposits 
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flowed into America, which caused serious deflation and tight money 
market in China. Many banks had closed down since 1933 and the credit 
scale also dropped dramatically, which caused negative effects to the 
Chinese enterprises that relied heavily on bank loans.332 
   A large number of Chinese cotton factories had been shut down since 
1933, as shown in the following table: 
 
Year Stopped spindles Stopped loom machines 
Factories Spindles Factories  Loom machines 
1928 8 142084 9 2515 
1929 9 146024 4 1200 
1930 5 128400 6 2105 
1931 6 51960 9 2418 
1932 10 119840 4 582 
1933 16 243936 11 3282 
1934 18 317996 11 3234 
1935 19 508264 14 5221 
1936 16 337728 12 3825 
Table 24 the Statistics on Closure of Main Chinese Cotton Factories333  
   Contrary to the dilemma of Chinese enterprises, Japanese companies 
took this opportunity to expand their production and occupy the Chinese 
market. Japan’s total investment in China increased from 400 million yen 
in 1930 to 1.57 billion yen in 1936. Among them, direct business 
investment increased from 211.86 million yen to 840 million yen. In the 
textile industry, Japan’s direct investment was 300 million yen, with an 
increase of 116.68 million yen when compared with 1930.334   
 
1.3 The Advantages of Japanese Goods and Enterprises in China  
   As mentioned in the Zhang Xueliang case, the crash of silver prices 
since 1929 had curbed Japan’s exports to China, and then Japan’s return to 
the gold standard in 1930 further worsened its trade relations with China. 
However, as Japan abandoned the gold standard system, the exchange rate 
relationship between China and Japan changed rapidly. Then after the US 
silver purchase policy was released in 1934, the silver price rose sharply, 
further enhancing the competitiveness of Japanese products. In just a few 
years, the trade relations between China and Japan changed dramatically. 
The silver standard system was used as an important economic tool for 
China in the late 1920s, but it soon became an obstacle to China’s foreign 
trade since 1932. From 1931 to 1934, Japan’s exchange rate against China 
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fell by about 150%. 
   Both Chinese officials and the public opinion regarded the dumping of 
Japanese goods as a serious economic challenge, and defined it as a 
“malignant dumping”, which aimed “not only to eliminate international 
competitors, but also to eliminate Japan’s competitors in China.”335 
   Japan’s dumping policy caused a devastating impact on China’s various 
industries, especially coal industry and cotton industry. In addition, the 
match, cement, fishery and paper-making industry had also been severely 
affected. The dumping area of Japanese goods was mainly located along 
the Yangtze River, especially Shanghai and Hankou (漢口).336 Japan not 
only lowered the price of goods, but also exempted shipping costs. And in 
order to prevent the influence of “boycotting Japanese goods movement”, a 
large number of Japanese goods were affixed with Chinese trademarks, so 
as to be unimpeded in the Chinese market. 
   First, in the coal industry, Japanese coal began dumping in Shanghai 
and other cities along the Yangtze River since 1932, which greatly 
damaged China’s promotion to use “national coal” (国煤). There were more 
than 50 types of Japanese coal sold in Shanghai, and some main types were 
shown in the table below: 
Unit：yen/ton 
Coal type Price in Japan Dumping price in China 
Takao dust coal 4.15 1.33 
Fukushima dust coal 4.15 1.27 
Otani dust coal 6.80 1.00 
Ikeno dust coal 4.15 1.20 
Kanda dust coal 4.15 1.20 
Kanda lump coal 4.15 0.62 
Wonsan lump coal 4.15 3.54 
Table 25 Dumping Status of Japanese Coal in Shanghai337 
   As can be seen from the table above, Japanese coal did not increase 
price due to freight rates and tariffs, but further sharply cut price for 
dumping. Under such a strategy, the proportion of Japanese coal in the 
Shanghai market increased rapidly from 7.6% to 18.6% in 1932. If the 
Japanese-controlled Fushun (撫順) Coal Mine was included, the proportion 
of Japanese coal rose from 15.8% to 34.2%. 
 
Coal type January 1932 August 1932 
Japanese coal 7.8% 18.8% 
Fushun coal (Japan controlled) 8.0% 15.4% 
Shandong (山東) coal  5.0% 7.0% 
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Kailuan (開灤) coal 46.7% 37.3% 
Vietnam coal 9.8% 4.1% 
Other Chinese coal 22.9% 16.4% 
Total  100% 100% 
Table 26 the Proportion of Various Coals in Shanghai338  
   In addition to Shanghai, the dumping of Japanese coal also brought 
damage to Chinese coal companies in other cities. On the one hand, 
Chinese coal had to cut prices to compete with Japanese coal; on the other 
hand, a large number of Chinese coal companies had stopped production or 
went bankruptcy. Many coal mines in Shandong and Jiangxi (江西 ) 
Provinces were facing serious economic difficulties and could not continue to 
operate, especially some small and medium-sized coal mines. According to 
statistics, the production of Chinese coals in 1935 only reached 58% of its 
production capacity in 1933. 
   Second, in the cotton industry, there were two main types of products: 
one was yarns and threads, and the other was cloth and garments. Japan’s 
policies on these two products had some slight differences. 
   For the cloth and garments, China used to import cotton cloth from 
Britain, but things had changed since the early 1930s. The cheap Japanese 
cloth gradually replaced the position of Britain and exported to China, 
India (Britain), Indonesia (Dutch), Egypt and other countries. With the 
increasing restrictions on Japanese cotton cloth in other countries around 
the world, Japan began to target China as the main dumping market.339 
The data of Japanese cotton cloth exports to China in 1932 were shown 
below: 
 
Month Quantity (1000 square yard) Value (yen) 
January  6,236 1,087,552 
February  11,168 1,981,931 
March  20,604 3,767,797 
April  17,523 3,281,659 
May  13,604 2,328,775 
June  14,185 2,369,146 
July  18,106 3,258,801 
August  22,447 4,304,013 
September  24,111 5,178,872 
October  17,930 4,096,302 
November  13,941 3,275,743 
December  13,741 3,292,532 
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Table 27 Japanese Cotton Cloth Exports to China in 1932340 
   As can be seen from the above figure, Japan’s cotton cloth exports to 
China had grown substantially in 1932. And it could not be ignored that 
there were still much Japanese cloth exported to China mainland through 
Hong Kong. 
   For the yarns and threads, although there were not many direct exports 
to China, Japanese enterprises in China were dumping heavily in the 
Chinese market. The two major textile centers in North China were 
Tsingtao and Tianjin (天津). Tsingtao’s textile industry was dominated by 
Japan except for one Chinese company Huaxin (華新). In Tianjin, Japan had 
spent huge sums of money to purchase Chinese-funded enterprises and 
planned to build 9 new enterprises. In just five years, the market share of 
Japanese textile industry rose from 0% to 55.2%.341 And in Shanghai, 
China’s largest textile industry center, Japan also vigorously expanded its 
control. By the end of 1936, the respective proportion of Chinese and 
Japanese spindles in Shanghai was 41.8% and 49.9%, which indicated that 
Japan maintained the leading role in Shanghai’s textile industry.342 
 
1.4 The Advantages of Japanese Goods in Southeast Asia 
   When talking about China’s foreign trade relations at that time, it must 
be taken into account the importance of so-called “Overseas Chinese Trade 
Network” (華僑通商網), namely the relations between China and overseas 
Chinese merchants in Southeast Asia.  
   Chinese immigrants to Southeast Asia reached a peak after the end of 
World War I, especially around 1927. By the early 1930s, the number of 
overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia had exceeded 6 million, which was 
shown in the following table: 
Unit: 1000 people 
Country Statistics by Jinan 
University in 1933 
Statistics by ROC Overseas Chinese 
Affairs Committee in 1934 
Siam (Thailand) 2,500 2,500 
British Malaya 1,800 1,709 
Dutch East India 1,234 1,233 
French Indochina 360 381 
Burma  300 194 
Philippine  160 111 
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British Brunei 88 75 
Total  6,442 6,203 
Table 28 the number of overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia343 
   Although some western colonial countries were considered to be the 
dominant power in Southeast Asia, these overseas Chinese played a more 
crucial role in business and trade in Southeast Asia.344 In this context, the 
ROC (Republic of China) government attached great importance to the role 
of overseas Chinese and officially established the Overseas Chinese Affairs 
Committee (僑務委員会) in 1926 to supervise overseas Chinese affairs. 
   Moreover, there was some economic cooperation relationship between 
overseas Chinese businesspeople and the Nanjing government, which was 
mainly reflected in three aspects:  
   First, nearly 90% of wholesalers and retailers in Southeast Asia were 
overseas Chinese, and they consciously cooperated with China to boycott 
Japanese goods and vigorously sold Chinese products.345 They were very 
important for promoting China’s foreign trade, which indicated that the 
development of the Overseas Chinese Trade Network was closely linked to 
the development of the Chinese economy.346 Moreover, a large number of 
overseas Chinese chambers of commerce (華僑商会 ) had played an 
important intermediary role here, not only as a channel to communicate 
with the Chinese government, but also for the exchange of information 
between overseas Chinese businessmen.347 
   Second, many overseas Chinese had invested in China and contributed 
to the development of China’s economy. For example, among the factories, 
companies, firms, banks operated by China, nearly 10% of which were 
invested by overseas Chinese. In addition to investing in enterprises, 
overseas Chinese also purchased a large amount of public debts and stocks 
issued by the Chinese government to support China’s economic 
construction and military mobilization. 348  Furthermore, the Nanjing 
government also announced policies to reward more overseas Chinese to 
invest and set up factories in China.349 Among them, the projects invested 
by overseas Chinese in Fujian (福建) and Guangdong (広東) Provinces were 
shown in the following table： 
 
Category Fujian Guangdong 
Urban construction  Real estate, running water, Electric lamp, telephone, 
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electric lamp, telephone, bank match, ice-making  
Transportation Railway construction, 
trucking company, airport 
Railway construction, 
steamship company 
Mining industry 
 
Mining companies  Mining companies 
Education  Primary school, middle school 
and university 
Primary school, middle 
school and university 
Table 29 the Projects Invested by Overseas Chinese in Fujian and Guangdong 350    
   Third, overseas Chinese had a large amount of overseas remittances (海
外送金、僑匯) to China, which greatly helped the Nanjing government to 
stabilize its finance and balance of payments.351 It could be concluded that 
the Nanjing government was very dependent on these remittances. 
Therefore, if the interests of overseas Chinese were damaged, it would 
inevitably affect the amount of remittances to China. 
 
Year  Total overseas remittance Trade deficit Proportion  
1931 422,200,000 655,361,000 64.3% 
1932 323,500,000 820,807,000 39.4% 
1933 305,700,000 762,025,000 40.1% 
1934 250,000,000 535,683,000 46.7% 
1935 316,000,000 343,400,000 92.0% 
1936 320,000,000 235,000,000 136.2% 
Table 30 the Role of Overseas Remittances in China’s Balance of Payments352 
   As can be seen from the table above, overseas remittances were crucial 
to China’s balance of international payments. It helped China import 
important raw materials and stabilized the exchange rate, and further 
prevented China from falling into a debt crisis. 
   However, the cooperation between the Nanjing government and 
overseas Chinese businesspeople was completely broken after 1931. And 
the key reasons lay in Japan’s dumping policy and the change of 
international silver price.353 
   First, Japan’s trade volume with Southeast Asia had grown rapidly 
since 1933. On the one hand, due to the global economic downturn, the 
purchasing power of Southeast Asian aborigines had fallen sharply; on the 
other hand, Japanese merchants began to trade directly with the 
aborigines and completely ignore the Chinese retailers and wholesalers.354 
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Japan took this opportunity to dump in Southeast Asia at a very low price, 
causing great losses to Chinese, British and Dutch businessmen. Japan’s 
trade volume with Southeast Asia during this period was shown in the 
following table: 
Unit: 1000 yen 
Year Export  Import  
1927 169,093 212,929 
1928 132,794 205,203 
1929 158,910 167,426 
1930 133,237 126,392 
1931 109,426 90,099 
1932 159,139 96,023 
1933 249,613 136,604 
1934 289,233 165,140 
1935 284,460 173,083 
1936 288,367 235,611 
1937 386,739 304,794 
Table 31 Japan’s Trade Volume with Southeast Asia from 1927 to 1937 355 
   With the development of Japan’s dumping policy, the position of 
Chinese merchants had gradually been replaced by Japanese merchants. 
In the Philippines, Chinese retailers controlled nearly 80% of the market in 
1931, but fell rapidly to 40% in 1933, and the shortfall was mainly filled by 
Japanese retailers by dumping cotton fabrics.356 In Dutch East India, 
Japanese cotton, porcelain, beverages, food and other daily necessities 
were also heavily dumped here, which greatly lowered local prices and 
seriously damaged the interests of Chinese intermediaries. During this 
period, the bankruptcy of Chinese merchants accounted for over 50% of the 
entire Dutch East India. In Siam, there were more overseas Chinese 
merchants, and they were very active in boycotting Japanese dumping 
policies. However, their boycotting actions not only did not work, but 
caused great losses for themselves. The Siamese people unexpectedly 
welcomed cheap Japanese goods and were resentful of China’s boycotting 
actions, which also stimulated the foreign merchants, including Japanese 
merchants, to try to replace the position of overseas Chinese.357 
   As a result, Japan’s expansion in Southeast Asia had gradually expelled 
the business of overseas Chinese, making the status of overseas Chinese 
very difficult. Lots of overseas Chinese were unemployed, and around 
280,000 of them returned to China from mid-1932 to mid-1933.  
   Second, the rise of silver price since 1934 further separated the 
economic ties between China and overseas Chinese merchants. As 
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mentioned above, under the impact of Japan’s dumping policy, the income 
of Chinese merchants had decreased drastically, resulting in a rapid 
decline in the amount of overseas remittances and investments. 
Furthermore, the surge in silver price caused a sharp rise in China’s 
exchange rate, thus it became not cost-effective for remittances and 
investments to China.358 
   Therefore, Japan’s dumping policy and international silver price 
changes had greatly damaged the trade links between China and 
Southeast Asian Chinese businessmen, and reduced the scale of the 
remittances that the Nanjing government relied heavily on. It caused 
China’s balance of payments and economic development to be in serious 
difficulties. The Nanjing government was also aware of this crisis and 
dispatched a senior official of Ministry of Finance Xu Jianping (許建屏) to 
visit Southeast Asia to inspect the status quo of overseas Chinese and 
propose solutions. Xu Jianping believed that the problem lay in Japan’s 
dumping policy over the past few years, and the government must respond 
to this phenomenon.359 
 
2. Nanjing Government’s Choice of Abolishing the Silver Standard System 
2.1 The Silver Standard System in China’s Economy since the late 1920s  
   The international silver prices had been falling since 1921, and there 
was a further sharp fall since 1929, which led to a growing exchange rate 
gap between the gold standard and silver standard countries. There were 
mainly three reasons here: first, after the great depression in 1929, all 
countries were vigorously purchasing gold, which led to a rapid rise in gold 
price and fall of silver price; second, although the silver price began to fall, 
the international silver production did not decline; third, countries that 
used silver as a currency continued to decrease.360 
   These three reasons led to a continuous decline in the silver price, and 
China was suffered a lot as a silver standard country. During this period, 
China had an intense discussion about the currency reform, calling for 
abandoning the silver standard system.361 In 1930, under the help of the 
famous American economist Kemmerer, the Chinese Ministry of Finance 
even proposed a draft on gradual transition to the gold standard system. 
Kemmerer stated that, “the silver standard system is extremely harmful to 
China. Therefore, China urgently needs a unified currency system and 
transited to a suitable gold exchange standard system.”362 
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   However, China was not able to abandon the silver standard system 
very quickly. For one, it was difficult for the Chinese to change their 
long-standing habits to use silver as a currency. For another, the decline of 
silver price and the continuous silver inflow also had some positive effects. 
As mentioned in the Zhang Xueliang case, it helped to resist the dumping 
of foreign goods and promoted the export of domestic goods. At the same 
time, the slight inflation caused by silver inflow also made it easier for 
Chinese enterprises to obtain loans from banks. 
   Therefore, the Nanjing government preferred to promote the currency 
reform on the basis of the silver standard system, and further promoted 
currency unification and the central government’s control over monetary 
policies. Therefore, the Nanjing government promoted currency reform (廃
両改元) in March 1933, and officially transitioned to the silver dollar (銀元) 
standard system in 1933. By the end of 1933, China’s financial situation 
became basically stable and this reform turned out to be a success.  
   This reform mainly achieved three goals: First, it unified China’s 
chaotic monetary system and improved China’s silver standard system. 
Every province began to use the same currency, which facilitated the flow 
of people and economic transactions. Second, the emerging Chinese 
banking industry had developed rapidly in this reform, and some vested 
interest groups such as Qianzhuan (銭荘) and foreign banks were severely 
damaged during this period. Therefore, the foreign banks no longer 
dominated in China’s foreign exchange market, and Chinese banks had 
embarked on the path of independent development and became the 
mainstay of Chinese finance. Third, it facilitated the participation of 
Chinese businesspeople in international trade and avoided the 
cumbersome procedures and losses caused by the inconsistency of the 
currency system.363 
   However, China’s silver standard system soon encountered a new 
challenge, namely the major adjustment of American silver policy in 1934, 
which caused the “silver problem” (銀問題) to be extremely serious. The core 
of the silver problem was the silver price, and silver price had once again 
experienced huge fluctuations during this period. 
   In December 1933, the American Treasury Department announced that 
it would purchase silver at a price of 6.45 cents, marked a 50% increase 
over the previous purchase price. By June 1934, the Silver Purchase Act 
was officially approved, and then the silver was announced to be 
nationalized in August. The changes of American silver policies triggered a 
lot of speculation actions, and the silver purchase price had been 
continuously raised. Therefore, the international silver price had stopped 
its long-term downward trend and rose sharply, which caused some 
negative effects to the economy and finance of some silver standard 
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countries, especially China. 
   The negative effects of rising silver price on China were mainly 
reflected in three aspects: 
   First, the purchasing power of Chinese people did not increase due to 
the rise in silver price, but continued to decline. The American government 
stubbornly believed that rising silver price would increase China’s 
purchase of American products, thereby increasing China’s influence in 
American society.364 However, America ignored that China was currently 
facing severe export sluggishness and shrinking of domestic enterprises. 
Therefore, the rising silver price would further worsen China’s exports and 
balance of payments, which indicated that China was not capable to 
purchase more American products.365 
   Second, due to the obvious gap between America and China’s silver 
prices, it led to a large amount of silver outflow, which caused a negative 
effect on Chinese finance. Due to the reduction of silver, the bank’s loan 
interest rate had increased significantly, which caused a large number of 
enterprises trapped in serious crisis, especially in the textile industry. In 
addition, the silver in rural areas had also been moving to cities, especially 
Shanghai, which led to the collapse of the rural financial system and 
economy.366 
   The chart below showed China’s import and export of silver around the 
1930s: 
Unit: yuan 
Year  Import  Export  Trade Deficit 
1926 122,740,891 39,849,559 82,891,32 (—) 
1927 127,583,362 26,182,492 101,395,870(—) 
1928 173,969,821 8,205,327 165,764,474(—) 
1929 189,187,183 24,310,312 164,876,871(—) 
1930 159,788,398 55,393,177 104,395,221(—) 
1931 118,233,016 47,429,681 70,803,335(—) 
1932 96,538,889 106,932,954 10,395,065(+) 
1933 80,431,474 94,54,914 14,422,440(+) 
1934 7,414,009 267,355,432 259,941,423(+) 
1935 10,204,074 70,394,397 60,190,323(+) 
Table 32 China’s Import and Export of Silver around the 1930s367 
   The table below showed China’s changes of loan interest rate before the 
currency reform in 1935:  
Unit: yuan /100 yuan 
Year Month  Loan interest rate 
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1934 
7 5 
8 9 
9 12 
10 7 
11 19 
12 33 
 
 
 
1935 
1 22 
2 8 
3 8 
4 10 
5 13 
6 19 
7 20 
8 18 
9 14 
Table 33 China’s Changes of Loan Interest Rate before the Currency Reform in 
1935368 
   It could be seen from the above two tables that China’s silver outflows 
from 1934 to 1935 were very large, and bank loan interest rates also 
showed an abnormal surge, reflecting the fact that the Chinese economy 
was already caught in a serious deflation. 
   Third, China’s foreign trade was naturally affected by the rise in silver 
price. The director of the China International Trade Bureau He Bingxian 
(何炳賢) said, “the impacts of American silver policy on China’s finance 
remain to be seen, but the impacts on China’s foreign trade is very obvious. 
China’s imports must increase and exports will continue to decrease.”369 
According to the calculation of Chinese scholars, the total import and 
export volume in 1935 was only 40% of that in 1931. Among them, the 
import declines were even faster than exports.370 
   Under such a background, some scholars argued that it was necessary 
to fundamentally change the silver standard system to solve the current 
problems. 
 
2.2 Debate on Silver Standard System and Nanjing Government’s Choice  
   Under the influence of American silver policy, the newly consolidated 
silver standard system faced new challenges. During this period, there was 
a heated debate on whether to continue to maintain the silver standard 
system. 
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   First, some people believed that we must abandon the silver standard 
system. Zhang Sumin argued that “we cannot stop the continued outflow of 
silver, which makes us have to finally give up the silver standard system. 
So the problem is that we should struggle till the end and then forced to 
change, or proactively change it now. I think the latter is more in our 
interest.”371 Yang Yinfu held that, “If China cannot break away from the 
silver standard system, it will not be able to resolve the situation of 
isolation and being controlled by others in the international monetary 
system.” 372  In addition, he also called for increased supervision and 
management of banks to ensure that banknotes would not be over-issued 
under the new future system. 
   In addition, Zhao Lanping clearly understood that the world was 
experiencing a devaluation war, so abandoning the silver standard might 
be a smart choice. Therefore, the currency should be separated from a 
certain amount of precious metals to achieve full flexibility.373 Liu Dajun’s 
opinions were similar to Zhao Lanping, and he also argued that, “these 
gold standard countries have abandoned their original system and started 
to depreciate, so China should also follow this trend and adopt a 
paper-standard system.”374 Gu Chunfan pointed out that “it is not realistic 
to expect America to abandon the silver purchase policy, and China also 
cannot adopt the gold standard system. Therefore, there is a great 
possibility that China will change to the paper standard system in the 
future. There are not so many technical difficulties here, but the real 
potential risk lies in the currency credit. When the external constraints of 
precious metals disappear, how can we artificially control the circulation 
amount of currency?”375 
   Second, many people supported the maintenance the silver standard 
system and provided some specific advices. The Times (時報) published an 
article and emphasized that “if China rashly abandons the silver standard 
system and expand its monetary supply, it will cause endless trouble to the 
future. Thus a more prudent approach should be adopted now, such as the 
Britain offering a sterling exchange certificate (磅券) to China.”376 Chen 
Zhenyi argued that it was better to stick to the silver standard system now, 
and he provided four solutions: completely separating the value of the 
China’s currency from the world’s silver price; the casting of silver dollar 
will be uniformly managed and implemented by the central government; 
making the Bank of China (中国銀行) as a complete international exchange 
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institution; establishing an exchange rate adjustment fund to balance the 
exchange rate market.377 Gu Jigao also stressed that the government 
should quickly establish a fund to adjust the silver price and avoid the 
sharp fluctuations of domestic silver price.378 
   In addition, Liu Zhendong’s “Limited Silver Standard System” (有限銀本
位) was discussed at the time. He believed that the future development of 
American silver policy was still difficult to predict, so it was necessary to 
implement a controlled silver standard system (統制銀本位).379 Therefore, 
he advocated establishing the limited silver standard system, which 
contained four aspects: unifying the national currency system; unifying the 
coinage rights so as to regulate the amount of currency in circulation; 
prohibiting the import and export of silver; prohibiting foreign banknotes 
from circulating in the Chinese market.380 
   From 1934 to early 1935, the debate over the currency standard system 
was very fierce, and it was hard to say which side prevailed. The Chinese 
Ministry of Finance had also repeatedly denied that China would abolish 
the silver standard system. The Nanjing government faced two difficult 
choices: if it insisted on the silver standard, it would be difficult to curb the 
silver outflow and deflation; if the silver standard was abandoned, it might 
lead to uncontrolled currency over-issuance and inflation. Therefore, it was 
necessary to continue to explore why the Nanjing government made the 
decision to implement the currency reform and abandon the silver 
standard system. 
   This dissertation argues that China’s economic relations with Japan 
played an important role in the Nanjing government’s currency reform 
decision. A Taiwan scholar Lee Yu-ping also points out that America’s silver 
policy was viewed as the most important reason for China’s economic 
depression and the implementation of currency reform in the Western view, 
but it is necessary to supplement the Asian views and emphasize more the 
influence of Japan’s economic policies.381 
   Japan’s dumping policy not only destroyed China’s market order and 
the development of domestic enterprises, but also cut off the overseas 
Chinese trade network that the Nanjing government was highly dependent 
on, making the Nanjing government face unprecedented difficulties in its 
balance of payments. In order to counterbalance the competitive 
advantages of Japanese companies and products in China and Southeast 
Asia, it was necessary for China to respond quickly to Japan’s dumping 
policy. So the adjustment of currency policy had become the most effective 
and fastest means for the Nanjing Government. Therefore, although it was 
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still controversial about abolishing the silver standard system from the 
perspective of America’s silver policy, the abolition of this system seemed to 
be more necessary from the perspective of China’s economic relations with 
Japan. 
   Song Ziwen (宋子文), chairman of the Bank of China, also made an 
important speech, saying that “China’s foreign trade is seriously affected 
by the exchange rate, so the currency reform can promote the development 
of foreign trade and improve China’s balance of payments.”382 
 
2.3 The Currency Reform in 1935 and Its Effects 
   On November 3, 1935, the Chinese Ministry of Finance officially issued 
a notice announcing the reform of Chinese currency system.383 Its content 
mainly included three aspects: 
   First, it emphasized to unify the currency issuance and implement 
centralized and controlled management of currency reserves. The article 
one stipulated that the “currency issued by the Central Bank, Bank of 
China, and Bank of Communications is the legal tender.” The Finance 
Minister Kong Xiangxi (孔祥熙) stressed that its purpose was to change the 
former scattered monetary system and unify the currency issuance system. 
And he believed that after the issuance of legal tender, the money supply 
could be adjusted flexibly according to the actual needs of society.384 
   As a transitional method, the banknotes issued by other banks (except 
the three banks above) would be recognized if they were issued before 
November 3, and no additional issuance would be permitted. These old 
banknotes would be gradually recalled within a certain period of time. 
   Second, it pointed out that the redemption of silver was stopped and 
China was separated from the silver standard system. The article one 
stipulated that “all public and private transactions must be settled by legal 
tender and the use of silver dollar (現銀) was prohibited.” Also, the article 4 
stipulated that “all silver dollars, silver coins or other silvers held by public 
and private institutions and individuals should be handed over to the 
“Issuance Reserves Management Committee” (発行準備管理委員会) or the 
designated banks for the exchange of legal tender since November 4th.”385 
   Third, it emphasized to promote currency management and ensured the 
exchange rate stability. The article 6 stipulated that “the Central Bank, 
Bank of China and Bank of Communications could perform exchange rate 
trading unboundedly so as to stabilize the exchange rate of legal tender.” 
The value of the new legal tender adopted a pegging policy to the pound, 
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and 1 yuan equaled to 1 shilling 2.5 pence.386 Then in May 1936, China 
signed the China-America Currency Agreement and agreed to deposit gold 
and foreign exchange assets to America in exchange for America’s help to 
stabilize the legal tender. Since then, China’s new currency system began 
to establish a close relationship with America.387 
   Then in December 23, the Chinese Ministry of Finance announced the 
inspection rules of the Issuance Reserves Management Committee, which 
stipulated that the amount of the legal tender and quantity of currency 
reserves should be checked every month (article 2); the issuance of legal 
tender should have 100% currency reserves, 60% of which consisted of gold, 
silver and foreign exchanges, and the other 40% was the securities issued 
by the Nanjing Government or other assets (article 4).388 Moreover, any 
speculation behavior would be severely punished.389 The purpose of these 
rules was to prevent the over-issuance of legal tender and maintain its 
stability. 
   Then in order to take care of the interests of farmers, the Chinese 
Farmers Bank was also allowed to issue the legal tender. Therefore, the 
circulation of new banknotes continued to increase. In October 1935, the 
total amount of banknotes issued by the four major banks was only 
436,595,862 yuan. But by October 1936, the total amount of issuance rose 
to 1,093,438,745 yuan.390 Among the newly issued banknotes, some were 
used to withdraw the old banknotes issued by other banks; some were used 
to purchase silver; and others were used in industrial production and 
economic life. By October 1937, the total currency issuance further rose to 
1,556,309,801 yuan. 
   This reform had tremendous impacts on China’s domestic economic 
development and the balance of power in the Fareast region. However, 
from the perspective of Sino-Japanese economic relations, its effects were 
mainly reflected in two aspects: namely the currency depreciation and 
increased currency supply. 
   First, from the perspective of exchange rate, the legal tender had a 
large depreciation against the yen, US dollar and pound. The table below 
showed the changes of exchange rate index in the Shanghai International 
Exchange Market: 
 
Year Britain America Japan France Germany 
1926 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
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1927 90.1 90.3 90.7 73.3 90.6 
1928 93.5 93.6 96.2 76.1 93.6 
1929 85.1 85.0 87.6 69.2 85.3 
1930 60.7 60.8 57.8 49.3 60.8 
1931 49.0 44.9 43.9 36.5 45.2 
1932 62.2 44.8 75.3 36.4 45.1 
1933 61.3 53.2 98.3 33.9 42.0 
1934 66.8 69.3 110.7 33.5 41.7 
1935 73.6 74.3 123.1 35.8 43.7 
1936 59.5 60.7 99.8 32.3 35.7 
1937 59.2 59.9 99.4 47.3 35.3 
Table 34 Shanghai Foreign Exchange Rate Index from 1926 to 1937391 
   The decline of exchange rate improved China’s trade conditions, which 
boosted exports and restricted Japan’s dumping policy in the Chinese 
market. Moreover, it also led to the recovery of domestic agricultural and 
industrial production. 
   Second, from the perspective of currency supply, the legal tender reform 
brought about a rapid rise in the currency supply and a slight inflation. As 
mentioned above, the total currency issuance rose to 1,556,309,801 yuan by 
October 1937, which was almost 3.5 times of that in 1935. The increased 
currency supply further led to the easy-money policy and falling interest 
rates of Chinese banks.392 It could help to solve the problem of capital 
shortage for many Chinese enterprises.  
 
2.4 Japan’s Reactions about this Reform 
   Japan had hoped to play a certain role in China’s currency reform in 
1935, and British financial adviser Frederick Leith Ross even visited 
Japan and requested to cooperate with Japan to assist China’s currency 
reform, which indicated that Britain wanted to ease its relations with 
Japan. On the Japanese side, the Finance Minister Takahashi korekiyo 
and some international financial experts viewed it as a good opportunity 
and became enthusiastic about this plan. However, due to the strong 
opposition of the Army, Japan eventually refused Lease Ross’s proposal.393 
It inevitably led to Britain and America occupying the dominant position in 
China’s new monetary system, and Japan had to face this new awkward 
situation. 
   Kobayashi Hideo divides Japan’s understanding towards this reform 
into three stages: First, from November 3 to the end of 1935, Japan’s 
attention was mainly concentrated on the investigation and study of 
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currency reform and thought about countermeasures. Second, from 
January to May in 1936, the foreign banks except Japanese banks handed 
over silver to the Chinese government, which meant that the currency 
reform was likely to succeed. Third, after May 1935, the Nanjing 
government had removed one obstacle after another in the currency reform, 
and this reform would be sure to succeed.394 
   Along with the deepening of understanding, Japanese officials were 
very dissatisfied and disgusted with the implementation of the Chinese 
currency reform. The Japanese Army believed that, “it reflected the 
Nanjing government’s sentiment of anti-Japanese and anti-Manchukuo. It 
is not conducive to the permanent peace in East Asia and is a very 
short-sighted approach. And its main purpose is to promote China’s foreign 
trade through the currency depreciation.”395 It should be noted that Japan 
paid special attention to the impact of the new currency system on 
Sino-Japanese trade relations. 
   The military official in the Shanghai Consulate Isugai Rensuke 
expressed his strong opposition to the currency reform, he mentioned that 
this reform was not fully prepared, nor had it been understood by Japan, so 
it would definitely fail in the near future. And he encouraged Japanese 
businesspeople and banks in China to boycott this reform, and did not rule 
out the possibility of using force.396 In addition, the Japanese Corps also 
emphasized in an informal statement that “the British loan this time was 
not enough to stabilize China’s new currency. The Nanjing government was 
bound to continue borrowing loans from Britain, which would make China 
a vassal of British capital.”397 And with the continuous strengthening of 
China’s relations with Britain and America, “China’s policy towards Japan 
might turn tough and led to the emergence of a comprehensive 
anti-Japanese campaign.398 
   In a report written by Vice Foreign Mamoru Shigemitsu, he mentioned 
China’s “low exchange rate policy” (低為替政策) triggered by its currency 
reform, and China also actively adjusted its trade policy with its low 
exchange rate. As the exchange rate decreased, the exports of many 
Chinese raw materials and semi-finished products increased rapidly. For 
some protected industries, low exchange rates could also help to reduce 
imports from foreign countries. 399  
   Therefore, the various critical views on Japanese side could also be 
roughly divided into three categories: First, Japan was dissatisfied that 
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China should had been negotiated with Japan on the currency reform issue, 
not Britain; second, if this reform succeeded, the power of Nanjing 
Government would be more consolidated, and China’s domestic politics 
would became more unified; third, Japan was worried that China’s 
cooperation with Britain and America would decline Japan’s economic 
interests in the Far East. 
   From China’s point of view, the first point was related to the “honor” (面
子) problem, and it had been partially solved after the explanations by the 
Chinese side. The second point was about China’s territory and sovereignty 
issue, and was mainly concerned by the Japanese Army. However, the third 
part might have the most comprehensive and profound impacts on Japan’s 
economic interests in the Fareast.400 Through this currency reform, China 
hoped to counterbalance the economic advantages of Japan in China and 
the Southeast Asia, and further promoted the development of domestic 
industries and the recovery of Overseas Chinese Trade Network. It also 
indicated that Japan was necessary to adjust its long-preferred dumping 
policy in the region and re-thought its economic relations with China. 
 
3. Counterbalancing Policy: Currency Reform and China’s Economic 
Recovery 
3.1 Currency Depreciation and the Decline of Japan’s Dumping Policy 
   As mentioned above, the legal tender had a large depreciation against 
many foreign currencies, especially the Japanese yen, which directly 
influenced the status of Sino-Japanese trade relations. In 1936, China’s 
exports rose rapidly and the trade deficit was significantly reduced, which 
was shown in the table below: 
Unit: million yuan 
Year Export    Import  Trade deficit 
1929~1931 1464 2082 (—)618 
1933 612 1346 (—)734 
1934 535 1030 (—)495 
1935 576 919 (—)343 
1936 706 942 (—)236 
Table 35 China’s Export and Import in the Early 1930s 401 
   It could be seen from this table that China’s export increased by 22.56% 
in 1936, and its trade deficit decreased by 31.2%. Although China still 
maintained the situation of “trade deficit”, its balance of payments had 
improved a lot. 
   In terms of the types of imported products, except the wool products, 
vehicles, vessels and chemicals, the imports of other items had fallen to 
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some extent. The largest reduction was in rice and wheat, reaching about 
70%; then cotton cloth reduced by 62%, sugar reduced by 55%; and the 
imports of rayon, wood, kerosene and cotton were also reduced by 30%. In 
general, China’s imports had declined no matter in raw materials and 
industrial products. 
Unit: customs gold unit 
Items 1935.01~09 1936.01~09 
Cotton cloth 9,887,696 3,781,445 
Cotton 20,436,781 13,688,876 
Wool products 8,456,031 8,826,151 
Rayon  3,176,525 1,789,746 
Metallic mineral ore 38,645,576 33,635,493 
Mechanical devices  26,864,208 19,042,218 
Vehicles and vessels 11,451,674 16,837,250 
Rice  49,080,951 11,543,729 
Table 36 the Changes of China’s Imports after Currency Reform in 1935 402 
   A trend worthy of attention was the increase in the proportion of raw 
materials, machineries and vehicles, as well as the decline in the 
proportion of consumer goods, reflecting the recovery of Chinese industrial 
production and the improvement of industrial capacity. 
   In terms of the types of exported products, except the peanuts, satin, 
and cotton yarn, the exports of other items had increased to some extent. 
The largest increase was in cotton cloth, soybean and cotton, with a 
growing rate of over 100%; then the China wood oil increased by 98%; 
leather products, coal and some other products increased by more than 
50%; raw silk and some metal minerals increase by about 30%. As a whole, 
China’s export growth in 1936 was very prominent.  
Unit: customs gold unit 
Items  1935.01~09 1936.01~09 Ratio 
Egg products 25,252,688 31,546,391 124.8% 
Leather products 18,252,271 33,478,703 183.4% 
Beans 2,700,075 5,905,251 218.9% 
Coal  4,864,530 8,085,155 166.2% 
Cotton  6,758,720 13,609,530 201.3% 
Raw silk 21,080,802 27,807,695 131.9% 
China wood oil 29,939,098 59,469,979 198.6% 
Cotton yarn 13,051,945 17,259,511 151.3% 
Cotton cloth 1,877,201 6,847,637 364.4% 
Tungsten ore 4,928,809 5,984,872 121.4% 
Tin bar 13,820,909 16,012,142 115.8% 
Table 37 the Changes of China’s Exports after Currency Reform in 1935 403 
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   Under such a background, the trade relations between China and 
Japan had also changed a lot. In fact, Japan was worried from the very 
beginning that this currency reform would have an impact on Japan’s trade 
with China and its enterprises in China. In a “China Currency Reform 
Symposium” held by the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce and Industry (東京商
工会議所), 19 related questions were raised and some of them were related 
to future China’s trade and industrial policies, such as: 
   (1) What’s the biggest reason why China had to implement this 
reform? (question 2) 
   (2) What impact would this reform have on China’s trade policies? 
Would China move toward a managed trade system? (question 3) 
   (3) Would China had inflation in the near future, and how strong 
would it be? (question 9)  
   (4) How would China’s prices change? (question 17) 404 
 
   If we look at bilateral trade between China and Japan, China’s trade 
deficit declined slightly in 1936. However, this was mainly due to the 
increase in China’s exports to Japan, but China’s decline in imports of 
Japanese goods was not so obvious. However, from the perspective of 
Japan’s dumping policy, the main dumped goods such as cotton cloth had a 
relatively significant decline, which was shown in the table below: 
 
Month Quantity (1000 square yard) Value (yen) 
1936/01 1,528,830 265,822 
1936/02 2,462,954 466,162 
1936/03 3,136,667 541,093 
1936/04 2,937,788 528,490 
1936/05 1,439,952 283,184 
1936/06 528,523 103,167 
1936/07 607,680 115,553 
1936/08 141,664 54,792 
1936/09 323,058 92,607 
1936/10 406,548 81,774 
Table 38 Japan’s Cotton Cloth Exports to China in 1936 405 
   The decline in Japanese cotton cloth dumping provided new 
opportunities for the development of the domestic textile industry, and 
some textile enterprises that had been suspended began to restart their 
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business again. And Japan might be also aware of this risk and 
dramatically cut off the price of cotton price since September 1936, which 
tried to occupy the Chinese market again. 
   As a result, with the advancement of the currency reform, its influence 
on foreign trade became more apparent. It acted as a tool to counterbalance 
Japan’s dumping policy and strived to protect China’s market order and 
the domestic enterprises. From the perspective of Japan, its advantages in 
exchange rate began to disappear, and the space for continuing cutting off 
prices by exploiting labors was also limited. Therefore, Japan’s dumping 
policy faced with serious challenges in China. 
 
3.2 Currency Supply and China’s Development in Textile Industry 
   In addition to the foreign trade, Sino-Japanese companies also 
competed fiercely in the Chinese market, especially in the textile industry. 
As mentioned above, China’s textile companies were highly dependent on 
the bank loans, and the outflow of silver and deflation had severely hit 
China’s textile industry since 1934. And many Japanese textile companies 
took this opportunity to expand their occupation of the Chinese market. 
   One important effect of the 1935 currency reform was to overcome 
China’s financial crisis and improve the existing banking system. And the 
main responsibilities of several major banks were gradually becoming 
clearer, such as: the Central Bank mainly controlled the issuance of 
currency; the Bank of China was mainly responsible for the management of 
foreign exchanges; and the Bank of Communications was mainly concerned 
with the development of the industry; the Chinese Farmers’ Bank paid 
more attention to the marginal provinces, rural areas and land 
businesses.406 
   By the end of 1936, the exchange rate of the new legal tender had 
remained fairly stable, exceeding the expectations of many people. The 
unification of the national currency was constantly advancing, and 
banknotes issued by many local banks and private banks had been 
gradually recalled. The three major banks had recalled more than 300 
million yuan of silver, which strongly supported the issuance of legal 
tender.407 At the same time, the situation of deflation and money squeeze 
also began to improve. 
   As the center of China’s financial industry, Shanghai could clearly 
reflect the changes in China's financial sector. The short-term interest in 
1935 fluctuated at around 20%, which made it almost impossible to get any 
loans. Then with the advancement of the currency reform, the short-term 
interest in 1936 had fallen sharply, stabilizing at around 8%, which greatly 
alleviated the money tightness. The changes of short-term interest were in 
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the table below: 
 
Month Short-term interest (maximum) Short-term interest (minimum) 
1936.01 9% 5% 
1936.02 8% 6% 
1936.03 10% 7% 
1936.04 9% 8% 
1936.05 10% 8% 
1936.06 9% 8% 
1936.07 9% 8% 
1936.08 9% 8% 
1936.09 10% 7% 
1936.10 9% 8% 
1936.11 9% 8% 
1936.12 9% 8% 
Table 39 The Changes of Shanghai’s Short-term Interest in 1936408 
   In addition, another big problem in China’s financial market was that 
the interest rate of “government bonds” (公債) was too high (around 13%), 
which led to a large number of hot money investing government bonds or 
arbitrage transactions. Therefore, the hot money could not fully serve the 
development of China’s domestic industries and commerce. In this context, 
the Nanjing Government issued a 1.46 billion yuan of “unified government 
bond” (統一公債) based on legal tender in February 1936, so as to re-organize 
more than 30 different types of government bonds. It had greatly delayed 
the repayment time and lowered the interest rate of government bond to 
around 6%, which could make the funds in the financial market fully 
concentrated on the development of domestic industry and commerce.409 
   With the consolidation of China’s financial system, the issuance amount 
of new legal tender in 1936 had also increased month by month, which was 
shown in the table below: 
 
Month  Central Bank Bank of China Bank of 
Communications 
total 
1936.01 220,641,090 308,118,309 190,809,700 719,569,099 
1936.02 224,324,443 293,838,239 181,883,700 700,046,382 
1936.03 251,503,350 310,150,611 186,699,700 748,351,661 
1936.04 262,247,473 323,282,987 196,065,640 781,596,100 
1936.05 277,775,264 343,155,286 201,401,740 822,332,290 
1936.06 299,253,125 352,772,792 204,912,051 855,937,968 
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1936.07 300,871,929 365,674,339 210,499,511 876,955,819 
1936.08 305,955,375 367,425,896 206,476,451 897,857,722 
1936.09 313,455,163 377,768,426 217,100,411 908,314,000 
1936.10 305,833,781 441,073,782 244,620,711 961,528,274 
1936.11 312,941,477 439,895,436 272,845,424 1,025,682,337 
1936.12 325,592,469 459,310,240 295,045,524 1,079,948,233 
Table 40 the Issuance Amount of New Legal Tender in 1936410 
   The development of the financial market and the emergence of slight 
inflation had provided new opportunities for the development of China’s 
textile industry, which was also called as “cotton finance” (綿業金融). At the 
end of June 1935, 40% of the China’s spindles were not in operation, and 
the owners of these enterprises hoped to get the assistance from the 
government, and they also agreed to cooperate with the government to 
complete the restructuring of the cotton industry.411 Furthermore, many of 
the textile machineries of Chinese companies had been used since the end 
of the Qing Dynasty and were very old. With the continuous improvement 
of textile technology, it was necessary to update the equipment to enhance 
the competitiveness of Chinese products.412 Although they were aware of 
the importance of the new equipment, these enterprises could never do it 
without the financial support from the banks. 
   First, the financial system’s assistance to the Chinese textile industry 
began in the rural areas, especially for these cotton growers and silkworm 
raisers, which were severely damaged in the rural depression and financial 
crisis. The Chinese Ministry of Finance ordered the Chinese Farmers’ 
Bank (中国農民銀行) to lend loans to the farmers on 1936 February 8, so as to 
promote rural revitalization and construction. The regulation provided 
that: 
 
(1) The bank should prepare at least 50 million yuan for land mortgage 
loans and rural loans. 
(2) The loans mentioned above shall be conducted by the bank’s head 
office, branches or local offices. In important agricultural production 
areas or areas that are in urgent need of financial assistance, branches 
and local offices should be established as soon as possible. 
(3) The land mortgage loans are mainly to improve the soil and 
re-organize the agricultural land, and loans will be issued in a low 
interest rate. 
(4) The rural loans are mainly to assist the land-holding peasants, and 
loans will be issued in a low interest rate. It is necessary to establish 
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more rural cooperatives to issue these loans. 
(5) The bank should set up some agricultural warehouses to facilitate 
the transportation and marketing of agricultural products. 
(6) The bank should report to the Ministry of Finance about the types, 
amounts, issuance areas of these loans every month.413 
 
   The improvement of the financial system and the support of the 
government quickly came into effect. Some other banks also began to follow 
up on lending loans for production of cotton and silk.414 For example, some 
bank representative came to the Jiangbei (northern part of the Yangtze 
River) cotton production areas and decided to issue loans to farmers, and 
they also cooperated with the Jiangsu Provincial Government to renovate 
irrigation systems and transportation. 415  The Bank of China also 
cooperated with the China Minsheng Banking Corp. (民生銀行) to issue a 
600 thousand yuan of loans to help cotton farmers in Shandong (山東) 
Province.416 Besides, the banks’ supports to farmers in Shanxi, Hebei, and 
Henan Province had also increased a lot. In 1936, China’s cotton field area 
and cotton production showed a huge increase. 
 
 
Year  
North China 
(Lu, Ji, Yu, Jin, 
Shan, Gan) 
Central China 
(Su, Zhe, Wan, Gan, 
E, Xiang, Chuan) 
South China 
(Min, Yue, 
Qian,Dian) 
Whole country 
1931 7,916 6,548 106 14,570 
1932 6,946 8,100 97 15,143 
1933 7,592 8,896 107 16,595 
1934 8,659 7,045 145 15,849 
1935 6,491 7,696 151 14,338 
1936 11,015 9,490 134 20,639 
Table 41 China's Cotton Production Changes from 1931~1936417 
 
   Second, with the increase in cotton field area and cotton production, 
many Chinese cotton mills that had been shut down were also considering 
starting and resume production. And Chinese banks and financial markets 
also played an important role in this process. With the slight inflation 
brought about by the currency reform, these cotton mills could repay their 
previous debts and re-expand production. For example, the Zhenxin (振新) 
Cotton Company signed a contract with the Bank of Shanghai and asked 
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for its help in debt repayment, company restructuring and re-production.418 
And the Dacheng (大成) Company also increased its capital by 2 million 
yuan to build a new factory, which showed that China’s cotton industry 
entered a phase of recovery after years of downturn.419 It should be paid 
special attention to the cooperation between Zhejiang Plutocrat (浙江財閥) 
and “Four South China Banks” (南派四銀行), and many of their cooperation 
were concentrated on the cotton companies, such as Hankou First Cotton 
Company, Zhenxin Cotton Company, Dingxin Cotton Company and 
Hengfeng Textile Company.420 The operating rates of spindles and looms in 
Chinese companies had increased in 1936, and it was shown in the table 
below: 
 
Year  Spindles in Chinese Companies  Looms in Chinese Companies 
Stored 
spindles  
Working  
spindles 
operating 
rates 
Stored 
looms 
Working  
looms 
operating 
rates 
1928 2113528 1971444 93.3% 16783 14268 85% 
1929 2326862 2180838 93.7% 16005 14805 92.5% 
1930 2402674 2274274 94.7% 17018 14913 87.6% 
1931 2589040 2537080 98.0% 20599 18181 88.3% 
1932 2637413 2517573 95.5% 19081 18499 96.9% 
1933 2742754 2498818 91.1% 20926 17644 84.3% 
1934 2807391 2489395 88.7% 22567 19333 85.7% 
1935 2850745 2342481 82.2% 24861 19640 79.0% 
1936 2746392 2408664 87.7% 25503 21678 85.0% 
Table 42 the Operating Rates of Spindles and Looms in Chinese Companies 421 
   As can be seen from the table above, the operating rates of the Chinese 
cotton companies stopped falling in 1936 and re-emerged. The Nanjing 
Government and many provincial governments had provided tremendous 
help and guidance to the revival of the textile industry. And their purpose 
was not only to promote the modernization of China’s textile industry, but 
more importantly, to compete with Japanese textile companies in China. 
Otani, an official of the Japanese Ministry of Industry and Commerce, also 
said that “China’s various industries have achieved rapid development 
recently, especially in the cotton industry, and it will soon pose a serious 
threat to Japan.”422 
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4. Counterbalancing Policy: Currency Reform and the Recovery of 
Overseas Chinese Trade Network 
4.1 Currency Depreciation and China’s Trade Relations with Southeast 
Asia 
   At that time, one important task for the Nanjing government was to 
rescue overseas Chinese businessmen and recover the trade network 
between China and Southeast Asia. Southeast Asia was an important area 
for China’s exports and overseas remittances acted as an important tool to 
improve China’s balance of payments, which was crucial to the operation of 
China’s national economy. 
   China was increasingly aware that the fierce competition between 
China and Japan in Southeast Asian economy, which mainly included 
three aspects: (1) trade competition, which was pushed by the Japanese 
government’s policies; (2) industrial competition, which referred to the 
mechanization of Japanese factories and their exploitation of labors; (3) 
agricultural competition, which meant that Japanese acquired local land 
for crop planting, especially in Philippine. It was obvious that the most 
serious one was the “trade competition” and Japan’s dumping policy, which 
severely damaged the interests of overseas Chinese merchants and China’s 
economic relations with Southeast Asia.423  
   After inspecting the current situation of overseas Chinese merchants in 
Southeast Asia, the Minister of Industry Chen Gongbo (陳公博) proposed 
some advices in 1935, and he emphasized that “China should have a much 
clearer understanding of the situation of consumers in Southeast Asia.”424 
It pointed out that in the context of the low purchasing power in Southeast 
Asia, the competitiveness of cheap Japanese goods was obviously higher 
than that of Chinese goods. At the same time, many overseas Chinese 
merchants tried their best to boycott Japanese goods, which also caused 
dissatisfaction among Southeast Asian aborigines. Lu Zhuoxin, an official 
of the Chinese Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee, also pointed out that 
“all domestic manufacturers in China should pay attention to the quality of 
products sold to Southeast Asia, and make the lowest price to narrow the 
price gap with the Japanese goods.”425 
   Since the currency reform in 1935, the exchange rate of the legal tender 
had fallen sharply and gradually stabilized in 1936, which was conductive 
to improve China’s trade conditions with Southeast Asia. In addition, due 
to the increase of Chinese cotton production and the decline in cotton cloth 
prices in 1936, the sales of Chinese cotton fabrics in Southeast Asia also 
began to rise. Therefore, many people also regarded it as a good 
opportunity to counterbalance Japan’s economic advantages in Southeast 
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Asia, and actively launched the movement on promoting exports of Chinese 
products.  
   On July 16, 1936, the government also sent a Nanyang (南洋) Trade 
Mission to promote trade relations with Southeast Asia, and this visit 
lasted for about four months. This delegation held exhibitions of Chinese 
products throughout Southeast Asian States, and signed export orders for 
more than 1.5 million yuan.426 At the same time, they also negotiated with 
the local government to reduce restrictions on the amount of Chinese 
imports.  
   For overseas Chinese merchants and consumers in Southeast Asia, the 
most important thing was still the price. Many overseas Chinese 
merchants said to the delegation that if Chinese products could be reduced 
to only 5% or 10% higher than foreign competitors, they would spare no 
effort to promote Chinese domestic products. Therefore, it could be seen 
that Chinese cotton fabrics, especially home-made cloth (土布) became the 
first best-selling goods in Southeast Asia, because their prices became very 
competitive after the currency depreciation and the recovery of China’s 
domestic cotton industry. 
   First, for the trade relationship between China and British Malaya, it 
achieved rapid growth from 1936 to 1937, which was shown in the table 
below: 
Unit: strait dollar 
Year  Imports from China Exports to China 
1931 30,507,474 5,176,607 
1932 22,364,681 4,006,288 
1933 20,043,041 5,862,636 
1934 22,585,376 5,466,033 
1935 20,415,900 3,596,640 
1936 22,067,596 4,351,758 
1937 27,612,000 5,090,000 
1938 23,919,780 3,156,032 
Table 43 British Malaya’s Trade Relations with China from 1931 to 1938427 
   China’s exports to British Malaya were mainly vegetables, cotton cloth, 
silk fabrics and peanut oil in 1936. And the chairman of the Nanyang 
Trade Mission Gao Shiheng (高事恆) said that he had the confidence to 
compete with low-priced Japanese good in Malaya, and “we believe that 
within five years that China will be able to hold her own in light 
manufactures and textiles….and we estimate that Chinese production 
costs are thirty percent lower than Japanese, so we have to reckon with 
Japanese manufactures’ under-selling behaviors and smuggling 
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campaign.”428  And there were nearly 1.8 million overseas Chinese in 
British Malaya, which meant a big potential market for Chinese products. 
   Second, for the trade relationship between China and Dutch India, it 
also achieved rapid growth from 1936 to 1937, which was shown in the 
table below: 
Unit: Chinese yuan 
Year  Imports from China 
1931 1,416,962,868 
1932 767,535,334 
1933 611,827,990 
1934 535,733,321 
1935 575,809,060 
1936 705,471,403 
1937 838,255,705 
1938 762,641,058 
Table 44 Dutch India’s Trade Relations with China from 1931 to 1938429 
   China’s exports to Dutch India were mainly cotton fabrics, food, daily 
necessities, papers and medicinal materials. In addition, Chinese 
governments also negotiated with the Dutch Indian Government to issue 
special permission for imported products from China, and further removed 
the import restrictions on Chinese cotton cloth.  
   Third, for the trade relationship between China and Philippine, their 
trade volume had returned to the level of 1932 after several years of 
decline, which was shown in the table below: 
Unit: Chinese Yuan 
Year  Imports from China Exports to China 
1933 5,449,000 4,254,000 
1934 5,107,000 4,962,000 
1935 4,807,000 4,854,000 
1936 6,103,000 4,019,000 
1937 6,945,000 3,883,000 
1938 6,703,000 3,521,000 
Table 45 Philippine’s Trade Relations with China from 1933 to 1938430 
   Although the total amount of Sino-Philippine trade was not very large, 
there were many types of products involved, so there was great potential 
for further development. In May 1936, Chinese industrial leaders in 
Philippine also decided to organize the “Sino-Philippines Trade Council” to 
promote Chinese trade in the new commonwealth.431 And in order to deal 
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with the “overnight success of Japanese penetration of Philippine foreign 
and domestic trade and industries which heretofore were majorly 
controlled by Chinese retailers, the Chinese General Chamber of 
Commerce in the Philippines was working on a widespread and intensive 
campaign to promote a closer Sino-Philippine economic and social 
relationship with the help of Chinese Consulate.” And these Chinese 
business leaders also made use of the nationalist sentiments raised in the 
Philippines to counter Japanese retailers and its dumping policies.432 
   Fourth, for the trade relations between China and Siam, their trade 
volume did not increase obviously, but these Chinese merchants still 
recover their influence in Siam soon. The trade data were shown in the 
below table. 
Unit: Chinese yuan 
Year  Imports from China 
1933   5,825,833 
1934 4,556,697 
1935 3,606,000 
1936 4,051,000 
1937 4,111,000 
1938 6,019,000 
Table 46 Siam’s Trade Relations with China from 1933 to 1938433 
   China’s exports to Siam were not so large, and the fastest growing 
products during this period were mainly textiles, papers, Chinese wine and 
fruits. In order to promote the bilateral trade relations, an economic 
mission was sent to Siam in May 1936, and the head of this mission Dr. 
Ling Ping held conversations with responsible officials of the Siamese 
Ministry of Economic Affairs and suggested mutual efforts for the 
promotion of Sino-Siamese trade; the inauguration of regular navigation 
lines between Siam and China by joint interests; and the establishment of 
a bank, either with Chinese capital, or Sino-Siamese joint investments, to 
assist in the development of Sino-Siamese trade. 434  Furthermore, a 
Sino-Siamese association was also established in early 1937 to promote 
their trade and friendship. 
   Finally, for the trade relations between China and French Indochina, it 
had also increased a lot from 1936 to 1937, especially in the raw silk, which 
accounted for nearly half of China’s exports to French Indochina. 
   Unit: Chinese yuan 
Year  Imports from China Exports to China 
1933 3,992,556 75,525,956 
1934 4,759,891 41,605,860 
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1935 5,644,000 59,973,000 
1936 9,894,000 18,048,000 
1937 12,827,000 29,991,000 
1938 15,816,000 11,990,000 
Table 47 French Indochina’s Trade Relations with China from 1933 to 1938435 
   For a long time, French Indochina had maintained a trade surplus to 
China, especially by the exports of rice and coal. In 1935, French Indochina 
agreed to sign a trade agreement with China in exchange for China’s 
concessions in reducing import tariffs of rice and coal. However, the 
currency reform in late 1935 completely balanced China’s losses by 
reducing tariffs, and further changed the trade status between China and 
French Indochina. It should be noted that China unexpectedly achieved a 
trade surplus with French Indochina in 1938.436 
 
4.2 The Recovery of Trade Network and the Nanjing Government’s Policy 
towards Overseas Chinese 
   Due to the improvement of trade relations between China and 
Southeast Asia, the economic situation of overseas Chinese merchants had 
improved obviously. At the same time, the exchange rate decline caused by 
China’s currency reform had further stimulated the expansion of overseas 
remittances. 
   Generally, there were two purposes for overseas Chinese remittances. 
One was for the daily life of domestic relatives, and the other was for 
investing and setting up various industries. A large amount of remittances 
were stored in banks or Qianzhuang (銭荘), which in fact was also a form of 
investment.437 When China’s exchange rate rose, the remittances for daily 
life would be slightly reduced, while remittances for investment would be 
significantly reduced. On the contrary, when China’s exchange rate 
declined, the remittances for daily life would slightly increase, while 
remittances for investment would be significantly enhanced. 
   Unit: yuan 
Year Total overseas remittance  
1931 422,200,000 
1932 323,500,000 
1933 305,700,000 
1934 250,000,000 
1935 316,000,000 
1936 320,000,000 
1937 450,000,000 
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1938 600,000,000 
1939 700,000,000 
1940 600,000,000 
1941 650,000,000 
Table 48 the Changes of Overseas Chinese Remittances from 1931 to 1941438 
   The increase of remittances had become an important force to balance 
China’s international balance of payments, and has greatly promoted the 
economic construction and industrial development promoted by the 
Nanjing government. And the United States Department of Commerce also 
reported that, “there has been a considerable increase in the amount of 
Chinese overseas remittances during the month of June (1936)…largely 
due to the improved economic condition of Chinese immigrants in British 
Malaya”, and the Department of Commerce also declared that “China 
financial standing would be enormously benefited by the reorganization of 
the financial structure and the currency reform.”439 
   Taking China’s Fujian and Guangdong Province, which had the most 
overseas Chinese, as an example, the role of remittances could be 
understood more clearly: 
   Unit: yuan 
Guangdong Province Trade deficit Remittances Remaining sum 
1934 192,182,434 198,000,000 (+)5,817,566 
1935 195,461,097 220,000,000 (+)24,538,903 
  1936 161,924,442 253,000,000 (+)91,075,558 
 
Fujian Province Trade deficit Remittances Remaining sum 
1934 38,595,434 46,398,000 (+)7,802,753 
1935 36,160,461 54,804,710 (+)18,644,249 
1936 22,777,318 62,356,300 (+)39,578,982 
Table 49 the Trade Deficit and Remittances in Guangdong and Fujian Province440 
   It could be seen that the remittances of overseas Chinese in Guangdong 
and Fujian Province could not only make up for the trade deficit, but also 
left a lot for local economic development. Therefore, there was a saying at 
the time that “the South China society is fed on the Southeast Asian 
overseas Chinese”. However, the role of overseas Chinese was not limited 
to South China, and it played an important role in the development of the 
entire Chinese economy. 
   Utilizing the exchange rate changes and the recovery of domestic 
industries brought about by the currency reform, the trade relations 
between China and Southeast Asia had been recovered to some extent, and 
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overseas remittances had also increased significantly. It enabled the 
Nanjing government to repair the trade network that was severely 
damaged by the Japanese dumping policy.  
   Furthermore, it should be emphasized that the relationship between 
the Chinese government and overseas Chinese had been greatly enhanced 
during this process. In the past, most of the overseas Chinese fled to 
Southeast Asia due to war and extreme difficulties in life. The Chinese 
government did not play a big role in it, nor had it established a systematic 
and institutional relationship with overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. 
However, the crisis brought about by Japanese dumping inspired the 
Nanjing government fully aware of the importance of the overseas Chinese 
economy and tried to consolidate contact and cooperation with them more 
effectively. 
   During this period, a large number of Chinese officials, scholars, and 
businesspeople visited Southeast Asia to better understand the current 
situation and helped solve the difficulties of overseas Chinese. The 
Minister of Industry Chen Gongbo (陳公博) said that, “there are some 
shortcomings in China’s trade relations with Southeast Asia, such as the 
overseas Chinese merchants cannot be well organized and concentrated; 
China’s exporters also cannot well organized and concentrated; the 
communications between overseas Chinese merchants and domestic 
exporter are quite few and difficult.”441 Therefore, the Nanjing government 
actively cooperated with the China General Chamber of Commerce (中華総
商会) to promote mutual trade relations. The Overseas Chinese Affairs 
Committee invited many overseas Chinese merchants and Chambers of 
Commerce to return to China to investigate investment and business 
conditions, and held lots of domestic goods exhibitions in Southeast Asia.442 
   For example, the China General Chamber of Commerce in Singapore 
held several exhibitions in 1936 and 1937, which aimed to promote Chinese 
products and strengthen the communications and information exchanges 
between merchants from both sides. 443  As an important trade 
transshipment center in Southeast Asia, Singapore played an important 
role in promoting Chinese products. The scale of the exhibitions was 
getting bigger and bigger, and the Nanjing government also gave strong 
support behind it. The similar exhibitions were also held in Siam, British 
Malaya, Dutch India Philippine and some other places. 
   Moreover, the Ministry of Economic Affairs of the ROC also announced 
detailed plans to support investment of overseas Chinese, especially in 
steel, railway, vehicles, aircraft, international trading companies, 
insurance business, paper industry, textile industry, rubber industry, sugar, 
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mining and so on.444 
   Besides, the Nanjing Government also promoted the establishment of 
Overseas Chinese Affairs Bureau (僑務局) in related provinces, especially 
Guangdong Province. The main tasks of them were: 
 
(1) Immigration registration;  
(2) Setting up the Overseas Chinese Information Agency; 
(3) Issuing passport and other travel documents; 
(4) Registering unemployed overseas Chinese; 
(5) Rewarding overseas Chinese to return to China for investment; 
(6) Investigating the fraud behavior of the shipping company; 
(7) Providing guidance to the overseas Chinese returning to China.445 
 
   It showed that the Nanjing government wished to strengthen the 
understanding, management and protection of overseas Chinese, and 
hoped to have a clearer understanding of the situation and market of 
Southeast Asia. 
   Then in addition to the Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee, the 
Kuomintang (中国国民党) was also actively involved in the leadership of 
overseas Chinese affairs, and realized some kind of “party dominance in 
overseas Chinese affairs” (僑務党化).446 On November 18, 1935, the Fifth 
National Congress of Kuomintang  emphasized that importance to 
promote overseas party affairs (海外党務), which stated that:  
 
(1) A special department should be set up to take charge of the 
guidance and supervision of the Kuomintang Central Committee on 
overseas party affairs. 
(2) In overseas countries, it is necessary to follow the principle of China 
and set up special commissioners in different regions to facilitate 
guidance. 
(3) According to the old rule, the allowance was paid to the overseas 
party branch every month. 
(4) The central tasks of the overseas party branch are to promote 
Chinese culture; promote overseas Chinese education; and improve the 
friendship with the local people. 
(5) It is necessary to resume the overseas Chinese training class of the 
Central Political School (中央政治学校), or set up a training school for 
party members abroad. 
(6) It is necessary to increase the spending on international 
propaganda. 
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(7) It is necessary to pay attention to protecting the interests of 
overseas Chinese, and the influence of Kuomintang must be deepened 
into the overseas Chinese. 
(8) Where the embassy or consulate has not yet been set up, the 
overseas party branch should be responsible for international 
information work; where there is an embassy or consulate, the party 
branch should assist the diplomat on collecting information.447 
 
   In general, in order to balance Japan’s trade advantage in Southeast 
Asia and recover the economic relations between China and Southeast 
Asia, the Nanjing government attached great importance to its overseas 
Chinese policy and strengthened the organizational and institutionalized 
links with overseas Chinese. It played an important role in the 
Sino-Japanese War that took place shortly afterwards. The donations 
and material assistance had become China's powerful reliance and 
weapons in this war. 
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Chapter 5 
Gold Standard and Thailand’s Economic Transition in the 
Beginning of Pacific War (1941~1942) 
 
 
1. Gold and Yen: the Evolution of Bloc Economy and Thailand’s Choice  
1.1 Gold Standard System in the 1930s and the Role of Gold 
   As mentioned above, the rebuild gold standard system in the 1920s had 
three new characteristics: First, the gold bullion or gold exchange standard 
system was replacing the traditional gold coin standard system; second, 
the gold standard system during this period contained more regulatory 
factors, and gave more power to the government and the central bank; 
finally, many countries that returned to the gold standard in the 1920s 
faced a dilemma of insufficient gold reserves. Overall, what was rebuilt 
during this period was a weakened gold standard system. 
   At that time, this weakened system was once again hit by the Great 
Depression since 1929. Every country tried to cope with the economic crisis 
by building high tariff barriers and currency depreciation, and they 
continuously chose to abandon the gold standard system from 1929 to 1936. 
Although in 1933 France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, 
Poland jointly formed a “gold group” to promote the reconstruction of the 
gold standard system, but it contradicted with America’s inflationism 
policy and Britain’s opportunistic monetary policy, which eventually ended 
in failure. 448  It actually declared the collapse of the traditional gold 
standard system, but the new monetary system had not yet been 
established, because many countries were still trying to return to the gold 
standard system. Some scholars referred to this period as “The Tripartite 
System”, that is, the monetary cooperation dominated by America, Britain 
and France in the chaotic times.449 
   In order to maintain the stability of the world currency order, America, 
Britain and France officially signed the Tripartite Agreement and the 
supplementary Gold Agreement in 1936. The America Government also 
issued a statement on October 12 stating that America would export gold 
or provide earmarked gold to countries that allow gold to be sold to 
America, so as to ensure the stability of their exchange rates. This 
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agreement aimed to promote gold movement and exchange rate stability 
between America, Britain and France, and was even called as a “new type 
of gold standard system”. 450  Before long Belgium, Netherlands and 
Switzerland also requested to join the agreement. 
   The achievement of the Trilateral System was an improvement of the 
former gold standard system. From the economic perspective, it allowed 
the growth of the country’s money supply and was conducive to achieving 
economic recovery as soon as possible. At the same time, it also curbed the 
competitive devaluation in the international arena and provided certain 
stability for the international economy.451 From the political perspective, 
the monetary cooperation between America, Britain and France was not 
only for the common economic interests, but also for seeking political 
support from America to deal with the rise of fascist states. Moreover, the 
formation of the Trilateral System could also be regarded as the origin of 
the dollar-dominated gold exchange standard system after the World War 
II.452 
   As early as January 30, 1934, the American President Franklin 
Roosevelt passed the Gold Reserve Act, which stipulated a fixed price for 
buying and selling gold – $35 per ounce. “According to the terms of this act, 
the ownership of all gold coins and bullions belong to the American 
government, and all gold coins will be withdrawn from circulation and 
melted into gold bullion, and new gold coin casting activities will not be 
permitted.” “Then from February 1, 1934, the official price of gold has been 
fixed at the level of $35 per ounce... As a result, the gold reserve act has 
established a lower limit for the world gold price in dollars.”453 And after 
the price of gold in dollars was established, the exchange rates of other 
countries began to take the US dollar as a reference or even pegged to it. 
Britain hoped to establish some alliance between British pound and US 
dollar, and it also tried to ensure consistency with American monetary 
policy at any cost. With the French franc officially linked to the pound in 
1938, the relationship between the dollar, the pound and the franc was 
basically established, and a currency group centered on the dollar had 
actually formed. 
   At the same time, America was constantly promoting the gold 
concentration policy (金集中政策 ). By the end of 1939, America’s gold 
holdings had reached 17.6 billion dollars, accounting for 60% of the global 
gold holdings. There were mainly four reasons for this phenomenon: the 
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first was the rapid increase in world gold production; the second was that 
America maintained a big trade surplus since 1937, and gold had become 
the main tool for international settlement; the third was the deteriorating 
political situation in Europe, which led to a large amount of gold in Europe 
capital fleeing to the United States; the fourth was the US gold purchase 
policy that has been promoted since 1933. Therefore, a strong impression 
at the time was that there was a huge gold reserve support behind the 
dollar, which was the source of the strong financial strength of the United 
States. And it also supported the sterling bloc and the franc bloc which 
stood firmly with the dollar.454 After the outbreak of World War II, the Axis 
Group’s aversion to gold was very obvious. Germany announced the use of 
“productive labor” as the basis for its currency, which would be far superior 
to the dollar supported by gold.455 Japan was also trying to build a regional 
currency and settlement system based on the Japanese yen, which was in 
opposition to the “gold-dominated states”. 
   Therefore, after the collapse of the gold standard system since the 1930s, 
it continued to function in the form of the Trilateral System, and America 
began to play a dominant role in the global financial system. So during this 
time period, how did we understand the role and position of gold? One view 
held that since the convertible relationship between domestic currency and 
gold had ended, the role of gold in the domestic economy was completely 
disappeared. However, another view pointed out in an opposite manner, “as 
the most important world currency, gold is still hidden behind the credit of 
any currency. No matter how the banknotes develop, gold reserves are 
crucial.”456 As the international situation continued to deteriorate since 
the late 1930s, the economic blocs that were isolated from each other were 
increasingly formed. Therefore, the latter view gradually prevailed in the 
discussions. 
   First, some focused on the role of gold reserves in maintaining currency 
credit. And they believed that the “gold standard mentality” (金本位心理) 
must be taken into account when considering the credit maintenance of a 
certain currency. Although there was no demand for gold redemption in 
domestic economy, the long-established gold standard mentality made the 
gold reserve still have its practical significance. And many countries also 
tried to maintain a certain connection between gold and their national 
currencies. 457  From the international situation in the 1930s, it was 
necessary for a currency to keep in touch with other countries in order to 
avoid isolation in the international financial market, and gold still seemed 
to be the best choice. Nishino Kiyosaku believed that “it is not realistic to 
establish a complete managed monetary system immediately, and a 
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managed gold standard system seems to be more likely to emerge, which 
can help maintain the stability of domestic prices and the foreign exchange 
market.”458 From the perspective of Japan, as the world continued to slip 
into the wartime economy, the so-called “golden issues” (金問題) attracted 
the attention of many scholars. In 1938, Kimura Kihachiro pointed out that 
“the gold issues’ impact on Japan involves political, economic, social and 
some other fields. The Japanese government has used a large amount of 
gold only as a payment tool in foreign trade, constantly eroding domestic 
currency reserves. What Japan ignores is that the increase or decrease of 
gold still affects the stability of the currency, and the gold principle is still 
valid... when the gold reserves are abundant, the national currency can 
work smoothly in the foreign exchange market; but when the gold reserves 
plummet, the credit of the national currency in the foreign exchange 
market may be problematic.”459 
   Second, some focused on the construction of the future monetary system. 
At that time, many countries began to realize that although it seemed 
unlikely to restore the traditional gold standard system, the new monetary 
system in the future was bound to be based on gold. Fukai Eigo believed 
that the future monetary system might be based on gold, or a mix of gold 
and silver, or an existing strong foreign currency, but in any case, gold 
would play a fundamental role.460 Therefore, it was still necessary for 
countries to maintain a certain amount of gold reserves. Even in the 
construction of a new international monetary order in the future, gold 
might play an important role. 
   Third, some focused on the role of gold in trade settlement at the time. 
Although the traditional gold standard system went collapse in the 1930s, 
the status of gold as a means of international trade settlement did not 
change fundamentally. Under the special permission of the government, 
gold exports were still allowed. Furthermore, by the end of the 1930s, gold 
shipments seemed to be the only viable means of trade at the time. As that 
time, America was the world’s major resource and industrial power, which 
led to significant increase in international demand for the US dollar and a 
large concentration of gold in the United States. However, for non-gold- 
producing countries, they generally faced the dilemma between “currency 
reserve” and “foreign settlement. They must use part of the gold to 
purchase strategic materials from other countries, while at the same time 
not excessively eroding the gold reserves of their central banks. And this 
dilemma also forced the Axis group to establish a closed economic and 
monetary bloc in Europe and Asia, in order to replace the gold-based 
international settlement mechanism, which was the “great-sphere 
economy” (広域経済 ) and the Greater East Asian Clearing Mechanism 
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promoted by Japan. But even in this extreme economic system, Japan did 
not completely deny the role of gold. It believed that “even if efforts are 
made to promote self-sufficiency within the great-sphere economy bloc, it 
cannot exclude the limited trade behavior between different economic blocs, 
so as to meet the shortage of some natural resources. In this case, gold still 
has its convenience.”461 
   Finally, with the rising confrontation between Germany and 
Anglo-American powers, the gold itself was endowed with more strategic 
implications. According to one report issued by the Cabinet Intelligence 
Department of Japan in 1940, the “gold-support theory” of America and the 
“gold-abandonment theory” of Germany were competing fiercely at that 
time.462 But the core was not in the value and essence of gold itself, but in 
the imbalance of gold distribution in the world. America occupied almost 
three-quarters of the world’s gold reserves. On the contrary, Germany had 
almost lost all gold reserves, thus there was no alternative but to establish 
a new currency order. Hitler’s Minister of Economy Walther Funk believed 
that “the future of Europe’s new currency order will not have any role of 
gold. We should not be bound by a monetary system that cannot be 
completely controlled by ourselves. As gold is concentrated in the United 
States, the gold issues have now become a total domestic problem for the 
United States.”463 Funk’s statement implied the emergence of a “non-gold 
economics”, and the purpose was to establish a new European economic 
system dominated by the German mark. Therefore, the gold issue seemed 
to have transcended an economic problem and became an important 
political problem. 
 
1.2 Japan’s Changing Views on Gold in the 1930s 
   Some scholars pointed out that the outbreak of the Pacific War was not 
inevitable. In fact, throughout the 1930s, Japan strategically tried to avoid 
the final showdown with America, and appropriately respected America’s 
open door policy and it interests in the Far East. And the same logic was 
also applicable in Japan’s financial policy. After the Inukai Tsuyoshi 
cabinet announced its withdrawal from the gold standard on December 13, 
1931, Japan’s attitudes toward gold had also gradually changed from 
cooperation to confrontation. 
   The cooperative relations between Japan and gold could be divided into 
two phases: the first phase was from the beginning of 1932 to the end of 
1936, during which gold was regarded as one of the important components 
of Japan’s currency reserves, also known as the “expanding currency 
reserve-ism” (正貨準備拡充主義); the second phase was from 1937 to 1940, 
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during which gold was used as the main tool for international trade, also 
known as “gold-shipment-ism” (金現送主義). 
   The first phase was the period of “expanding currency reserve-ism”, 
which was aimed at making up for the rapid loss of gold reserves in Japan 
in the past few years. To some extent, it could also be understood that the 
Japanese governors still seemed to be preparing for the return to the gold 
standard system in the future.464 At the end of 1929, Japan’s gold reserves 
still had around 1,072.27 million yen, but with the announcement of the 
lifting of the ban on gold exports and the return to the gold standard on 
January 11, 1930, a large-scale gold outflow occurred in Japan. By the end 
of 1930, Japan’s gold reserves were only 825.99 million yen, and it was 
further reduced to 465.95 million yen at the end of 1931. In April 1932, it 
was reduced to 422.06 million yen. 
     Therefore, in order to expand Japan’s gold reserves, Japan had adopted 
an active policy to reward gold production. In addition to the rising gold 
prices during this period, gold miners were further encouraged to expand 
production. Since March 1932, Japanese government officially announced 
the gold purchase price to promote the gold purchase. The gold production 
in Japan from 1929 to 1935 was shown in the following figure: 
Unit: kilogram 
Year  Japan(mainland) Korea Taiwan Total  
1929 10,422.322 5,552.719 462.251 16,437.292 
1930 12,067.899 6,186.451 487.620 18,741.970 
1931 12,275.038 9,031.293 553.920 21,860.251 
1932 12,497.166 9,700.728 817.073 23,014.967 
1933 13,728.590 11,508.165 652.139 25,888.894 
1934 15,146.585 12,427.602 1,002.928 28,577.115 
1935 18,192 — — — 
Table 50 Japan’s Gold Production from 1929 to 1935465 
   Given the stability of currency reserves and exchange rates, Japan was 
considering to preform nationalization and concentrated management of 
the existing gold. Therefore, the Japanese government officially announced 
the Gold Purchase Act by Bank of Japan on April 7, 1934, stipulating that 
the Bank of Japan should purchase and hold gold. Here are some of the 
main terms: 
 
Article 1: The government has decided the Bank of Japan should 
purchase and retain gold on the proposal of the Minister of Finance. 
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Article 2: The purchase price of gold shall be subject to the approval of 
the Minister of Finance; 
Article 3: Gold purchased under this law will be used as a reserve for 
bank exchange certificates; 
Article 4: The Japanese government should bear the debt of gold 
purchases and compensation for insufficient gold in the currency, and 
provide proof of borrowing to the Bank of Japan.  
Article 5: For international payment and other specific purposes, the 
government can order Bank of Japan to transfer the gold purchased 
under this law to the government financial account in the Bank of 
Japan. 
Article 6: When the gold purchased by this law generates profits, the 
Bank of Japan shall hand in part of the profits to the government.466 
 
   The purpose of the Japan’s gold policy during this period was not to 
make international payments, but to consolidate Japan’s currency reserves 
after abandoning the gold standard system and the massive outflow of gold. 
Since the early 1930s, Japan had implemented an expansionary fiscal 
policy, and over-issued a large number of currencies. The expansion of gold 
reserves was conducive to consolidating Japan’s currency credit and 
preventing inflation from falling out of control.467 
   The second phase was the so-called “gold shipment-ism.” With the 
assassination of Minister of Finance Takahashi Kakuji in 1936, the 
“Takahashi Finance” ended, and the new “Baba Finance” (馬場財政) began 
to enter the historical arena. The main feature of this period was the large 
import of munitions, but at the same time the price of overseas raw 
materials was rising. On the one hand, Japan adopted a low-price dumping 
policy in export; on the other hand, the price of imported products became 
increasingly high, which led to Japan’s international balance of payments 
facing severe challenges, and it became more and more difficult for Japan 
to make ends meet. 
   No matter how Japan encouraged and supported export trade, Japan’s 
production capacity and the absorption capacity of the foreign markets 
were almost saturated. Coupled with the rising labor costs in Japan, it was 
increasingly difficult for Japan to continue to maintain its previous export 
advantages. Therefore, the Japanese government began to focus on the role 
of gold, hoping to use gold shipment to make up for Japan’s shortage in 
foreign exchange reserves. 468  Therefore, Japan continued to introduce 
policies to encourage gold production, in order to import as many military 
supplies as possible. In 1937, Japan conducted six large-scale gold 
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shipments to foreign countries, totaling approximately 320 million yen. 
Some of the gold held by Bank of Japan was also diverted from the 
currency reserve to a payment tool in foreign trade. 
   In this context, the Japanese government was fully aware of the 
importance of gold in international trade. However, according to the 
statistics of the relevant gold companies, the gold purchased by the Bank of 
Japan was only about 80% of the total gold production, and the remaining 
20% was still circulated in the market. Furthermore, as the international 
situation continued to deteriorate, Japan realized that it was necessary to 
convert gold into strategic materials as soon as possible to strengthen 
national defense. Therefore, Japan proposed the Gold Production 
Management Law in the special congress and requested to prepare 
relevant budgets for rewarding gold production. The specific regulations 
were as follows: 
 
(1) Newly produced gold needs to be concentrated in the government; 
(2) The government has the right to issue relevant orders or limit the 
use of gold and ban the related transactions of gold; 
(3) The government will perform necessary supervisions, guidance and 
bans on the gold production industry; 
(4) The government exempts the import duties on the relevant 
equipment and machinery required by the gold production industry; 
(5) The government will reward the gold production industry; 
(6) The regulations in overseas land (外地) should be formulated on the 
principles above.469 
 
   The Minister of the Finance Kaya Okinori and Minister of Commerce 
and Industry Yoshino Shinji stressed in their narrative of their policy 
motives, “considering the situation inside and outside, it is very important 
to increase Japan’s domestic gold production, and these gold should be 
managed uniformly by the government to avoid waste, so as to improve 
Japan’s capacity in foreign payment. At the same time, it is also very 
important to consolidate the domestic currency reserves.”470 From the 
statements of the two ministers, their understanding of gold had changed 
significantly, and they obviously paid more attention to improving Japan’s 
capacity in international trade. 
   In 1937, several major gold shipments to foreign countries were shown 
in the following table: 
 
Year Gold (kilogram) Price in yen (1000 yen) 
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1937.03 13,929 54,248 
1937.04 10,095 39,412 
1937.05 14,111 55,093 
1937.06 26,492 102,749 
1937.07 19,651 76,064 
Total  84,279 327,567 
Table 51 Japan’s Several Major Gold Shipments in 1937471 
   As Japan’s understanding of gold changed, it meant that it became 
necessary to transfer part of Bank of Japan’s gold reserves to foreign 
payments. However, the momentum of Japan’s currency over-issuance still 
did not stop, which would cause certain damage on the stability of the yen. 
Both officials and scholars were thinking about how to achieve a balance 
between “currency reserve” and “foreign payment”. 
   Therefore, the Japanese government then officially introduced the Gold 
Reserve Pricing Law (金準備評価法) in August 1937 to adjust the gold 
content of the yen. Through the revision of the currency law and the 
strengthening of gold management, it aimed to eliminate the panic on 
Japanese yen in the market. There were four main points in this law: 
     First, the previous pricing standard was 1 momme gold equivalent to 5 
yen, and it would be revised to 1 momme gold equal to 12.931 yen, which 
actually reduced the gold content in the yen. 
     Second, the profits of 740 million yen brought about by the change in 
gold pricing standard should be handed over to the government and a 
formal special account for gold funds should be established. 
     Third, the government would transfer some of the gold bullion 
preserved by the Bank of Japan to the national treasury (国庫). At the same 
time, the gold coins and gold bullions held by the Bank of Taiwan and the 
Bank of Korea were also transferred to the Bank of Japan for centralized 
management. 
     Fourth, it was stipulated that if gold pricing adjustments were made 
again in the future and some profits were generated, these profits would 
continue to be handed over to the Japanese government; and if losses were 
caused, they would be compensated by the Bank of Taiwan and the Bank of 
Korea.472 
   Judging from this law, the Japanese government was well aware of the 
dual pressures on the reduction of gold reserves and the increase in 
currency issuance. This law was introduced to solve the possible currency 
credit crisis. In the process, Japan also strengthened the management of 
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the two colonial banks, the Bank of Taiwan and the Bank of Korea, and 
clearly shared the mainland financial risks with overseas land. 
    Considering the changes in Japan’s gold policy in the 1930s, it basically 
maintained the cooperative attitudes with gold after leaving the gold 
standard system. In the first phase, the introduction of Takahashi Finance 
brought Japan’s transition from “tightening finances” to “expanding 
finances”, followed by inflation and constant currency over-issuance. Japan 
could ensure the relative stability of the yen by increasing its gold reserves. 
In the second phase, the Baba Finance opened the climax of the import of 
military supplies. As the balance of payments situation deteriorated, 
Japan had to use a large amount of gold reserves as a tool for foreign trade 
to ensure that Japan could complete national defense construction as soon 
as possible.  
    During this period, gold was essentially discussed as an economic issue. 
Japan’s focus is not on “want gold or not”, but how to reach a balance 
between currency reserves and foreign payment, and tried to make use of 
gold effectively. However, it should be noted that since the end of the 1930s, 
gold began to rise as a political issue and revealed the political conflicts 
between Japan, America and Britain. After the decoupling of Japan-US 
finance with gold as the core, it quickly ushered in the official military 
confrontation between Japan and America in late 1941. 
 
1.3 Japan’s Hostility towards Gold and the Greater East Asia Financial 
Sphere  
   The cooperation between Japan and gold did not maintain for a long 
time. The German Minister of Economy Walter Funk’s delivered a speech 
on the “New World Economic Order” in 1940, and he stressed the value of 
gold as the final means of international settlement was completely lost. 
Since then, the gold issue became a core issue in international society, and 
Japan also needed to clarify the future positioning of gold in its national 
strategies. 
    At this time, there were two main types of gold policies. One was the 
gold-support theory (金擁護論 ) led by America, and the other was 
gold-abandonment theory (金拋棄論) dominated by Germany. At least by the 
early 1940s, Japan’s attitudes toward gold still remained unclear and did 
not make an explicit statement. 
    From the standpoint of America, with the advancement of the gold 
purchase policy, it experienced serious inflation due to excessive gold 
imports. Therefore, America planned to take some measures to deal with 
these problems, and the proposed policies include: 
 
    (1) Re-circulating the gold coins as a currency; 
    (2) Unrestrictedly increasing the reserve ratio of the banks; 
131 
 
    (3) Prohibiting gold imports; 
    (4) Promoting gold production reduction by international cooperation; 
    (5) Realizing the international redistribution of gold; 
    (6) Stopping the gold purchase policy and reducing the gold purchase 
price.473 
 
   These policies were obviously aimed at solving the inflation situation in 
America, but things had completely changed with the deterioration of the 
European war situation. Germany’s open criticism of gold made America 
aware of the profound political implications of gold. And the American 
Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau soon stated that America had no 
intention to ban gold imports and lower gold purchase prices. His remarks 
indicated that America was willing to accept unrestricted gold inflows in 
order to stabilize the price of gold and continue to play a fundamental role 
in international settlement.474 
   Corresponding to America’s gold policy, it was Germany’s 
gold-abandonment theory, and Germany wanted to completely smash the 
economic implications of gold. As gold continued to concentrate in America, 
Germany almost lost all its gold reserves, so it had no choice but to 
establish a new currency system. Germany further explained that “the 
large amount of gold reserves hoarded by America does not make any sense, 
because it is impossible to return to the gold standard system, and the gold 
reserves have completely lost the value of the past. And with the outbreak 
of war, it is difficult to purchase strategic materials even by gold...Britain 
has also sent its gold to America, but it has no effect on the status quo of 
British economy. Currently, the Europeans great-sphere economy led by 
Germany is playing a new and indispensable role for the world.”475 
   Walter Funk believed that the value of the German mark was not 
supported by gold, but by labor and productive capacity, his main opinions 
were as follows: 
 
    (1) Mark will become the dominant currency in Europe. In the future, 
the fundamental role of gold in European currencies will stop. We do 
not need to be attached to a monetary system that must rely on gold. 
    (2) The new European economic order will be based on the national 
economies of European countries, with Germany and Italy as the core; 
    (3) The new European economic bloc is not a complete self-sufficient 
economic group. It also interacts with other economic blocs in the 
world. 
    (4) The future trade relationship between North America and 
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Europe depends entirely on America.  
    (5) The trade between Germany and South America should exclude 
the intermediary role of America, and Germany will develop trade 
relations under the premise of respecting the sovereignty of South 
American countries. 
    (6) After Britain stops its piracy behaviors in East Asia, new 
conditions of trade in East Asia will be possible.476 
 
   Which choice would Japan make between gold-support theory and 
gold-abandonment theory? On the one hand, in order to coordinate the 
Japanese-German cooperation in the war, it was necessary to support 
Germany in the gold policy and isolate America’s gold policy; on the other 
hand, Japan believed that even if the significance of gold in maintaining 
domestic currency credit was greatly weakened, but it was still crucial to 
show the credit of Japanese yen in the international society.477 
    There were two main reasons which led to Japan’s final decision to break 
up its relations with gold: First, with the gradual deterioration of the 
international situation, all countries increasingly strengthened their 
restrictions on strategic materials, so it became hard for Japan to purchase 
the required materials even if they hold gold. Second, the gold issue did not 
depend entirely on the nature and value of gold itself, and had essentially 
turned into a diplomatic issue.478 With the final signing of the Treaty of 
Triply Alliance and Japan’s military presence in the French Indochina, 
Japan ushered in a turning point of relations with America and Britain. 
They banned the export of important resources such as iron and oil to 
Japan, and implemented an asset freeze, which in fact completely cut off 
economic ties with Japan. For Japan, the break-up with the 
Anglo-American economy indicated that the necessity of gold shipment had 
almost disappeared, so the importance of gold began to decline rapidly.479 
   With the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere 
and the Greater East Asia Financial Sphere, Japan clearly stated that it is 
necessary to “abandon the principles based on American and British 
currencies and then establish a yen order”.480 In essence, it aimed to 
exclude the influence and domination of gold in East Asia, and then 
establish a new regional currency system and settlement system based on 
yen and Bank of Japan. Although Japan also recognized that gold could 
still play a certain role in the settlement among different economic blocs, 
but its function had been greatly reduced compared with the past. And 
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Japan believed that there was almost no role for gold within the Greater 
East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. 
   Similar to Germany, there had been more and more hostile views on 
gold in Japan during this period. Shiratori Toshio pointed out that “the 
reason for the success of Nazi Germany is to completely change the nature 
of money. The currency is no longer based on gold, but is backed by the 
power and credit of the state. A large number of currencies could be issued 
and help to develop the economy.” Therefore, he hoped to completely 
remove the myths and misconceptions about gold reserves, and proposed to 
“issue a future currency in the name of the Japanese Emperor and with all 
the resources in the Greater East Asia Sphere as its reserves...Japan 
should not be bound by the traditional liberal economics, and should not be 
afraid of inflation. It must be realized that the real risk is the deflation and 
stagnation of production.”481 
    Shinjo Hiroshi also stressed that, “Japan’s greater-sphere economy 
completely liberates money from gold. The pound bloc and dollar bloc are 
totally different from the yen bloc. The gold standard system was 
controlled by Britain and America, so they certainly hoped to solidify this 
system.” And he believed that if the future world was divided into different 
blocs, the transactions between different blocs did not necessarily use gold. 
On the one hand, each economic bloc would achieve a certain degree of 
self-sufficiency. On the other hand, each economic bloc could select other 
trustworthy commodities as a measure of value. In other words, the 
ultimate fate of gold would depend on how the trading methods around the 
world would change, but Japan hoped that “gold will continue to exist as a 
pure ornament and commodity.”482 
 
1.4 Two Confronted Bloc Economies and Thailand’s Road to Hedge 
   With the break-up on gold issues, the confrontation between Japan’s 
Greater East Asia Financial Sphere and the Anglo-American financial 
group began to emerge. The world had entered into the era of bloc economy, 
and import restrictions had gradually increased. 483  Many countries 
adopted strict foreign exchange management policies, and the 
inconvertibility among currencies became more and more clear.484 Such a 
new international structure was a huge external pressure for Thailand, but 
it was also an important opportunity. 
   Since 1941, Thailand began to intentionally use the hedging strategy 
between Japan, America and Britain. Some Scholars called it the bamboo 
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diplomacy or flexible diplomacy. However, Thailand’s early hedging 
strategies were mainly concentrated in the political and diplomatic fields, 
not in the economic field. 
   At the beginning of 1941, it was reported that Thailand had signed a 
secret military agreement with Britain and America, and its clauses 
emphasized the cooperation among these three countries to safeguard their 
common interests. It reflected that Britain and America hoped to 
consolidate their encirclement towards Japan. At the same time, Japan 
also strived for the alliance with Thailand, and it believed there were three 
advantages for Japan: the first was the growing anti-British sentiment 
among the Thai people; the second was that as the military pressure in 
Europe increased, Britain and America’s economic aid to Thailand would 
certainly decline; the third was Thailand did not have obvious 
anti-Japanese sentiment, Thailand would definitely turn to the Japanese 
side if Japan was strong enough. 
   Therefore, Japan, Britain and America all actively sought for the 
support of Thailand during this period, which provided a good window of 
opportunity for Thailand’s hedging strategy in the diplomatic domain. On 
the one hand, Thailand was privately developing diplomatic relations with 
both sides; on the other hand, Thailand officially issued a statement in 
June 1941 stating that “Thailand will firmly maintain good and equal 
friendship with all countries, and Thailand will not yield to any 
pressure.”485 Even by the end of November 1942, Thailand still 
emphasized that “there has been a subtle change in the international 
situation since Japan’s military presence in French Indochina, but 
Thailand does not want war. Thailand will strictly abide by a neutral 
stance in political, economic and military aspects, and develop friendly 
relations with all countries.”486 Therefore, before the start of the Pacific 
War, Thailand tried to maintain its relatively vague position and avoid 
making clear choices between the two groups. 
   However, with the official establishment of the Japan-Thailand alliance, 
there was no space to continue performing hedging strategy in the 
diplomatic field. And in 1942, it should be noted that Thailand began to 
focus on the hedging strategy in the economic field. The emergence of two 
confronted currency blocs gave Thailand the opportunity to continue using 
hedging strategies. And its main aim was to hedge the risks of completely 
integrating into the yen bloc, and defend its economic interests as much as 
possible. 
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2. Thailand’s Currency System and its Crisis in the Beginning of Pacific 
War 
2.1 Thailand’s Currency System Changes before the Pacific War 
   Ancient Siam used short elliptical silver bars as currency, and it was 
called “bullet coin”. In addition, some shellfish produced in the Mekong 
River had also been used as currency.487 Later, as the Portuguese, Dutch, 
and British came to Thailand one after another, which brought prosperity 
to Thailand’s foreign trade, a large number of foreign currencies began to 
enter the Thai market, including Japan’s gold and silver Koban (小判), 
British pounds, Spanish silver coins and so on. 
    The Chakri dynasty was formally established in 1782. During the reign 
of the first two generations of monarchs, there was no record of gold or 
copper coins in the historical materials, but the first gold bullet coin was 
discovered during the reign of Rama III, which was issued with three 
different fineness and logos. After the succession of Rama IV, with the 
tremendous development of Siam’s foreign trade, he also made great 
changes to the monetary system of Siam, stopping the construction of the 
bullet coin and bracelet coin used in Siam for hundreds of years. For the 
first time, flat-shaped currencies were issued, and silver coins and copper 
coins also entered the circulation field of Thailand for the first time.488 
   During this period, Siam, like many East Asian countries, adopted a 
silver standard system. The baht was originally a unit of weight (15 grams) 
and then became a currency unit. “The Baht’s exchange value was fixed at 
8 baht per pound sterling by the weight of the coin and the international 
price of silver in sterling. This rate varied as the price of silver changed in 
terms of gold.”489 The currency issued in Siam was originally the silver 
baht, and the subsidiary currencies were mainly copper coins, including 
Salung, Fuang, Pei and Att. The exchange ratio was 1 baht to 4 Salung, 1 
Fuang to 2 Pei, and 1 Pei to 2 Att.490 In order to promote the casting and 
promotion of silver coins, the Siamese Government officially issued the 
“Proclamation Concerning the Use of Foreign Coins” in 1857, and the then 
re-coined the foreign silver coins in a ratio of 3 Mexican silver dollars to 5 
Ticals (a Siam currency unit). 
   From the 1850s to 1902, Siam’s silver standard system continued to 
develop. “Private traders and exchange merchants played an important 
role in the silver imports to Siam, and it was not until the end of the 19th 
century that banks replaced their role. Siam’s first modern bank was a 
branch of Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited, which 
was established in 1888.”491 Later, many foreign banks entered the 
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country and issued banknotes in Siam. However, the Siamese government 
was very cautious about this, so the issuance area was strictly limited to 
Bangkok. By the end of 1902, the number of banknotes in circulation was 
only about 3.3 million baht. 
   After 1895, Siam’s silver standard system was severely challenged by 
the collapse of the silver price. Siam’s foreign exchange rate had fallen into 
huge fluctuations, and it fell to 20 baht against 1 pound by 1902. At the 
same time, as global silver production continued to rise and silver prices 
continued to fall, the Siamese government and merchants were greatly 
damaged. Fluctuations in the silver price forced the Siamese government 
to consider reforming the currency system to maintain Thailand’s stable 
foreign trade relations and financial situation. In 1908, Siam announced 
the Currency Act and officially established the gold standard system. This 
currency act stipulated that the baht would be the main currency, and the 
gold content of baht was 55.8 centigrams. In addition, the article 23 of this 
act provided that the Ministry of Finance would set up a reserve fund of 2 
million baht to maintain the exchange rates between Siam and other 
foreign countries. The reserve fund would include the silver baht, pure gold 
and silver bullions.492 
   However, due to the limitation of gold reserves, gold coins did not 
become the main currency in the Siamese market, and silver coins were 
still widely used. Therefore, Siam’s monetary system was still correlated 
with the changes of international silver price. Once the silver price rose, 
the silver coins in the hands of the Siamese people might be exported 
overseas as commodities. At the same time, Siam also provided an 
exchange rate between baht and pound, which aimed to facilitate 
international trade and debt repayment. At the same time, Siam also 
deposited a large amount of reserve funds in London, so Siam’s foreign 
exchange market was greatly affected by London. 
    From 1908 to the World War I, Siam’s gold standard system had 
remained basically stable. But with the outbreak of World War I and the 
surge in demand for silver, global silver price soared and reached a peak of 
61.5 pence per ounce in 1920. It led to a large outflow of silver coins from 
Siam, and the number of silver coins circulating in Siam also decreased 
year by year. Corresponding to the decrease in the circulation of silver 
coins, the circulation of banknotes in Siam had been rising, and the reserve 
ratio of banks had been continuously lowered. The circulation of silver 
coins and banknotes during this period in Siam was shown in the following 
table: 
 
Year Silver coins amount 
（unit：1000 baht） 
Banknote amount 
（unit：1000 baht） 
Average silver price 
（unit: pence/ounce） 
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1914 76,126 28,707 25
5
16
 
1915 69,806 31,435 23
11
16
 
1916 73,185 40,080 31
5
16
 
1917 79,912 47,858 40
7
8
 
1918 88,500 59,664 47
9
16
 
1919 98,775 113,766 57
1
16
 
1920 100,303 108,596 61
1
2
 
1921 82,278 72,986 36
7
8
 
1922 68,765 83,995 34
7
16
 
1923 61,639 91,663 31
15
16
 
1924 59,304 115,603 34 
1925 59,074 116,807 32
1
8
 
1926 59,630 145,861 28
11
16
 
1927 59,280 133,958 26
21
32
 
Table 52 Siam’s Circulation of Silver coins and Banknotes from 1914-1927493 
   In 1919, due to the soaring price of rice, the demand for currency supply 
increased significantly, resulting in a large number of over-issuance of 
banknotes. Therefore, in order to maintain the stability of the monetary 
system, Siam temporarily terminated the redemption of banknotes at the 
end of 1919 in order to get rid of the current predicament and began to 
prepare for the future currency reform. Since 1921, international silver 
prices had gradually declined, and Siam’s foreign exchange rate had 
gradually returned to stability. On April 15, 1928, Siam officially changed 
to the gold bullion system.494 The main contents of the new currency act 
included: 
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   (1) The old laws on gold standard system, banknote issuance, 
coinage and other related notices will be abolished; 
     (2) The unit of the currency is baht. And the new currencies include: 
silver coins (50 satang, 25 satang); nickel coins (10 satang, 50 satang); 
copper coins (1 satang). 
     (3) The gold content of the baht is 0.66567 gram.  
 
   Therefore, Siam had officially adopted the gold bullion system since 
1928, which stipulated that the gold content of baht was 0.66567 gram of 
pure gold, and that 1 pound could be exchanged for 11 baht. The Siamese 
government also prepared a large number of reserve funds in an effort to 
maintain the stability of the new currency system. 
   However, the Great Depression since 1929 quickly caused a great 
damage on Siam’s economy which was dominated by rice exports, and 
further affected the stability of the new currency system. From 1927 to 
1928, Siam’s rice exports amounted to 210 million baht; from 1928 to 1929, 
it was rapidly reduced to 175 million baht; from 1929 to 1930, it was 
further reduced to 130 million baht. After Britain abandoning the gold 
standard system in September 1931, Siam did not follow up with Britain’s 
steps quickly, resulting in a sharp increase in the exchange rate of baht 
against pound. It further hit Siam’s rice exports, resulting in a serious 
fiscal deficit in 1931.495 It forced Siam to abandon the gold standard 
system in 1932 and began to peg to the pound.496 Many people believed 
that it was not necessary for Siam to abandon the gold standard system 
now, but its aim was mainly to save the rice industry. 
     The main contents of the Currency Act Amendments in 1932 were as 
follows: 
 
   (1) The exchange rate between baht and pound will return to 1 
pound against 11 baht, 
     (2) In order to maintain the exchange rate of 1 pound against 11 
baht and avoid various liabilities, it is necessary to determine the 
specific content of the reserve fund. 
     (3) The following items are legal reserve funds: pound sterling; 
sterling securities; gold; gold securities; bank deposits that can be 
withdrawn at any time or within 7 days; silver baht. 
     (4) The Minister of Finance has the right to sell the silver baht in 
the reserve fund and to purchase pound exchanges, gold or gold 
exchanges (金為替). 
     (5) The value of the property listed in the report shall be calculated 
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in pound, and shall eventually be converted to the value of the baht at 
an exchange rate of 1:11. 
 
   After May 1932, Siam gradually sold its gold and foreign exchanges of 
other gold standard countries, replacing them with the pound, and Siam 
officially changed to the pound standard system.497 
    With the gradual disappearance of silver as the main currency of Siam 
since September 1938, the Siamese government decided to sell some of the 
silver in the reserve fund and replaced it with gold. The Thai Finance 
Minister also made it clear in his remark at the beginning of 1939, “Since 
Thailand has long abolished the silver standard system, it is completely 
unnecessary to use the silver coin. And silver is very unstable, so it should 
be sold as soon as possible and replaced with gold bullions. It is in the 
interest of Thailand to obtain gold which has a more stable price.”498 
Therefore, Thailand sold a large amount of silver to America and used the 
money it received to buy gold in London. 
    In addition, with the deteriorating situation in Europe after 1939, 
Thailand also began to include US dollar and dollar securities in its official 
reserves in addition to the British pound, in order to diversify risks.499 In 
order to strengthen the circulation and credit of Thai baht in the country, 
Thailand also strived to promote the popularization and use of the Thai 
baht to replace the various foreign currencies circulating in Thailand. At 
the same time, Thailand also announced a restrict prohibition on carrying 
foreign currencies into Thailand and prevented any speculative behaviors 
against the Thai baht.500 
 
2.2 The Japanese-Thai Alliance and Thailand’s Economic Crisis 
   As the Japanese army entered the northern part of the French 
Indochina in September 1940 and played an important role in mediating 
the border conflict between Thailand and French Indochina, Japan’s 
influence on Thailand gradually increased. However, Britain was very 
dissatisfied with this trend. On the one hand, Britain deployed massive 
troops around the borders among Thailand, Burma and British Malaya, so 
as to pressure Thailand. On the other hand, the British Minister Counselor 
in Thailand also actively negotiated with the Thai government to prevent 
Thailand from approaching too close to Japan. Due to the profound 
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historical relationship between Thailand and Britain, there were also 
many voices in Thailand that were dissatisfied with Prime Minister 
Phibun’s pro-Japanese policy. 
   In addition, Thailand was also an important area for Japan, Europe and 
America to compete for strategic resources. In 1940, Japan purchased 
3,600 tons of raw rubber produced in Thailand, accounting for only 12% of 
the total production. However, this figure soon rose to 50% by the end of 
1941. In addition, Japan was also vigorously purchasing other strategic 
resources from Thailand. After Japan entered the southern French 
Indochina in July 1941, its foreign assets were completely frozen. Japan 
lacked the necessary foreign exchange to purchase materials. Therefore, it 
began to adopt gold settlement method and directly provided gold to the 
Thai National Banking Bureau in exchange for 35 million of baht loans.501 
   In order to promote Japan-Thailand economic cooperation, Japan 
announced the “Economic Development Measures for Thailand” in March 
1941, clearly stating that “with the progress of the new world order and the 
emergence of the bloc economy, we should persist on the stance of 
coexistence and common prosperity, and strengthen the close economic 
relations with Thailand, making it a part of the Greater East Asia 
Economic Sphere.” The main measures mentioned by Japan in this 
document included: 
 
   (1) Liberating the Thai economy from completely relying on Europe 
and America and making it as a member of the Greater East Asia 
Economic Sphere; 
     (2) The Thai government will gradually replace the British or 
American policy advisers by Japanese; 
     (3) It is necessary to establish an economic committee or other 
appropriate authorities to facilitate Japan’s participation in the 
formulation and implementation of Thailand’s economic policies, 
further promoting economic cooperation between Japan and Thailand,  
     (4) It is necessary to revise Thailand’s tariff system and entry 
procedures which are not favorable for Japan gradually, so as to 
achieve the freedom and smoothness of Japanese economic activities in 
Thailand; 
     (5) In order to realize Thailand’s full dependence on Japan’s 
economy, Japan and Thailand should sign an extensive barter 
agreement, and Thailand should give priority to Japan to supply the 
necessary materials; 
     (6) In order to establish a Japan-centered financial sphere in East 
Asia, it is necessary to strengthen the financial relationship between 
Japan and Thailand. An important part of this is to complete the 
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formation of Thailand’s central bank under the guidance and 
assistance of Japan; 
     (7) Japan will support the popularization and development of Thai 
business education and promote the improvement of Thailand’s 
commercial position; 
     (8) Japan will provide guidance and assistance to industrial 
revitalization in Thailand; 
     (9) In order to strengthen the development of tin, cotton and other 
resources needed by Japan, Japan and Thailand should strengthen 
cooperation to ensure the entry of Japanese technology and capital; 
     (10) Thai government should change its restrictive attitudes 
towards mining rights. For minerals permitted by law (such as tin), the 
entry of Japanese companies should be quickly promoted.502 
 
   In addition, the program also included economic cooperation in many 
other fields such as railways, highways, aviation, communications, 
agriculture, and aquaculture. As the situation in the Far East continued to 
deteriorate, Thailand’s status seemed to be becoming more and more 
important. From a geopolitical point of view, Thailand would also play an 
important channel for Japan to enter the British Malaya and other parts of 
Southeast Asia. 
   Thailand still tried to maintain a neutral position during this period. It 
did not want to be involved in the war in the Far East, and it also did not 
want to be completely obedient to Japan. Moreover, it should be noted that 
Thailand even expressed a modest welcome to the strengthening of British 
Malayan military power.503  But as Japan’s conflicts with Britain and 
America continued to intensify, maintaining neutrality seemed to become 
more and more difficult. Due to Thailand’s key position in geopolitics and 
providing strategic resource, it was likely to become the core of the 
contradiction in the Far East.504 
   On December 7, 1942, Japanese Ambassador to Thailand Tsubogami 
Teiji visited the official residence of Prime Minister Phibun and hoped to 
inform him that Japanese army planned to “pass” the Thai territory in 12 
hours in order to attack British Malaya. However, the ambassador 
Tsubogami could not find the Prime Minister and the attitudes of other 
government ministers were also unclear. Therefore, the Japanese army 
entered the territory of Thailand without the permission of the Thai 
government and triggered some small scale conflicts between the Japanese 
and Thai solders. After discussing with the cabinet, the Prime Minister 
Phibun announced the armistice command of the Thai army on December 8, 
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and signed an agreement with Japan for permitting Japanese army’s 
passage over Thailand’s territory. The main contents of the agreement 
included: 
 
   (1) In order to deal with to the emergencies in East Asia, Thailand will 
allow the Japanese army to pass its territory. Thailand will provide all the 
facilities for Japan to pass its territory; 
   (2) In order to determine the specific details of the foregoing matters, 
the military branches of both countries shall formulate specific agreements 
afterwards; 
   (3) Japan should guarantee respect for Thailand’s independence, 
sovereignty and reputation.505 
 
   Subsequently, Thailand and Japan officially signed the Japanese-Thai 
Treaty of Alliance on December 21, 1941, clearly stipulating that it was 
compulsory to give full support in the event of any attack by a third country,  
which indicated that Thailand completely stood in the Japanese side in 
diplomatic and security domains. 506  On January 3, 1942, Japan and 
Thailand signed the Japan-Thailand Cooperative Operation Agreement, 
stipulating that Thailand would provide Japan with support and 
convenience in aviation, air defense, communications, transportation, 
meteorology, and would supply all necessary materials, food and labors for 
Japan. In addition, Thailand would also assist on the camping and army 
rations of the Japanese troops stationed in Thailand.507 On January 25, 
1942, Thailand officially declared war on Britain and America, and the war 
declaration stated that Britain had long exploited and damaged Thailand’s 
economy, finances and trade, and condemned the air strikes and attacks 
launched by Britain and America since the establishment of the 
Japanese-Thai alliance. Moreover, Thailand also determined that it would 
counterattack every attack made by the America and Britain in the 
future.508 
   Despite this, Thailand had a high degree of reliance on Britain and 
America in both economic and financial areas. Thailand war declaration 
soon led to serious economic consequences, and Britain had frozen all of 
Thailand’s assets in London. In the early days of the Pacific War, a large 
part of Thailand’s currency issuance reserves were kept in London, so 
Britain’s assets freeze policy caused a huge damage to Thailand. Taking 
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the data at the end of November 1941 as an example, Thailand’s currency 
issuance was 270 million baht, while the reserves in Britain were as high 
as 180 million baht, accounting for two-thirds.509 
    Thailand clearly realized that its alliance with Japan would definitely 
cause a huge damage to its economy and finance. As early as December 12, 
1941, Thailand announced the Currency Emergency Act to deal with the 
current financial dilemma, and its main contents included: 
 
    Article 1: The name of this Law is Currency Emergency Act of the 
Buddhist Calendar 2484 (1941); 
    Article 2: This Law shall be implemented since the public 
announcement, with a term of one year; 
    Article 3: The Minister of Finance may, in the form of regulations of 
the Ministry of Finance, amend the following currency-related matters, 
including: 
    (1) The limits of various currencies as legal tender; 
    (2) The conditions for identifying whether a currency is damaged or 
not; 
    (3) The value of the Thai currency against gold or other foreign 
currencies; 
    (4) Reserve fund; 
    (5) The currency issuance based on the reserve fund; 
    (6) Currency exchange; 
    Article 4: The Minister of Finance will announce further regulations 
on entry and outflow of currencies in Thailand; 
    Article 5: The Minister of Finance will supervise the implementation 
of this law.510 
 
   With the outbreak of the Pacific War and the increase in Thai financial 
risks, Thailand began to experience currency depreciation and rising 
domestic prices. However, the market transaction price of coins such as 
copper coins had exceeded their nominal value. For example, the market 
price of 1 satang copper coins was about 1.3~1.5 satang.511 Therefore, 
there were many speculative behaviors of hoarding copper coins, resulting 
in the insufficiency of money supply in the market. In view of this 
phenomenon, the amendments of the Currency Emergency Act stipulated 
that “anyone who hoards or speculates on coins must be severely punished 
and sentenced to imprisonment for 5 to 20 years.”512 Thai government not 
only strictly supervised on speculation in the market, but also announced 
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the Ministry of Finance Regulations (No. 1) on December 21, 1941, which 
changed the criteria for identifying “destroyed currencies”. The Article 2 
stipulated that “the destroyed coins which are identified in the Currency 
Act in 1928 will be deemed not to be destroyed and will still be treated as 
legal tender”, and its main intention was to increase the amount of money 
supply in the market.513    
    In addition to the breakdown of economic relations with Britain and 
America, Thailand also faced economic pressure from Japan. On the one 
hand, Japan required a significant devaluation of Thai currency and 
achieved an equivalent link with yen. It would be conductive for Japan’s 
Greater East Asian Financial Sphere policy, and facilitated the acquisition 
of rice from Thailand at a low price.514 On the other hand, as Japan’s 
military expenditures continued to increase, Thailand had to lend a large 
amount of baht loans to Japan, which led to the continuous over-issuance 
of baht and the deterioration of inflation. The domestic prices of Thailand 
had risen and the lives of ordinary people had been directly affected. In this 
bad economic situation, how to stabilize the Thai currency and maintain a 
smooth economic transition in the early days of the Pacific War had become 
an important issue.  
 
3. Hedging Strategy: Thailand’s Return to the Gold Standard System and 
Bangkok Negotiations  
3.1 Gold Standard and Thailand’s Release of Mixed Information 
   Faced with such a serious phenomenon, how did Thailand’s hedging 
strategy work? As mentioned above, with the official establishment of the 
Japan-Thailand alliance, there was no space to continue performing 
hedging strategy in the diplomatic field. Since 1942, it should be noted that 
Thailand began to focus on the hedging strategy in the economic field. The 
emergence of two confronted currency blocs gave Thailand the opportunity 
to continue using hedging strategies. And its main aim was to hedge the 
risks of completely integrating into the yen bloc, and defend Thailand’s 
economic interests as much as possible. 
   Since Thailand had always adopted a strict reserve system of 100% or 
more, so Britain’s assets freeze policy caused a serious damage on the 
issuance and credit of Thai currency. For Thailand, it was necessary to 
supplement the currency reserves and stabilize the baht as soon as possible. 
Therefore, on January 26, the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs soon asked 
Japan to provide loans for issuing government bonds to stabilize the 
currency. The details of the memorandum were as follows: 
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   (1) Thailand hopes to borrow 200 million baht of gold (0.32639 gram 
of gold to 1 baht), or borrow foreign exchanges if necessary (100 baht to 
159.25 yen). 
   (2) The loan interest rate is 3% per year. 
   (3) The repayment of loan should be 40 years after 5 years’ 
retention.515 
 
   Faced with Thailand request, Japan replied on January 30th that if 
the denomination of the Thai government bonds could be expressed by 
Japanese yen, the Japanese side would agree to provide loans. However, 
it needed to be specially pointed out that Japan expressed its 
dissatisfaction about Thailand’s demand for gold. Japan emphasized that 
“the payment within the Greater East Asian Sphere should be made by 
yen. Our economies and communications with Britain and America has 
been completely cut off, thus the importance of gold has already 
disappeared. Thailand’s demand for gold showed its conventional 
thinking.”516 
   However, although Thailand was clearly aware of Japan’s aversion or 
hostility towards gold, it was surprised to find that Thailand announced 
delink with the pound and returned to the gold standard system on 
January 31, 1942, and foreign exchange management would also be 
implemented. It meant that Thailand’s financial and monetary policy had 
undergone major changes.517 The main contents of this announcement 
were as follows: 
  
   Article 1: The receiving of pound sterling and its direct exchange 
with Thai banknotes is stopped; 
   Article 2: The Ministry of Finance shall accept gold bullions with 
the specified fineness, and further realize the direct exchange with the 
legal tender at a ratio of 1 baht to 0.32639 gram of pure gold. The 
Ministry of Finance should stipulate the freight rates and other fees 
for the transportation of gold to Bangkok. When accepting gold 
bullions from foreign countries, it can be directly exchanged with the 
legal tender in accordance with the ratio specified in the preceding 
paragraph. 
   The gold exchanged each time should not exceed 50,000 baht. 
   Article 3: Add the following two items to the reserve fund of 
Thailand: one is government compensation bond; the other is the 
Treasury bill. 
   Article 4: The currency board will prepare for reserve fund and 
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banknotes issuance.518 
 
   It indicated that Thailand had once again established a direct linkage 
with gold after it abandoned the gold standard system in 1932. In addition, 
the ratio of 1 baht to 0.32639 gram of gold was also calculated by its former 
exchange rate with pound and the gold price of the New York gold market. 
Although the standard system had been changed from pound sterling to 
gold, the exchange rate of Thai baht did not change much. Therefore, it 
seemed to indicate that Thailand still maintained a potential financial 
connection with Britain and America, and it was also in contrast to Japan’s 
desire for baht depreciation.519 In general, Thailand’s choice of currency 
system seemed to contradict with its foreign policy. That is to say, Thailand 
adopted a cooperative policy with Japan in military and political aspects, 
but it did not cooperate with Japan on economic issues.   
   Although it was said that leading Thai politicians were “obsessed with 
traditional economic theories and orthodox methods towards financial 
issues, and really wanted to restore the gold standard system” during that 
time520, Japan felt worried by this significant policy option, and viewed it 
as a sign of betrayal, which meant that Thailand “retained the possibility 
of returning to the sterling or dollar bloc in the future”.521 In addition, all 
other currencies in Greater East Asia had already pegged with the yen at a 
one-to-one relationship, thus the exception of Thai baht would inhibit the 
smooth goods exchanges within the Co-prosperity Sphere. Therefore, in 
order to establish Japan’s currency hegemony, it was necessary to continue 
struggling with the gold-dominated states (金支配国家 ) in the region. 
Moreover, Japan tried to persuade Thailand that if the baht was linked to 
the international gold market, it would still not be conductive to maintain 
its stability.522 
   As mentioned before, Thailand used gold standard as a hedging 
strategy to deal with its relations with Japan, so as to reduce uncertainty 
and avoid risks. In this process, the most important thing was to release 
mixed information. By the announcement of pegging to gold in early 
February, Thailand successfully released mixed information of allying with 
Japan and remaining financial linkages with western countries. However, 
Thailand did not want to challenge or undermine Japan’s yen order since it 
was contrary to Thailand’s bandwagon strategy toward Japan in military 
and political affairs. In early 1942, Thailand still had many expectations 
for this alliance, and tried to meet the demands of the Japanese side. 
Instead of saying that Thailand would like to restore the gold standard 
system and impair the yen order, it would be better to regard it as a 
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method to steadily separate from the former sterling-standard system.523 
Therefore, Thailand did not choose to peg to the yen immediately, but 
sought for help it needed through negotiations with Japan on standard 
currency. As such, Ambassador Tsubogami Teiji began to hold intensive 
talks with the Thai Prime Minister Phibun on economic issues. In the 
so-called “Japan-Thailand economic cooperation”(日泰経済連携), currency 
and gold issues were very crucial.524 
   Therefore, the Japanese government soon announced its currency and 
financial policies towards Thailand on February 23, 1942. This 
announcement stressed that the core of Japan’s financial policy towards 
Thailand was to promote the equivalent linkage between the Thai baht and 
the Japanese yen, and to establish a central bank of Thailand as soon as 
possible. Furthermore, in order to make up for Thailand’s insufficient 
currency reserves, Japan would provide loans for Thailand and thereafter 
the payment between Japan and Thailand should be conducted in the form 
of “special yen” (特別円).525  
   Thailand was fully aware of Japan’s dissatisfaction with its return to 
the gold standard system, and it would also be inevitable for Thailand to 
change to the yen standard system in the near future. However, Thailand 
wanted to get the best terms in the treaties and protect its own national 
interests during the negotiating process. 
 
3.2 Bangkok Negotiations and Thailand’s Linkage Strategy between 
Currency and Trade Issues 
   The Thai-Japanese Economic Negotiations were both held in Bangkok 
and Tokyo. The Japanese government informed the Thai embassy of the 
basic principles of economic negotiations in January 30th, 1942. It 
emphasizes three points: “Japan rejects Thailand’s request for gold; baht 
should be linked to yen, and the ratio is one to one; it’s necessary to 
establish the Thai Central Bank quickly and incorporate influential 
Japanese advisors in it”.526 It reflected that Japan was very concerned 
about gold issues and Thai currency reconstruction. After that, Thailand’s 
announcement on gold standard system on February 1st further 
exacerbated Japan’s worries that gold would slowly change the nature of 
Thailand’s economy. 
   The economic negotiations in Bangkok started from February 12th. 
Japanese Consul-General Uchiyama, Clerk Matsuda and Fujisawa held 
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several talks with Wanit at Thai Economy Ministry. 527  During these 
negotiations, Thailand mainly strived for three side payments, which were 
important for economic stability during wartime. These side payments 
consisted of a currency stabilization loan, a bilateral trade agreement and 
an agreement on gold shipments to Bangkok in return for the special 
yen. 528  The currency stabilization loan and gold shipment would 
supplement the specie assets and help to stabilize the price of commodities. 
In addition, with Thailand’s increasing dependence on Japan, a formal 
trade agreement became increasingly necessary to guarantee Thailand’s 
exports and imports with Japan. Because the baht needed to be devalued 
nearly 30% to be equivalent with the yen, Thailand also hoped to increase 
the price of export products (especially rice) and prevent price increases of 
import products from Japan.529 In short, Thailand needed assistance from 
Japan in order to alleviate the negative impacts of separating from 
Anglo-American influence.  
   In Bangkok negotiations, the most crucial issue was currency standard 
or exchange rate. If baht could not be pegged to yen by 1:1, Japan would 
spend more money on materials purchasing in Thailand, and also left a 
possibility for Britain and America to interfere Thailand’s financial affairs. 
Therefore, the representatives of both sides decided to hand over the 
exchange rate issue directly to Prime Minister Phibun and Ambassador 
Tsubogami. And in order to meet Thailand’s demand for gold, Japan also 
made concessions and proposed to provide earmarked gold instead of gold 
shipment.  But it had to be incorporated in Secret Agreement and not 
open to the public. 
   On exchange rate issue, Prime Minister Phibun chose to use delaying 
tactics and did not give an accurate answer to Japanese delegates. On the 
first official negotiation on February 12th, Phibun stressed that “he can 
fully understand Japan’s desire for Thailand to change its exchange rate. 
However, the rapid realization of equivalent linkage with Japanese yen 
will have a great impact on Thai economy, so it must be carefully 
considered.”530 Then on the second official negotiation on March 2, Phibun 
further pointed out that “he has no objection to the principle of modifying 
the exchange rate of the Thai baht, but the Thai-Japanese Trade 
Agreement must be signed on the same day, clearly specifying the quantity 
and price of Thailand’s exports and imports with Japan.”531 Therefore, the 
Thai leaders had clearly linked the currency issue to trade issues at this 
time, because they thought that a 200 million baht of currency stability 
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loan was not enough to safeguard Thailand’s economic interests.   
   However, the Japanese government was very dissatisfied with Phibun’s 
delaying tactics and the linkage between trade and currency issues, and 
asked Thailand to make changes to its exchange rate as soon as possible. 
Phibun promised that the revision of exchange rate would be enforced 
“within one month” on March 3rd, but he soon changed it to “a reasonable 
time” on March 20th.532 In addition, Thailand also reorganized the cabinet 
during this period, and the new cabinet announced its policy agenda on 
March 16th, which stressed that Thailand would strive to maintain the gold 
standard system. 533  It reflected that Thailand would not be easily 
compromised on currency issues, because it had become an important 
bargaining chip in Thailand’s economic negotiations with Japan. 
   Phibun’s delaying tactic aimed to force Japan to hold serious 
negotiations with Thailand on trade issues, or even make more concessions. 
Japanese representatives felt nervous by Thailand’s ambiguous attitude, 
so they urgently asked the Japanese government to clarify the framework 
of trade agreement with Thailand.534 Then the Japanese Government 
replied the basic principles of trade agreement on March 28th and 
requested the exchange rate be amended by April 1st. 
   After that, Ambassador Tsubogami and Thai vice Foreign Minister 
Wichit held several talks on specific terms of trade agreement. On March 
30th, Tsubogami and Wichit reached a preliminary consensus and signed 
the memorandum. The main contents included: 
 
  (1) Japan should purchase 20,000 tons of gum, 7,000 tons of tin, 
7,000 tons of teak from Thailand in 1942. 
  (2) The exchange rate should be amended to 100 baht: 100 yen 
before April 22nd. 
  (3) Tsubogami will come back to Japan on April 4th, in order to 
mediate Wanit’s Economic Mission to Tokyo. 
  (4) If Thai Mission and the Japanese side reach a consensus on the 
terms of trade agreement before April 22nd, the exchange rate should 
be immediately amended from that day.535 
 
3.3 Bangkok Negotiations and Thailand’s Request for Loans 
   After the western assets freeze on Thailand, Thailand’s most urgent 
request for Japan was a 200 million baht loan to issue government 
bonds and enrich Thailand’s currency reserves. Therefore, in the 
Ministry of Finance regulation on January 31, in addition to restoring 
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the gold standard system, it was also very important to include 
government bonds in Thai currency reserves. 
   First, the loan issue also had som だい e close relations with currency 
issue. The earliest proposal by Thailand mentioned the total amount of 
loan was “200 million baht”. However, the Japanese side emphasized 
that after the Japanese-Thai currencies reached an equivalent 
agreement, the Japanese side would give Thailand a loan of “200 million 
yen”. Due to the relative depreciation of the Thai baht, the total amount 
of loans provided by Japan had actually been greatly reduced. Therefore, 
Thai representatives stress that Japan should provide a loan of 300 
million yen to compensate for the losses caused by exchange rate 
changes in Thai baht. And it might also become one of the prerequisites 
for the equivalent linkage between yen and baht.536 
   Second, as mentioned above, Thailand hoped that the loans could be 
conducted by gold. But it became more sensitive after Thailand changing 
to the gold standard system. In several communications between the 
Japanese Embassy in Thailand and the Japanese government, both 
sides believed that it was necessary to avoid using gold as the main form 
of providing loans. The Japanese Embassy in Thailand stressed that 
“the loans should be carried out in the form of Japanese yen, and 
earmarked gold should be absolutely avoided.” The attitude of Japanese 
government was slightly softer, but it also emphasized that the 
proportion of earmarked gold could not exceed 50%. 
   Faced with Japan’s pressure, Thailand was also aware that it had to 
make some concessions on the issue of gold loans. In this case, Thai 
Financial Minister Wanit offered to sign two loan agreements: a public 
agreement and a secret agreement. The public agreement would 
stipulate that Japan should provide loans to Japan by earmarked gold or 
special yen, but the secret agreement stressed that the issue of 
earmarked gold would be gradually discussed in the future, which 
lowered the possibility for Thailand to get gold in a short time.537 
   But in exchange, Thailand also hoped that Japan could make some 
compromises, especially in the loan interest rate and repayment period. 
And these two things also became the key issues in the subsequent 
Tokyo negotiations. 
   After preliminary discussions on trade and loan issues, the Bangkok 
negotiations came to an end. During these two months, Japan always 
urged Thailand to give up the baht-gold peg and revised to link with yen by 
1: 1 ratio. Thailand made use of Japan’s anxious and urgent mentality, and 
then coerced Japan to make compromise on providing loans and a more 
favorable trade agreement. In addition, Japan had to continue negotiating 
with Thai Mission in Tokyo on trade issues to ensure a formal agreement 
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on exchange rate as soon as possible. 
 
4. Hedging Strategy: Tokyo Negotiations and the Agreements on Trade and 
Loan 
4.1 Japan’s Compromises and the Progress of Trade Agreement 
   The Wanit Pananon delegation arrived at Tokyo in April 4th, 1942, and 
the “negotiations had not progressed as quickly and as smoothly as it 
seems had been expected”.538 Japan still concentrated on the yen-baht 
agreement and persuaded Thailand into adopting a yen-standard system. 
However, Wanit stressed the necessity to “create an effective wartime 
economy which would be for the mutual good”, which implied that 
Thailand sought for the help it needed, especially the three “side payments” 
mentioned above.539 At the same time, Japan was still worried that the 
gold standard system would bring many changes to Thailand’s domestic 
economy, while retaining the Anglo-American financial influence in 
Thailand. 
   As the Thai delegation clearly understood Japan’s negotiating goals, so 
it took a relatively proactive negotiating policy. On April 9th, Thai economic 
mission presented a draft of trade agreement to Japanese delegation, 
which required Japan to meet Thailand’s three requests within one year: 
 
  (1) The Japanese government should purchase Thai rice at the price 
of baht 8.30 per picul (including the rice cleaning tax). 
  (2) The Japanese government should import 20,000 metric tons of 
rubber, 7,000 metric tons each of tin and teak produced in Thailand. 
  (3) The Japanese government should export goods for Thai civil use, 
amounting in total to about 60 million yen.540 
 
   The above three items indicated that Thailand wanted a reasonable rice 
price when trading with Japan, and it hoped to get as many consume goods 
as possible. The 60 million yen of Japanese goods mainly included: 20 
million of cotton piece goods, 8 million of machineries, 4 million of artificial 
silk yarns and fabrics, 2.7 million of tobacco leaves, and 2 million of paper 
and tea. In addition, Thailand also asked Japanese enterprises in 
Shanghai to provide another 3480 metric tons of cotton yarns and 2815 
bales of cotton piece goods.541 
   In April 10th, Thai delegates further pointed out “the trade agreement 
should not only concerned trade between Japan and Thailand, and 
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Thailand should be able to continue freely trading with other territories 
besides Japan”.542 And it also claimed for a substantial increase in rice 
prices and the quantity of goods received from Japan. 543  Therefore, 
Thailand quickly raised its requests to 35,000 tons of rubber, 14,000 tons of 
tin, and 20,000 tons of teak. 
   Consequently, the Understanding on Basic Items of Trade Agreement 
was officially reached, and it stipulated that the following measures should 
be taken by the Japanese Government in one year beginning on April 22nd:  
 
   (1) The Japanese Government will purchase Thai rice at the price of 
Baht 9.60 per picul. The above mentioned price shall mean the F.O.B 
Bangkok or Koh-Sri-Chang price without bag and excluding export 
duty. 
   (2) The Japanese Government will permit the import from Thailand 
into Japan of not less than 30,000 metric tons of rubber and not less 
than 7,000 metric tons each of tin and teak produced in Thailand. 
   (3) a. The Japanese Government will permit the export from Japan 
to Thailand of goods for Thai civil use amounting in total to about 70 
million yen. The figure above mentioned shall include about 20 million 
yen of cotton piece-goods and other cotton goods, about 8 million yen of 
machineries and their accessories, about 4 million yen of artificial silk 
yarns and fabrics, 5.6 million of tobacco leaves, and 2 million yen each 
of paper and tea.  
   b. Besides the preceding provision a, the Japanese Government will 
give good offices for the supply form Shanghai to Thailand of some 
kinds of goods especially about 3480 metric tons of cotton yarns, about 
2815 bales of cotton piece goods, certain amount of cotton goods. 
   c. Goods for the use of the Thai Government shall be treated 
separately from these understandings.544 
 
   In this document, the Japanese government agreed to continue 
negotiations for a formal trade agreement.545 The import price of Thai rice 
had been raised to 9.60 baht per picul as Thailand wished. And the import 
figure of rubber had also been raised to 30,000 ton, but the figures of tin 
and teak stayed at 7,000 ton.  
   In return, Thailand finally made an oral statement that “the exchange 
rates between yen and baht shall be fixed at par and this exchange rate 
shall be put into effect from April 22nd. Both Governments will immediately 
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take such measures as may be necessary to put into practice the above 
exchange rate as from the day mentioned above”.546 
   Although Japan and Thailand reached a preliminary trade agreement 
to achieve the equivalent linkage between yen and Thai baht, Thailand 
was still worried about Japan’s future policies, especially the price changes 
of imports and exports. Thailand obviously expressed its worries to 
Japanese side as follows: 
 
   “In order to re-assure the public opinion in regard to the 
devaluation of the Thai currency so as to secure parity with Yen, Thai 
government was considering that the price already agreed upon is 
definite and final, has caused that Thai Rice Company to raise the 
buying prices accordingly so that farmers may have some immediate 
compensation to offset to some extent the effect of the devaluation. 
Since the Government of Thailand has made public announcement of 
the compensatory measures, i.e. by raising the paddy buying prices, 
any change would have big effect on the public opinion. Therefore, Thai 
Government also asks the Japanese Government to be so kind as to 
adhere to the prices and the terms of delivery already provided for in 
the initiated Understanding on Basic Items of Trade.”547 
 
   Therefore, Thai delegation still strived to seek for a more favorable 
trade agreement. Thailand continued to stress that “if the proposed 
formula is not satisfactory, Thai government will consider another 
formula”. 548  Then on June 27th, the Understanding on Trade (Draft, 
Confidential) provided that “both countries shall endeavor to avoid 
unreasonable rise of the export prices of its own products to be exported to 
the other”, which greatly reduced Thailand’s concerns about the price 
fluctuations of trade products. 549  In addition, Japan also made great 
concessions on energy issues, and agreed to provide 7,950 kiloliters of 
mineral oil to Thailand. The main contents of this agreement were as 
follows: 
 
   (1) Rice and its by-products: Thailand agreed to supply to Japan, for 
the year of 1942, all the rice and its products produced in Thailand 
exceeding the quantities for home consumption in Thailand and also 
for the frontier trade. The quantities of rice and its by-products to be 
supplied to Japan for the year 1942 shall be at least 1,200,000 metric 
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tons.  
   (2) Mineral Oil: the Government of Japan shall endeavor as much 
as possible to alleviate the shortage of mineral oil in Thailand. And the 
kinds and quantities of mineral oil to be supplied for each month by 
Japan to Thailand shall be as follows: 
Aviation gasoline 87 or 73 ………………………… 350 kiloliters 
Motor spirit …………………………………………2,000 kiloliters 
Kerosene ………………………………………………1,500 kiloliters 
Gas Oil ……………………………………………… 500 kiloliters 
Heavy diesel oil (B) …………………………………… 2,500 kiloliters 
Heavy diesel oil (C) …………………………………… 8,000 kiloliters 
Lubricating oil ………………………………………… 300 kiloliters 
Total …………………………………………………………7,950 kiloliters 
   (3) The importation of Thai products to Japan: the Government of 
Thailand shall allow the exportation of the Thai products to Japan 
according to the indications of List A. 
   (4) The importation of Japanese products to Thailand: the 
Government of Thailand shall allow the exportation of the Thai 
products to Japan according to the indications of List B. 
   (5) Export prices of products of the two countries: Each Government 
of the two countries shall endeavor as much as possible to avoid 
unreasonable rise of the export prices of its own products to be 
exported to the other. If one of the two governments desire with good 
reason to have an exchange of views on the subject of the export prices, 
the said Government shall inform their desire to the other. An 
exchange of views, thereafter, shall be conducted between the experts 
designated by the two Governments respectively.550 
 
   The trade representatives of both sides met on June 28th, and they 
believed this Understanding on Trade would help to promote the smooth 
exchange of goods between Japan and Thailand.551 Indeed, with its 
clever use of gold issues, Thailand changed its position in economic 
negotiations with Japan, and ensured a more favorable trade agreement 
with Japan. 
 
4.2 Japan’s Compromises and the Final Loan Agreement 
   As mentioned above, Thailand also hoped that Japan could make 
some compromises on providing loans, especially in the loan interest 
rate and the repayment period. And these two things also became the 
key issues in the Tokyo negotiations. The original proposal given by the 
                                                             
550
 National Archives of Thailand, บก. สงูสดุ 2.6.3/7, การเจรจาเศรฐกิจที่กรุงโตเกียว(Economic Negotiations in Tokyo), ปึกที ่2, 
Understanding on Trade (Draft) Confidential ,1942.06.27, p.187-189. 
551
 National Archives of Thailand, บก. สงูสดุ 2.6.3/7, การเจรจาเศรฐกิจที่กรุงโตเกียว(Economic Negotiations in Tokyo), ปึกที ่3, 
Minites(Draft, Confidential),1942.06.28. 
155 
 
Japanese side was: the interest rate was 4.2% and the repayment period 
was 20 years. 552  There obviously existed a certain gap from the 
expectations of Thailand. 
   At this time, in parallel with the loan negotiations, the delegates of 
both sides also discussed on the special yen issue. It seemed there were 
some linkages between loan and special yen negotiations, and after the 
special yen agreement was finally signed on June 18, the loan 
agreement was also signed on the same day as “compensation”.553  
   In fact, in the Bangkok negotiations, the Japanese side had already 
emphasized the definition of special yen in the loan needed to be 
clarified, and the core question was the convertible relationship between 
the special yen and gold.554 Thailand finally made a compromise on the 
convertibility of special yen to gold, which partly enabled Thailand to get 
more favorable conditions in loan exchange rate and repayment period. 
   The special yen system was established in the potential risks of 
Anglo-American assets freeze towards Japan since 1940, and Japan was 
trying to establish a yen-centered settlement system and get rid of 
financial dependence on the western powers.555 The central banks within 
the yen bloc sold their retained foreign exchanges to the Yokohama Specie 
Bank, and then established the special yen bank account. And the biggest 
difference between special yen and ordinary yen was that “it guarantees a 
certain degree of convertibility with other foreign currencies.”556 However, 
this convertibility was difficult to realize after the formal assets freeze 
since July 1941 and the exchange rights of Manchuria, Mongolia and 
China had already been deprived. 
   But for Thailand, it strongly urged for the convertibility between the 
special yen and gold. In the Bangkok negotiations held on Marth 19th, the 
Secret Agreement stipulated that, “the special yen refers to a kind of yen 
which is used in Thai-Japanese settlements and Thailand’s settlements 
with other countries (also including countries outside of the Greater East 
Asian Sphere), and it could be freely (自由に) transferred to gold by a ratio of 
4.80 yen to 1 gram of gold”.557 In the subsequent Tokyo negotiations, Japan 
and Thailand continued to debate on the definition of special yen and its 
relations with gold. 
   However, in the context of fierce confrontation between “gold-support 
theory” and “gold-abandoning theory”, some Japanese officials began to 
worry that “if Japan ships much gold to Bangkok, it will inevitably bring 
about tremendous changes to the Thai economy. And this change is what 
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Japan has to consider carefully.”558 After Thailand’s decision to return to 
the gold standard system, Japan’s worries further strengthened. For Japan, 
it was very important to make the special yen system as the main 
settlement method between Japan and Thailand. 
   In the Tokyo negotiations, Thailand insisted on incorporating “the 
special yen will be ‘freely’ transferred to gold” in the final agreement, but 
Japan strongly demanded that “freely” must be deleted. At last, Thailand 
decided to delete the word “freely”, but asked Japan to add new words 
which could express a sentiment of “under reasonable requirements”. In 
the final agreement, this part was expressed as “when necessary” (必要に応
じ).  
   The Memorandum on Japanese-Thai Special Yen Settlement was 
officially announced on May 2nd, and its main contents were as follows: 
 
   (1) All settlements between Japan and Thailand must be completed 
by special yen. 
   (2) The settlements between Thailand and other countries (or 
regions) that have already adopted special yen system should also be 
carried out by the special yen. (But it needed to be agreed by other 
countries or regions) 
   (3) For other countries or regions which are not mentioned in the 
provisions above, if they want to make settlements through special yen, 
Japan and Thailand Governments will agree under appropriate 
conditions. 
   (4) The Thai Ministry of Finance and Bank of Japan should make 
necessary arrangements on the operation of special yen system. 
   (5) The special yen could be transferred to gold by a ratio of 4.80 yen 
to 1 gram of gold when necessary.559 
 
   Therefore, Thailand was incorporated in Japan’s special yen 
settlement system, and Thailand had made considerable concessions 
on the convertibility between special yen and gold. The final agreement 
was signed on June 18th, and Thai special yen account was established 
in Bank of Japan for its foreign settlements. And on the same day, the 
Thai-Japanese loan agreement was also signed as a compensation for 
the special yen agreement. The interest rate and repayment period of 
this loan was reduced to 3.5% and 5 years, which met the requirements 
on the Thailand side. 
 
4.3 Repayment of Military Loans and Gold Shipments 
  Although the currency standard or exchange rate issue had been solved 
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and Thailand decided to adopt the yen standard, it did not mean that the 
influence of gold issues completely disappeared. Thailand still did not want 
to be completely incorporated into the yen bloc, for the yen bloc had a new 
risk. 
   As the Japanese victory tide began to decline by the end of 1942, the 
credit of yen was also faced with severe challenges. Thailand feared that if 
Japan failed in the war, these payments made by special yen would become 
worthless, so Thailand urged for more methods of payment in addition to 
special yen.  
   During the Pacific war, Japanese military expenditures in Thailand 
were all paid by baht. As Japan did not have enough baht on hand, it had 
to borrow necessary baht assets from Thailand government. These loans 
would be repaid by gold at first, but it was out of step with Japan’s plan to 
establish the Greater East Asian Financial System, which meant Japan 
had to divert specie assets to foreign settlements. Later they reached an 
agreement on special yen payment so as to eliminate the need for using 
foreign exchanges or gold to meet overseas debts. 560  However, the 
considerable Japanese military expenditures coupled with huge Thai 
budget deficits, resulted in a huge increase in money supply and 
inflation.561  
   With the increasing issuance of baht, Thailand hoped to increase its 
gold reserves and enhance citizens’ confidence in baht. Therefore, Thailand 
negotiated with Japan to strive for the “half amount payment by gold” (半额
金決済) mechanism, so as to hedge the risks of yen bloc. Then it gradually 
formed a loan repayment pattern of special yen plus earmarked gold plus 
gold shipment. And even if Japan failed in the war, Thailand would still be 
able to maintain the acquisition of the earmarked gold, which could help to 
ensure its financial stability after the war.562   
   Japan’s gold settlements with Thailand during wartime were as follows: 
  
 Earmarked Gold Gold Shipment(金現送) 
Gold Amount 
(kilogram) 
Price 
(thousand yen) 
Gold Amount 
(kilogram) 
Price 
(thousand yen) 
1941 11,606 55,968 4,311 20,933 
1942 11,424 55,462 — — 
1943 6,042 29,000 — — 
1944 11,440 60,000 — — 
                                                             
560
 ณรง พ่วงพิศ. (1998) “ปัญหาเงินเยนพิเศษระหว่างประเทศไทยกบัประเทศญ่ีปุ่ น (พ.ศ. 2484-2505)”. วารสารประวติัศาสตร์. 
561
 จาง ห ยิ่ ว ซิว-, & อาทร ฟุ้ ง ธรรมสาร. (1994) “การ เป็น พนัธมิตร และ การ ต่อต้าน ญ่ีปุ่ น ของ ไทย ระหว่าง ค. ศ. 1941-1945”. วารสาร ญ่ีปุ่ น ศกึษา 
(Japanese Studies Journal), Vol.11. No.2, p.105. 
562
 高石末吉『覚書終戦財政始末第 4 巻:戦費の調達と大陸各地の銀行』、270頁。 
158 
 
1945 4,325 25,000 1,672 8,686 
Total 44,838 224,610 5,893 29,618 
Table 53 Japan’s Gold Settlements with Thailand during Wartime563 
   From the table above, Thailand successfully acquired nearly 45 tons of 
earmarked gold (worth 224.61 million yen) and 5.893 tons of gold (worth 
29.618 million yen) by shipments. And it did help to protect the baht’s 
value from excessive inflation. In addition, gold issues once again became a 
major topic in economic negotiations between Japan and Thailand. In the 
following three years, the two governments negotiated the payment mode 
of military loans and gold issues every half year. If the negotiations stalled, 
it would directly affect Japan’s military expenditures and military 
operations in Thailand and the whole of Southeast Asia. Therefore, it 
formed an effective coercive power against the Japanese government, and 
Thailand seized this opportunity to claim more favorable conditions and 
compensations in bilateral negotiations. For example, Thailand urged for 
more machinery and technologies from Japan, and demanded that Japan 
should help Thailand become a self-supporting industrial center.564  
   In addition, it should be noted that Thailand always urged for gold 
shipment in every military expenditure negotiation. At that time, Japan 
was in lack of gold reserves and feared that Thailand’s increasing gold 
reserves would improve its financial ties with the Western powers, so 
Thailand did not receive any gold shipment from 1942 to 1944.565 Despite 
this, due to the inability to meet Thailand’s desire on gold issue, Japan 
might make more concessions to Thailand on other issues such as economic 
support or territories. It could also be seen as a manifestation of Thai 
currency power. 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 6 
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1. Conclusion 
1.1 In the Theoretical Aspect 
   This dissertation supplements the studies on currency power. The 
existing studies mainly concern the currency power of strong states, 
including dominant states and middle powers. However, weak states have 
long been ignored in this field.  
   The originality in theoretical aspect is reflected in the following three 
points: 
   First, the exercise of currency power always requires a certain amount 
of financial resources and a considerable ability to take risk. These strong 
states are generally risk-seeking states, and their objectives of using 
currency power tend to coerce or attack other states. However, for many 
weak countries, they do not have so much financial resources and do not 
want to take too much risk. Therefore, this dissertation argues that the 
preferences of some weak states are risk-neutral or risk-avoidance, and 
their goal is simply to balance the influence of strong powers or to 
minimize their losses.  
   Second, the previous studies ignore some other forms to perform 
currency power. This dissertation mentions two new forms for weak states: 
counterbalancing policy, which is used by China; and hedging strategy, 
which is used by Thailand. Counterbalancing policy means to balance (or 
offset) other’s economic advantages by making use of currency relations, so 
as to change the unbalanced or abnormal economic situation. They tend to 
be risk-neutral, and only want to balance the influence or reduce the 
benefits of its opponents. Hedging strategy refers to maintain relationship 
with two competitive currencies or currency blocs simultaneously, and 
refuse to completely cut off currency relations with anyone of them. Their 
preference is risk-avoidance, and they hope to increase their freedom of 
action or reduce vulnerability in a changing situation. Furthermore, they 
may get some side-payments by this strategy. 
   Generally, this dissertation gives a systematic summary on the studies 
of currency power and make up for its deficiencies in currency power of 
weak states, which was shown in the chart below: 
 
 Currency Power 
Strong States Weak States 
Dominant states Middle powers 
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Forms  currency dependence 
currency 
manipulation 
currency as a symbol 
currency interdependence 
institutional limits 
countervailing power 
counterbalancing 
policy 
hedging strategy 
Objectives attack, coerce Balance 
offset 
minimize losses 
Risk 
Preference 
risk-seeking risk-neutral risk-avoidance 
Table 54 the Studies on Currency Power (made by the author) 
   Third, from the perspective of empirical research, most of the case 
studies focus on the sterling, US dollar, French franc and Euro, but pay 
little attention to the relations within Japanese yen bloc. Therefore, this 
dissertation attempts to make up for this deficiency and tries to explore 
how the weak countries in Asia use currency power to counter the powerful 
Japanese empire from the 1920s to the 1940s. 
 
1.2 In the Empirical Aspect 
   It should be noted that there were two special cases when researching 
on Japan’s colonial economic history, and they were China and Thailand. 
They were the only two nations that maintained relative political and 
economic autonomy within the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere 
until the end of the war. And this particularity was surely reflected in their 
policies towards Japan, especially economic policies. This dissertation 
selects three cases: Zhang Xueliang’s regime in Manchuria from 1929 to 
1931; the Nanjing Government from 1934 to 1937; and the Phibun’s 
administration from 1941 to 1942. In these cases, despite their huge 
military gap with Japan, both China and Thailand have demonstrated 
sufficient economic flexibility and well maintained their own economy from 
Japan’s exploitation. 
   Therefore, the research question in this dissertation can be summarized 
as: how did China and Thailand protect their economic interests from 
Japan’s excessive pressure or exploitation?  
   There are some previous studies on this issue, but they have ignored 
China and Thailand’s active interference and manipulation of bilateral 
currency relations. This dissertation argues that currency has played a 
crucial role in their relations with Japan. China and Thailand were 
inevitably influenced and restricted by Japan in terms of security and 
diplomacy, but both of them have maintained considerable autonomy in 
currency policies. From the late 1920s to mid-1930s, China experienced 
tremendous changes in the silver price and currency system, which 
affected Japan greatly. In early 1940s, Thailand also took a hedging policy 
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between gold-standard states and Japan, so as to protect its national 
interests. Ultimately, Japan’s influence on the international financial 
market was so weak, which gave the possibility for China and Thailand to 
exert their currency power.  
   Therefore, this dissertation gives a hypothesis that: China and 
Thailand successfully promoted their position in negotiations with Japan 
through the exercise of currency power, so as to protect their economic 
interests. 
   In the Zhang Xueliang case, the existing studies provide some 
explanations about how Zhang Xueliang protected the economic interests 
from Japan’s excessive pressure or exploitation. This dissertation argues 
that the rapid change of gold-silver ratio since 1929 helped Zhang to 
adopted effective economic policies from limited financial resources. 
Through the manipulation of gold-silver ratio, Zhang Xueliang successfully 
exercised his currency power. During this process, he not only brought 
damages to Japan’s South Manchuria Railway Company, but also promote 
its own railway network and industrial policies. 
   In the Nanjing Government case, the existing studies provide some 
explanations about how the Nanjing Government protected the economic 
interests from Japan’s dumping policy in China and the Southeast Asia. 
This dissertation argues that Nanjing Government successfully exercised 
its currency power through the currency reform in 1935. By this reform, 
the Nanjing Government not only curbed the momentum of Japan’s 
dumping policy, but also promoted its own industrial policies and recovered 
the overseas Chinese economic network. 
   In the Phibun administration’s case, the existing studies analyze some 
strategies that Thailand used to cope with Japan’s excessive demands on 
economic aspect. However, as an important part of Japan-Thailand 
economic relations in the beginning of Pacific War, the details of economic 
negotiations in Bangkok and Tokyo in the first half of 1942 and Thailand’s 
negotiating strategies have not been fully studied. These negotiations 
basically set out the principles of Thailand's economic policy towards 
Imperial Japan during the whole Pacific War. Therefore, it is necessary to 
study the details of these two negotiations and further explore the 
negotiating tools and chips of the Thailand government. By using Japanese 
and Thai literatures, this dissertation finds that gold issues were the main 
topics in these negotiations, and have played an important role in 
Thailand’s economic policy towards Japan. Thailand used the gold 
standard to wrestle with Japan and behaved more inclined to adopt the 
gold standard rather than the yen standard, so as to request for more side 
payments and hedge the risk of incorporating into the yen bloc. Through 
the negotiations on gold issues, the Phibun administration successfully 
exercised its currency power. 
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1.3 In Comparative Studies 
   By comparing China and Thailand’s cases, it also reveals the differences 
within the weak states. There are two biggest differences between Chinese 
and Thai cases: for one thing, Thailand and Japan are allies, but China not; 
for another, China’s successful use of currency power occurred just before 
the war, while Thailand used its currency power during wartime. These 
differences will help us to have a deeper understanding of the background 
and motivations of weak states’ policies. 
   In addition, it is interesting to find that the weak states’ currency power 
is all related with their active currency reform and significant financial 
changes in international market. It seems to reveal the source of the weak 
states’ currency power and how to find a window of opportunity to exercise 
this power. 
 
2. Future Work 
2.1 Studies on Currency Power 
   As mentioned above, the existing studies on currency power almost 
focus on the strong states, so it is necessary to do more research on 
currency power of weak states. Through digging into more historical and 
current materials, it might be possible to find more empirical cases in this 
field. It can help us to better understand the role of currency and how to 
make use of it. 
   Although power politics and hard power still have the most important 
impact on international relations, the influence of monetary and financial 
tools is clearly increasing. After entering the 21st century, this feature 
becomes more obvious. All major countries are striving for dominance in 
international financial affairs. 
 
2.2 Studies on Weak States 
   The currency power of weak states can be further included in the 
studies of weak states. The traditional international studies always focus 
on great power relations or hegemonic power, but recently more and more 
scholar begin to research on the importance of weak states, such as the 
states in Southeast Asia, Central Asia or Middle East. Therefore, currency 
power can provide a new perspective in weak states studies. 
   Since the 21st century, small states or weak countries have played an 
increasingly important role. They can make use of international 
organizations or contradictions among big powers to realize their objectives. 
There are more and more empirical cases worthy of our research and 
exploration. In fact, most of the states in the international system are weak 
states, and their foreign policies and diplomatic tools have long been 
ignored. 
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2.3 Studies on Japan’s Colonial Economic History 
   Many studies on Japan’s colonial economic history are centered on 
Japan, and ignore the importance of other weak states. So it is necessary to 
study Japan’s colonial economic history from the perspective of its 
surrounding countries. It can help us to better understand the full view of 
the history during that period. 
   Besides Thailand and China, French Indochina also needed to be 
further studied, because it also maintained the convertibility between 
special yen and gold to some extent. So it might be meaningful to studies 
the policy motives of French Indochina Government and its relations with 
Japan during 1942 to 1945. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
164 
 
References 
● Theory on Currency Power  
(1) English 
- A. Wheatley (Ed.). (2013). The Power of Currencies and Currencies of Power. IISS. 
- A. Walter (1993). World Power and World Money: the Role of Hegemony and 
International Monetary Order. Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
- A. Saunders & M. M. Cornett (2003). Financial Institutions Management: A Risk 
Management Approach. Irwin/McGraw-Hill. 
- A. Truitt (2003). The Making of National Money: Territorial Currencies in Historical 
Perspective. Political and Legal Anthropology Review, 26(2). 
- A. Chapnick (1999). The Middle Power. Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, 7(2). 
- A. Hazlewood (1952). Sterling Balances and the Colonial Currency System. The 
Economic Journal, 62(248). 
- B. Chowdhry & J. T. Howe (1999). Corporate Risk Management for Multinational 
Corporations: Financial and Operational Hedging Policies. Review of Finance, 2(2). 
- B. J. Cohen (1998). The Geography of Money. Cornell University Press. 
- B. J. Cohen (2003). The Geopolitics of Currencies and the Future of the International 
System. Orfalea Center for Global & International Studies. 
- B. J. Cohen (2006). The Future of Money, Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
- B. J. Cohen (2006). The Macro Foundation of Monetary Power, in David Andrews eds., 
The International Monetary Power, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
- B. J. Cohen (2010). Currency and State Power. in Finnemore, M. eds., Back to Basics: 
State Power in a Contemporary World. Oxford University Press. 
- B. J. Cohen (2015). Currency Power: Understanding Monetary Rivalry. Princeton 
University Press. 
- B. W. Brittain, Lehrman Institute & B. M. Rowland (1976). Balance of Power or 
Hegemony: the Interwar Monetary System. New York: New York University Press. 
- B. D. Brown (1978). Money Hard and Soft: on the International Currency Markets. 
Springer. 
- B. F. Tessman (2012). System Structure and State Strategy: Adding Hedging to the Menu. 
Security Studies, 21(2). 
- B. Thorhallsson & A. Wivel (2006). Small States in the European Union: What Do We 
Know and What Would We Like to Know?. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 
19(4). 
- C. J. Schneider (2011). Weak States and Institutionalized Bargaining Power in 
International Organizations. International Studies Quarterly, 55(2). 
- C. P. Kindlerberger (2013). International Money: A Collection of Essays. Routledge. 
- C. P. Kindlerberger (2013). Keynesianism vs. Monetarism: other Essays in Financial 
History. Routledge. 
- C.P. Kindleberger, The Benefits of International Money, Journal of International 
Economics, Vol.2, No.4, 1972. 
- C. R. Henning (1994). Currencies and Politics in the United States, Germany, and Japan. 
Peterson Institute. 
165 
 
- D. M. Andrews (1994). Capital Mobility and State Autonomy: Toward a Structural 
Theory of International Monetary Relations. International Studies Quarterly, 38(2). 
- D. M. Andrews, C. R. Henning & L. W. Pauly (Eds.). (2002). Governing the World's 
Money. Cornell University Press. 
- D. A. Lake (2009). Hierarchy in International Relations. Cornell University Press. 
- D. Vital (1971). The Survival of Small States: Studies in Small Power/Great Power 
Conflict. Oxford University Press. 
- E. Birnbaum (1968). Gold and the International Monetary Power Structure. Business 
Economics, 3(2). 
- E. Helleiner, (1998). National Currencies and National Identities. American Behavioral 
Scientist, 41(10). 
- F. J. Gavin (2004). Gold, Dollars, and Power: the Politics of International Monetary 
Relations, 1958-1971. UNC Press Books. 
- F. S. Mishkin (2007). Monetary Policy Strategy. Mit Press. 
- H. Zimmermann (2002). Money and Security: Troops, Monetary Policy, and West 
Germany's Relations with the United States and Britain. Cambridge University Press. 
- H. O. Schmitt (1964). Political Conditions for International Currency Reform. 
International organization, 18(3). 
- I. M. Drummond (1987) The Gold Standard and the International Monetary System, 
Macmillan Education. 
- I. W. Zartman & J. Z. Rubin (Eds.). (2002). Power and Negotiation. University of 
Michigan Press. 
- J. L. Broz & J. A. Frieden (2001). The Political Economy of International Monetary 
Relations. Annual Review of Political Science, 4(1). 
- J. H. Ping (2017). Middle Power Statecraft: Indonesia, Malaysia and the Asia-Pacific. 
Ashgate Publishing Limited. 
- J. Rickards (2012). Currencies of Power and the Power of Currencies. International 
Institute for Strategic Studies-ISSS Geo-economics and Strategy Programme. 
- J. Kirshner (1995) Currency and Coercion: the Political Economy of International 
Monetary Power. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
- J. Kirshner (Ed.). (2003). Monetary Orders: Ambiguous Economics, Ubiquitous Politics. 
Cornell University Press. 
- J. Manicom & J. Reeves (2014). Locating Middle Powers in International Relations 
Theory and Power Transitions. In B. GILLEY & A. O’NEIL (Eds.), Middle Powers and the 
Rise of China. WASHINGTON, DC: Georgetown University Press. 
- J. S. Odell (2014). US International Monetary Policy: Markets, Power, and Ideas as 
Sources of Change. Princeton University Press. 
- K. N. Waltz (1979). Theory of International Politics. Waveland Press. Addison-Wesley 
Publishing Company. 
- K. Gallagher (2015). Countervailing Monetary Power. In Ruling Capital: Emerging 
Markets and the Reregulation of Cross-Border Finance. ITHACA; LONDON: Cornell 
University Press. 
- Kindleberger & L. Lehrman (1976). Money and the Coming World Order. New York: New 
York University Press. 
- L. E. Armijo & S. N. Katada (2015). Theorizing the Financial Statecraft of Emerging 
Powers. New Political Economy, 20(1), 42-62. 
166 
 
- L. B. L. B. Yeager (1976). International Monetary Relations: Theory, History, and Policy. 
New York: Harper and Row. 
- L. Yonghai, J. Linzhou, W. Tiejun (2012) “America’s Currency-Power Strategy and 
China’s Reactions.” World Economics and Politics. No.3.  
- Liwei, The Political Basis of Currency Competition: A research approach based on 
International Political Economy, Foreign Affairs Review, 2011(3). 
- L. Gardner (2015). The Curious Incident of the Franc in the Gambia: Exchange Rate 
Instability and Imperial Monetary Systems in the 1920s, Financial History Review, 
Vol.22. 
- M. D. Bordo & A. J. Schwartz (Eds.). (2009). A Retrospective on the Classical Gold 
Standard, 1821-1931. University of Chicago Press. 
- M. De Cecco (1984). The International Gold Standard: Money and empire (2nd ed.). 
London: F. Pinter. 
- M. Friedman (1992). Franklin D. Roosevelt, Silver, and China. Journal of Political 
Economy, 100(1). 
- M. I. Handel (2016). Weak States in the International System. Routledge. 
- M. Kaelberer (2001). Money and Power in Europe: The Political Economy of European 
Monetary Cooperation. SUNY Press. 
- M. Kaelberer (2005). Structural Power and the Politics of International Monetary 
Relations. The Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies, 30(3). 
- M. Vermeiren (2014). Power and Imbalances in the Global Monetary System: A 
Comparative Capitalism Perspective. 
- O. Höll (Ed.). (1983). Small States in Europe and Dependence (No. 6). W. Braumüller, 
Austrian Institute for International Affairs. 
- P. J. Katzenstein (1985). Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe. 
Cornell University Press. 
- R. Desai (2013). The Brics Are Building a Challenge to Western Economic Supremacy. 
The Guardian. 
- R. N. Cooper (1975). Prolegomena to the Choice of an International Monetary 
System. International Organization, 29(1). 
- R. Gilpin (1987). The Political Economy of International Relations. Princeton University 
Press. 
- R. Keohane (1969). Lilliputians' Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics. 
International Organization, 23(2).  
- R. A. Lester (1944). International Aspects of Wartime Monetary Experience (No. 3). 
Princeton University. 
- R. Luna-Arocas, G. Guzmán, I. Quintanilla & M. Farhangmehr (2001). The Euro and 
European Identity: the Spanish and Portuguese case. Journal of Economic Psychology, 
22(4). 
- R. Nurkse (1944). International Currency Experience: Lessons of the Interwar Period 
(No. 4). League of Nations. 
- R. Vayrynen (1971). On the Definition and Measurement of Small Power Status. 
Cooperation and Conflict, 6(1).  
- S. Strange (1971). The Politics of International Currencies. World Politics, 23(2). 
- S. Strange (1971). Sterling and British Policy: a Political Study of an International 
Currency in Decline. Oxford University Press.  
- S. Cooper (2006). The Limits of Monetary Power: Statecraft within Currency Areas. In D. 
167 
 
M. Andrews (eds.) International Monetary Power. Cornell University Press. 
- T. C. Lawton, J. N. Rosenau & A. Verdun (Eds.) (2000). Strange Power: Shaping the 
Parameters of International Relations and International Political Economy. Burlington, 
Vt.: Ashgate. 
- T. J. Pempel (2010). Soft Balancing, Hedging, and Institutional Darwinism: The 
Economic-security Nexus and East Asian Regionalism. Journal of East Asian Studies, 
10(2). 
- T. Risse (2003). The Euro between National and European Identity. Journal of European 
Public Policy, 10(4). 
- T. C. Schelling (1979) The Strategy of Conflict, Harvard University Press. 
- W. Bernhard, J. L. Broz & W. R. Clark (2002). The Political Economy of Monetary 
Institutions. International Organization, 56(4). 
- W. Mwangi (2001). Of Coins and Conquest: The East African Currency Board, the Rupee 
Crisis, and the Problem of Colonialism in the East African Protectorate. Comparative 
Studies in Society and History, 43(4). 
 
 
(2) Japanese 
浅田喬二（1975）「日本植民史研究の現状と問題点」『歴史評論』第 300号。 
浦野起央（1992）『国際政治における小国』南窓社。 
河津暹『植民と植民政策』有斐閣、1940年。 
慶応義塾各国経済研究会 （1936）『大英ブロック経済及経済政策』改造社。 
小林英夫（2006）『大東亜共栄圏の形成と崩壊』御茶の水書房。 
柴田善雅（1999）『占領地通貨金融政策展開』日本経済評論社。 
ストレンジ（1989）『国際通貨没落過程の政治学: ポンドとイギリスの政策』本山美彦訳、三
嶺書房。 
島崎久弥（1989）『円の侵略史: 円為替本位制度の形成過程』日本経済評論社。 
山本有造（1992）『日本植民地経済史研究』名古屋大学出版社。 
 
(3) Chinese 
陈雨露、王芳、杨明《作为国家竞争战略的货币国际化：美元的经验证据—兼论人民币的国际化
问题》，载《经济研究》2005 年第 2 期。 
刘锡良《国际货币竞争理论研究评述》，载《经济学动态》2008 年第 5 期。 
王湘穗《币权：世界政治的当代枢纽》，载《现代国际关系》2009 年第 7 期。 
王湘穗《地缘与币缘交织的格局之变》，载《现代国际关系》2013 年第 4 期。 
韦民《小国与国际关系》，北京：北京大学出版社 2014 年版。 
赵柯《货币的政治逻辑与国际货币体系的演变》，载《欧洲研究》2011 年第 4 期。 
 
● Case One ：Zhang Xueliang’s Regime 
(1) Japanese  
朝日新聞社政治経済部（1931）『満蒙の諸問題』朝日新聞社。 
アジア経済研究所図書館（2011）『史料満鉄と満洲事変:山崎元幹文書.上』岩波書店。 
石田武彦（1978）「中国東北における産業の状態について: 1920 年代を中心に」『經濟學研究』
28(4)。 
168 
 
内田良平（1930）『全満蒙鉄道統一意見書』黒竜会出版部。 
大石隆基（1931）『満蒙の危機：帝国の満蒙鉄道利権消長史』国交通信社。 
大蔵省『満蒙鉄道敷設促進について（外務省と松岡理事との間で遂げたる懇談要領）』アジア
歴史資料センター、A09050417900。 
關東廳財務部（1929）『東三省官銀號論・遼寧省發行紙幣論・東三省官銀號附屬營業省財政關
係論』。 
郭志華（2012）『「満洲事変」前における東三省地域政権の通貨統一』岡山大学博士論文。 
外務省外交資料館（1924）『満鉄ノ東支南部線発駅貨物吸収策ニ関スル件』アジア歴史資料セ
ンター、B12081113200。 
外務省外交史料館（1924）『東三省支那側実業振興計画ニ関スル件』アジア歴史資料センター、
B11090811800。 
外務省外交史料館（1925）『奉天省ノ国産奨励策ニ関スル件』アジア歴史資料センター、
B11090812600。 
外務省外交史料館（1925）『奉天実業会議ニ関スル件』アジア歴史資料センター、B11090812200。 
外務省外交史料館『奉天派の対日態度並びに関税増徴問題に対する対策としての南北和平定義』
アジア歴史資料センター、B02030036000。 
外務省外交史料館『満鉄幹部と奉天官憲との関係』アジア歴史資料センター、B02030032600。 
外務省外交資料館（1929）『昭和４年３月８日から昭和４年４月７日：満蒙問題ニ関スル交渉
一件／満蒙鉄道交渉問題』、アジア歴史資料センター。 
外務省外交資料館（1929）『支那国有鉄道関係雑件／外国人傭聘関係』、アジア歴史資料セン
ター。 
外務省外交資料館（1929）『昭和４年４月２７日から昭和４年６月７日：満蒙問題ニ関スル交
渉一件／満蒙鉄道交渉問題』、アジア歴史資料センター。 
外務省外交史料館『昭和６年７月６日から昭和６年９月１０日』アジア歴史資料センター、出
版年不明、B02031683900。 
外務省外交資料館（1930）『東北財政会議』、アジア歴史資料センター。 
外務省外交資料館（1930）『総合資料第２５号 葫蘆島築港工事ノ進歩状況』、アジア歴史資
料センター。 
外務省外交資料館（1930）『総合資料第２８号 満州ニ於ケル国産奨励ト新工業ノ勃興』、ア
ジア歴史資料センター。 
外務省外交資料館（1930）『総合資料第３３号 満蒙鉄道問題ニ関スル支那側新聞論調』、ア
ジア歴史資料センター。 
外務省外交資料館（1930）『銀安ノ鉄道運賃、貨物ニ及ボス影響』、アジア歴史資料センター。 
外務省外交資料館（1931）『中日鉄道交渉ニ関スル日本側提案予測ト我ノ態度及準備』、アジ
ア歴史資料センター、B10074565800。 
外務省外交資料館（1931）『葫蘆島築港ノ概要』アジア歴史資料センター、B10074566300。 
外務省外交史料館『鉄道ニ関スル権益侵害』アジア歴史資料センター、出版年不明、
B02030465500。 
外務省情報部『満州ニ於ケル支那側ノ条約蹂躪』外務省情報部、出版年不明。 
草柳大蔵（1979）『実録満鉄調査部』朝日新聞社。 
小林英夫（2000）『近代日本と満鉄』吉川弘文館。 
佐々木孝三郎（1936）『奉天経済三十年史』奉天商工公会。 
上海鐵道省辨事處（1931）『南京政府治下の支那鐵路』上海鐵道省辨事處。 
蘇崇民著、山下睦男など訳（1999）『満鉄史』葦書房。 
塚瀬進（1993）『中国近代東北経済史研究: 鉄道敷設と中国東北経済の変化』東方書店。 
東亜経済調査局（1933）『銀及銀価低落の研究』東亜経済調査局。 
南満洲鉄道株式會社庶務部調査課（1928）『満蒙に於ける日本の投資状態』南満洲鉄道。 
169 
 
南満洲鉄道株式会社庶務部調査課（1929）『奉海鉄道の満鉄に及ぼす影響』南満洲鉄道。 
南満州鉄道株式会社（1929）『南満州に於ける支那人の経済的対外関係: 南満洲に於ける支那
人の繁栄状況』南満洲鉄道。 
南満洲鉄道株式会社庶務部調査課（1931）『満洲政治経済事情.昭和 5年』南満洲鉄道。 
南満洲鉄道株式会社経済調査会（1932）『満洲貿易詳細統計：昭和 6 年』南満洲鉄道。 
南満洲鉄道株式会社総裁室地方部残務整理委員会著（1977）『満鉄附属地経営沿革全史・上巻』
龍溪書舎。 
『南満州鉄道株式会社統計年報：昭和 5年度上、昭和 6 年度上、昭和 7年度上』（1991）龍溪
書舎。 
西村成雄（1992）「張学良政権下の幣制改革--「現大洋票」の政治的含意」、『東洋史研究』50(4)。 
西村成雄（1996）『張学良: 日中の覇権と「満洲」』岩波書店。 
野村浩一（1961）『満州事変直前の東三省問題』『国際政治』第 15号。 
林采成（2013）「満鉄における鉄道業の展開：効率性と収益性の視点より」『歴史と経済』第 4
号。 
原田勝正（1931）『満鉄』岩波書店。 
防衛省防衛研究所（1927）『埠頭築造に関する件』アジア歴史資料センター、C01006304700。 
防衛省防衛研究所（1931）『満鉄収入前途悲観説（排日）』、アジア歴史資料センター。 
前田美稲（1936）『銀及銀政策』創造社。 
満史会『満州開発四十年史』満州開発四十年史刊行会、1964 年。 
満州史研究会編（1972）『日本帝国主義下の満州:「満州国」成立前後の経済研究』御茶の水書
房。 
満洲輸入組合聯合会（1928）『定款諸規程及組合員名簿』満洲輸入組合聯合会。 
『満洲中央銀行十年史』（1942）満洲中央銀行。 
満鉄会（2007）『満鉄四十年史』吉川弘文館。 
満鉄調査資料第 129 編（1930）『遼寧の準備庫と現大洋票』南満洲鉄道。 
康越 (2001)『国民政府形成期における東北地域政治: 東北政務委員会の制度化過程を中心に』、
大阪外国語大学博士論文。 
 
(2) Chinese 
Books and Archives： 
《實業部檔案》，中國第二歷史檔案館，南京。 
《交通銀行檔案》，中國第二歷史檔案館，南京。 
《奉天公報》，遼寧省檔案館，沈陽。 
《奉天省政府公報》，遼寧省檔案館，沈陽。 
《遼寧省政府公報》，遼寧省檔案館，沈陽。 
《東北政治委員會檔案》，遼寧省檔案館，沈陽。 
《奉天省公署檔案》，遼寧省檔案館，沈陽。 
中華民國財政部《滿州幣制史料. 紙幣篇》，1930 年。 
王雨桐《最近之东北经济与日本》，新中国建设学会出版科 1933 年版。 
《东三省金融整理委员会报告书》，东三省金融整理委员会 1931 年版。 
东北文化社年鉴编印处《东北年鉴》，东北文化社 1931 年版。 
國立東北大學《東北要覽》，國立東北大學編印出版社 1944 年版。 
章有义编《中国近代农业史资料》，三联书店 1957 年版。 
孔经纬《日俄战争至抗战胜利期间东北的工业问题》，辽宁人民出版社 1958 年版。 
姚贤镐编《中国近代对外贸易史资料》，中华书局 1962 年版。 
170 
 
复旦大学历史系中国近代史教研组编《中国近代对外关系史资料选辑》，上海人民出版社 1977
年版。 
吉林省社会科学院《满铁史资料》编辑组编《满铁史资料》，中华书局 1979 年版。 
解学诗主编《满铁史资料·第二卷·路权篇》中华书局 1979 年版。 
《辽宁文史资料》第六辑、第十二辑，中国人民政治协商会议辽宁省委员会文史资料研究委员会
编，1981 年版。 
许道夫《中国近代农业生产及贸易统计资料》，上海人民出版社 1983 年版。 
中国人民政治协商会议吉林省委员会文史资料研究委员会《吉林文史资料选辑·第四辑：张作霖
等奉系军阀人物资料专辑》吉林人民出版社 1983 年版。 
政协沈阳市委员会文史资料研究委员会编《沈阳文史资料》，政协沈阳市委员会文史资料研究委
员会办公室 1985 年版。 
孔经纬《东北经济史》，四川人民出版社 1986 年版。 
李晨生《辽宁档案通览》，档案出版社 1988 年版。 
遼寧省檔案館編《奉系軍閥檔案史料彙編》，江蘇古籍出版社 1990 年版。 
苏崇民《满铁史》，中华书局 1990 年版。 
中国银行总行、中国第二历史档案馆合编《中国银行行史资料汇编》，档案出版社 1991 年版。 
孔经纬《新编中国东北地区经济史》，吉林教育出版社 1994 年版。 
中国第二历史档案馆编《国民政府财政金融稅收档案史料 (1927-1937 年)》，中国财政经济出版
社 1997 年版。 
董慧云、张秀春《张学良与东北新建设资料选》，香港同泽出版 1998 年版。 
马寅初《马寅初全集》（第六、七、八卷），浙江人民出版社 1999 年版。 
辽宁省档案馆（Liaoning Provincial Archives）《奉天省长公署为奉海铁路公司呈请改定客货运费按
现洋核收事》档号：JC010-01-008166，1928 年 1 月。 
辽宁省档案馆（Liaoning Provincial Archives）《奉天省公署为政委会指令拟定维持奉票办法事》，
档号：JC010-01-009988，1929 年 6 月。 
辽宁省档案馆（Liaoning Provincial Archives）《辽宁省政府为行政院训令奉国府会决议于最近期内
整理铁路行政其办法事》，档号：JC010-01-031825，1929 年 7 月。 
辽宁省档案馆（Liaoning Provincial Archives）《辽宁省政府为铁道部咨奉令铁道敷设由铁道部统一
筹备事》，档号：JC010-01-008111，1929 年 8 月。 
辽宁省档案馆（Liaoning Provincial Archives）《辽宁省政府为外交部请抄洮南葫芦岛两处开埠章程
事》，档号：JC010-01-009204，1929 年 8 月。 
辽宁省档案馆（Liaoning Provincial Archives）《辽宁省政府为救济金融办法事》，档号
JC010-01-010003，1930 年 1 月。 
辽宁省档案馆（Liaoning Provincial Archives）《东北政务委员会为铁道部咨以热河大兴大新两矿附
近支路不得由外人修筑等因请饬严防事》，档号：JC010-01-008294，1930 年 3 月。 
辽宁省档案馆（Liaoning Provincial Archives）《辽宁省政府为交委会咨审定铁路网计划制定各县人
口面积农矿各产调查表事》，档号：JC010-01-008109，1930 年 8 月。 
辽宁省档案馆（Liaoning Provincial Archives）<改订运价拟参照南满运价以便竞争意见案>，载《辽
宁省政府为铁道部举行全国运价会议议案、商运会议意见说明事》，档号：JC010-01-003785， 1930
年 11 月。 
辽宁省档案馆（Liaoning Provincial Archives）《辽宁省政府为辽宁省管理金融暂行章程事》，档号：
JC010-01-005568， 1931 年 1 月。 
辽宁省档案馆（Liaoning Provincial Archives）<东北与满铁有借款关系铁路之整理方针>，载《情
报日报》第 123 号，1931 年 9 月 5 日。 
辽宁省档案馆编《奉系军阀档案资料汇编 第三册》香港地平线出版社 1990 年版。 
辽宁省档案馆编《九一八事变前后的日本与中国东北：满铁秘档选编》，辽宁人民出版社 1991
年版。 
辽宁省档案馆编《辽宁省档案馆珍藏张学良档案》，广西师范大学出版社 1999 年版。 
171 
 
马尚斌《奉系经济》，辽海出版社 2001 年版。 
宓汝成编《中华民国铁路史资料》，社会科学文献出版社 2002 年版。 
胡玉海《近代东北铁路与对外关系》，辽宁大学出版社 2007 年版。 
张友坤、钱进、李学群《张学良年谱》，社会科学文献出版社 2009 年版。 
中國第二歷史檔案館編《中華民國史檔案資料匯編總目索引》，鳳凰出版社 2010 年版。 
郭俊胜《张学良与九一八事变研究》，辽宁人民出版社 2011 年版。 
解学诗、苏崇民编《满铁档案资料汇编·第一卷》社会科学文献出版社 2011 年版。 
解学诗、宋玉印编《满铁内密文书》第 2 卷，社会科学文献出版社 2015 年版。 
 
Journals： 
任松《张作霖与日本“满蒙铁路交涉问题”》，载《辽宁大学学报》1982年第 3期。 
王维远《论张学良时期东北经济的发展》，载《辽宁大学学报》1983年第 3 期。 
陈志明《九· 一八前东北地区整顿金融活动述略》，载《北方文物》1986 年第 4 期。 
张劲松《九一八事变研究综述》，载《抗日战争研究》1991 年。 
吴菊英《东北地区现存民国铁路档案简介》，载《民国档案》1996 年第 2 期。 
衣保中《论民国时期东北民族资本的三种形态》，载《吉林大学社会科学学报》1997 年第 5 期。 
苏晓轩《论 1912 年至 1931 年东北民族工业发展的社会基础》，载《辽宁大学学报》1999 年第 4
期。 
胡雪梅《东北大豆出口贸易与近代中国东北开发(1860～1931)》，载《北方文物》2002 年第 3 期。 
于军《浅谈张学良经济改革的重大举措及意义》，载《党史纵横》2003 年第 6 期。 
赵英兰、赵建明《论 1928～1936 年张学良对日外交观》，载《社会科学战线》2004 年第 6 期。 
潘德昌《满蒙路权外交与日奉关系》，载《渤海大学学报》2006 年版。 
董昭华《国家产业发展战略与国际货币制度选择——以日本的金本位制选择（1897-1931）为例》，
北京大学国际关系学院 2010 年博士论文。 
付丽颖《日元扩张与伪满货币制度的建立》，载《外国问题研究》2012 年第 3 期。  
程亚娟《近代东北对外贸易发展特点述略》，载《东北史地》2012 年第 2 期。 
陈祥《两次直奉战争期间张作霖整合东北地方权力研究》，载《东北史地》2012 年第 5 期。 
易丙兰《奉系与东北铁路建设：1918-1931》，北京大学 2013 年博士论文。 
 
Old Newspaper and Journals in Republic of China times(1912~1949)： 
《奉天省长公署训令第 118 号：准保安总司令部咨为东三省交通委员会成立请令属知照》，载《奉
天公报》1924年。 
《东三省建筑铁路之新计划》，载《银行周报》1926年第 20期。 
《國內：銀本位利害之比較》，載《東省經濟月刊》1927年第 5期。 
新闻报《满铁扩张水上运输计划：以七百万元添轮十艘》，1927年 12月 10日，第 1版。 
徐逐實《東三省之幣制與金融》，載《銀行周報》1928 年第 3期。 
《各埠金融：奉票跌落與日本紙幣》，載《銀行月刊》1928年第 4期。 
《各埠金融：張學良計畫整頓奉票》，載《銀行月刊》1928年第 7期。 
張久烈《驅逐外幣談(附圖)》，載《東三省官銀號經濟月刊》1929年第 1期。 
《日本擬在滿洲設立中央銀行》，載《東三省官銀號經濟月刊》1929年第 2 期。 
姚孟年《不兌換紙幣之整理與奉票》，載《東三省官銀號經濟月刊》1929 年第 2 期。 
大民《目前東省金融之整頓方策》，載《東三省官銀號經濟月刊》1929年第 2期。 
林泉清《奉票問題之一考察》，載《東三省官銀號經濟月刊》1929 年第 4期。 
夙兢 《擴充聯合準備庫以為統壹東省幣制之張本》，載《東三省官銀號經濟月刊》1929年第 4
172 
 
期。 
楊壹 《整頓東省金融之實際方法》，載《東三省官銀號經濟月刊》1929 年第 4期。 
《哈爾濱各銀行計劃發行現大洋票》，載《東三省官銀號經濟月刊》1929 年第 5 期。 
《財政部決將實施金本位制劃定統壹幣制步驟》，載《東三省官銀號經濟月刊》1929年第 5期。 
董敏修《統一東三省幣制論》，載《東三省官銀號經濟月刊》1929 年第 4期。 
夙兢 《整理東三省幣制之管見》，載《東三省官銀號經濟月刊》1929年第 4期。 
靜如《論東三省幣制之改革》，載《銀行周報》1929年第 24期。 
《雜纂：東三省幣制之大改革》，載《銀行周報》1929 年第 22期。 
《滿鐵鐵道收入大減》，載《東三省官銀號經濟月刊》1929 年第 3期。 
《金銀價變動大問題》，載《遼寧財政月刊》1929年第 42期。 
侯德封《辽宁省：鞍山炼铁厂》，载《中国矿业纪要》1929 年地质专报丙种 3。 
《确立农业政策为发展工商业之基础案说明及方案》，载《国民政府公报(南京 1927)》，1929年
第 208期。 
《东北之纺织事业：辽宁厂大著优胜》，载《纺织时报》1929 年第 646 期。 
《世界金銀價變動與我國之救濟》，載《中東經濟月刊》1930年紀念特刊。 
竹溪《最近金銀價大變動的研究》，載《東三省官銀號經濟月刊》1930年第 4期。 
《中政會議通過采用金本位制案》，載《東三省官銀號經濟月刊》1930年第 1期。 
《日人操縱東北金融：使大洋票價低於現大洋，以達其推行金票之目的》，載《中華實事周刊》   
1930 年第 51 期。 
《幣制消息：東北統一元法金融》，載《中央銀行旬報》1930年第 7 期。 
《幣制消息：東北設立金融整理會》，載《中央銀行旬報》1930年第 10期。 
張恪惟《東北金融大問題》，載《東三省官銀號經濟月刊》1930年第 7期。 
《幣制消息：東三省焚毀舊票》，載《中央銀行旬報》1930年第 3期。 
盧廣績《請實行獎勵政策以發展東北之出口貿易案》，載《國際貿易導報》1930 年第 9期。 
《財部實行銀本位辦法》，載《湖南財政匯刊》1930 年第 12期。 
子敬《東北幣制問題》，載《東方公論》1930 年第 28 期。 
王玉麒《東北幣制芻言(附表)》，載《交大月刊》1930年第 2期。 
劉振東《有限銀本位制》，載《經濟學季刊》1930年第 2期。 
《中國逐漸采行金本位幣制法草案：財政部甘梅爾設計委員會擬(未完)》，載《東三省官銀號經
濟月刊》，1930 年第 5期。 
《中國逐漸采行金本位幣制法草案(續)：財政部甘梅爾設計委員會擬》，載《東三省官銀號經濟
月刊》，1930年第 6期。 
《中國逐漸采行金本位幣制法草案(續)：財政部甘梅爾設計委員會擬》，載《東三省官銀號經濟
月刊》，1930年第 7期。 
《中國逐漸采行金本位幣制法草案(續)：財政部甘梅爾委員會擬》，載《東三省官銀號經濟月刊》
1930 年第 8期。 
馬寅初《讀財政部甘末爾設計委員會改革幣制計劃書後(未完)》，載《東三省官銀號經濟月刊》，
1930 年第 7期。 
馬寅初《讀財政部甘末爾設計委員會改革幣制計劃書後(續)》，載《東三省官銀號經濟月刊》，1930
年第 8期。 
《幣制消息：東三省金融整理委員會之初步調查》，載《中央銀行旬報》1930年第 17期。 
盧廣績：《工商會議中關於國際貿易之議決案：請實行獎勵政策以發展東北之出口貿易案》，載《國
際貿易導報》1930 年第 9 期。 
朱彬元《银价低落与国际贸易》，载《国际贸易导报》1930年第 4期。 
173 
 
朱家语《东北急应注意的几种实业》，载《东三省官银号经济月刊》1930 年第 1 期。 
《辽宁纱厂增锭一万》，载《纺织时报》1930 年第 750期。 
《安东丝业之最近调查》，载《农业周报》1930年第 38期。 
《哈尔滨东三省面粉同业联合会之成立》，载《中东半月刊》1930 年第 2期。 
《沈阳开办民生工厂》，载《新闻报》1930年 12月 9 日，第 6版。 
《东省五路开始联运》，载《新闻报》1930年 8月 18 日，第 8版。 
《沈海吉海实行联运》，载《东省经济月刊》1930年第 1期。 
《北宁路高局长在举行葫芦岛开工典礼时演说词》，载《华北水利月刊》1930年第 7期。 
蕭共天《改行金本位問題》，載《東三省官銀號經濟月刊》1931年第 1期。 
《私經濟：東北幣制之歷史調查》，載《觀海》1931年第 2期。 
張誌剛《東北之幣制問題（附表），載《新北方》1931 年第 5-6期。 
張鴻銘《關於中國貨幣本位不得不說的幾句話》，載《東三省官銀號經濟月刊》1931年第 6期。 
《滿鐵營業决算減收狀况》，載《铁路月刊：湘鄂线》1931 年第 7期。 
《半年來北滿貨物輸出量：東行漸多南行日少，滿鐵全線將減運費》，載《商業月報》1931年第
4期。 
《设立东北制铁厂》，载《东三省官银号经济月刊》1931年第 6 期，第 2 页。 
趙鏡元《東北新交通政策與滿蒙鐵路交涉》，載《時事月報》1931 年第 5期。 
《高纪毅谈日本铁路交涉现状》，载《新闻报》1931年 2月 22日第 8版。 
《中日铁道交涉高纪毅据理力争》，载《时报》1931年 4月 4日第 4 版。 
  《东北铁路交涉近况》，载《国闻周报》1931年第 10期，第 8 页。 
《中日鐵路交涉與東北築路並進》，载《沈海铁路月刊》1931年第 26期。 
《東鐵運費改銀本位制問題》，載《鐵路月刊：湘鄂線》1931年第 3-4 期。 
《南滿鐵路改用銀本位：用以抵制北寧鐵路》，載《銀行周報》1931年第 11 期。 
《滿鐵營口線運費改用銀位》，载《铁道》1931年第 9 期。 
《東北鐵路貨運競爭》，載《鐵路公報:京滬滬杭甬線》1931 年第 5期。 
《調查：滿鐵減輕運費之情形》，載《鐵路月刊：湘鄂線》1931年第 7期。 
《東北海外貿易新紀元》，載《東三省官銀號經濟月刊》1931年第 8 期。 
《東北貿易在中國貿易中之地位》，載《中東經濟月刊》1931年第 9 期。 
《中日煤业所受金贵银贱之影响：北票煤畅销》，载《矿业周报》1931年第 138 期。 
《外人注意肇新窰业》，载《东三省官银号经济月刊》1931 年第 4期。 
《东北制油业活动》，载《时报》1931年 2月 22 日，第 2版。 
《北满油业渐趋繁盛》，载《农林新报》1931 年第 3 期。 
《辽民生厂造成汽车，此为国人制造之第一辆》，载《新闻报》1931年 6月 20日，第 7版。 
 
● Case Two ：The Nanjing Government 
(1) English 
- A. N. Young (1971). China's Nation-building Effort, 1927-1937. Hoover Press. 
- A. S. Everest & H. Morgenthau (1950). Morgenthau, the New Deal and Silver: A Story of 
Pressure Politics. King's Crown Press. 
- D. H. Leavens (1939). Silver Money (Vol. 4). Principia Press, Incorporated. 
- H. M. Bratter (1931). Silver: Some Fundamentals. Journal of Political Economy, 39(3), 
321-368. 
- J. M. Blum (1959). From the Morgenthau Diaries: Years of Crisis, 1928-1938 (Vol. 1). 
Houghton Mifflin. 
174 
 
- L. Cheng (2003). Banking in Modern China: Entrepreneurs, Professional Managers, and 
the Development of Chinese Banks, 1897-1937. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
- L. G. Ting (1936). Recent Developments in China's Cotton Industry. China Institute of 
Pacific Relations. 
- M. Friedman (1992). Franklin D. Roosevelt, Silver, and China. Journal of Political 
Economy, 100(1), 62-83. 
- M. B. Russell (1972). American Silver Policy and China, 1933-1936 (Doctoral dissertation, 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign). 
- M. Frank (1942). Banking and finance in China. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations. 
- R. Murphey (1953). Key to Modern China. Harvard University Press. 
- T. Wright (1991). Coping with the World Depression: The Nationalist Government's 
Relations with Chinese Industry and Commerce, 1932–1936. Modern Asian Studies, 25(4). 
-Wei Yinglin. (1936). The New Monetary System of China. University of Chicago Press. 
- Y. K. Cheng (1957). Foreign Trade and Industrial Development of China. South African 
Journal of Economics, 25(4), 306-306. 
 
(2) Japanese 
赤木完爾（1982）「中国幣制改革をめぐる英米提携」『法學研究』55(3). 
秋田茂、籠谷直人（2001）『1930 年代のアジア国際秩序 』溪水社。 
井上準之助論叢編纂会編（1935）『井上準之助論叢.第 3 巻』井上準之助論叢編纂会。 
今村忠男（1939）『支那新通貨工作論』商工行政社。 
伊予谷登士翁（1977）「世界恐慌下に於ける中国幣制改革--1930 年代中・米関係の展開」『経
済論叢』(120)。 
奥和義（2016）「1935 年の中国の貨幣制度改革前後の国際経済関係」『關西大學商學論集』60(4)。 
籠谷直人（2000）「1930 年代前半のシンガポールにおける華僑通商網 : 日本綿布取引を事例
に」『經濟史研究』(4)。 
外務省外交資料館（1933）『本邦品ニ対スル為替ダンピング税』アジア歴史資料センター、
B09040004500。 
外務省外交資料館（1935）『華僑ノ現勢／1935 年』アジア歴史資料センター、B10070577900。 
外務省外交資料館（1935）『幣制改革及銀国有問題』アジア歴史資料センター、B08060889300。 
「最近に於ける支那海外移民の經濟的地位」（1933）『滿鐵調查月報』13(6)。 
外務省外交資料館（1936）『国民政府財政及通貨問題』アジア歴史資料センター、
B02130135600 
外務省外交資料館（1936）『中華工業国外貿易協会主弁南洋商業考察団ノ商品展示会』アジア
歴史資料センター、B08061749900。 
外務省外交資料館『中国ニ於ケル貨幣関係雑件／幣制改革問題 第三巻』アジア歴史資料セン
ター、B08060896200。 
外務省外交史料館『中国ニ於ケル貨幣関係雑件／幣制改革問題 第四巻』アジア歴史資料セン
ター、1936 年、B08060897400。 
企画院（1939）『華僑の研究』松山房。 
久保亨（1986）「国民政府の輸出促進政策と中華工業国外貿易協会: 1930 年代中国における輸
出志向工業化の模索」『東洋文化研究所紀要』第 103 号。 
久保亨（1999）『戦間期中国< 自立への模索>: 関稅通貨政策と経済発展』東京大学出版会。 
黑松嚴（1935）「支那のボイコツトに就て」『大阪商工會議所月報』40(618)。 
175 
 
国立公文書館（1935）『支那幣制に対する我方の態度』アジア歴史資料センター、
A09050543600。 
佐野健太郎（1986）「1935 年中国の幣制改革について (1)―通貨増発の波及効果をめぐって
―」『高知論叢』(50)。 
新川傳助（1937）『南洋華僑の研究』、興中公司。 
『支那の貿易外収支』（1942）東亜研究所。 
『支那幣制改革に関する諸問題』（1936）東京商工会議所。 
城山智子（2006）「一九三〇年代の中国と国際通貨システム-一九三五年幣制改革の対外的・
国内的意義と影響に関する一考察」『国際政治』(146)。 
城山智子（2011）『大恐慌下の中国:市場・国家・世界経済』名古屋大学出版会。 
杉原薫（1986）『アジア間貿易の形成と構造』ミネルヴァ書房。 
竹井十郎（1932）『我南洋貿易を阻害する華僑の真相』東亜経済調査局。 
大日本紡績聯合会（1935）『綿糸紡績事情参考書.第 59次(昭和 7年上半期)』大日本紡績聯合
会。 
大日本紡績聯合会（1935）『綿糸紡績事情参考書.第 60次(昭和 7年下半期)』大日本紡績聯合
会。 
大日本紡績聯合会（1940）『綿糸紡績事情参考書.第 67 次(昭和 11 年上半期)』大日本紡績聯合
会。 
大日本紡績聯合会（1940）『綿糸紡績事情参考書.第 68 次(昭和 11 年下半期)』大日本紡績聯合
会。 
高橋亀吉（1937）『日本産業労働論』千倉書房。 
高村直助（1982）『近代日本綿業と中国』東京大学出版会。 
東亜経済調査局（1933）『銀及銀価低落の研究』東亜経済調査局。 
德永淸行（1941）「支那銀行制度の調整-幣制改革より事變前後の動向を繞つて-」『東亞經濟論
叢』1(2)。 
德永淸行（1941）「支那國家銀行の統制力-特に幣制改革の前後を重點として-」『東亞經濟論叢』
1(3)。 
『東洋及南洋諸国の国際貿易と日本の地位』（1933）三菱経済研究所。 
東洋協會調査部（1936）『支那幣制改革の囘顧』東洋協會。 
南満州鉄道株式会社（1936）『支那ノ幣制改革ニ對スル内地銀行家ノ意見』滿鐡・天津事務所
調査室。 
野沢豊（1981）『中国の幣制改革と国際関係』東京大学出版会。 
樋口弘（1943）『南洋に於ける日本の投資と貿易』味燈書屋。 
波多野澄雄（1978）「リース・ロスの極東訪問と日本-中国幣制改革をめぐって-:日英関係の史
的展開」『国際政治』第 58 号。 
藤井光男（1987）『戦間期日本繊維産業海外進出史の研究：日本製糸業資本と中国・朝鮮』ミ
ネルヴァ書房。 
福田省三（1939）『華僑経済論』大同書院。 
防衛省防衛研究所『外国側の態度及我陸軍の意向』アジア歴史資料センター、1935-1938年、
C11110595900。 
防衛省防衛研究所『本改革令実施後の支那情勢』アジア歴史資料センター、1935-1938年、
C11110594800。 
堀和生（2001）「植民地帝国日本の経済構造: 1930 年代を中心に」『日本史研究』462、26-54
頁。 
176 
 
松岡哲史（1934）『平価切下とソシアルダンピングの話』和甲書房。 
米谷栄一（1939）『近世支那外国貿易史』生活社。 
宮下忠雄（1952）『中国幣制の特殊研究: 近代中国銀両制度の研究』日本学術振興会。 
森時彦（2001）『中国近代綿業史の研究 』京都大学学術出版会。 
吉田政治（1939）『最近の支那通貨事情: 蒋政権の通貨政策と国際関係』東洋経済出版部。 
リヨウ·パオセイン著、勝谷在登譯（1940）『支那幣制の性格的研究』白揚社。 
 
 
(2) Chinese 
Books and Archives: 
中国第二历史档案馆《一九三三年中国经济现状、中国近年之银行及中国基本工业之概况史料》
全宗号三四，案卷号 1461。 
中国第二历史档案馆《日本对南洋各地贸易概况》，全宗号四，案卷号 16967。 
中国第二历史档案馆《一九三四年中美间白银问题谈判史料》全宗号三四，案卷号 1466。 
中国第二历史档案馆《中国银行董事长宋子文对我国货币改革政策发表谈话如下》，载《一九三
五年国民党政府实行新货币政策经过及货币金融史料》全宗号三四，案卷号 1462。 
中国第二历史档案馆《军事委员会委员长行营抄发辅币条例、妨害国币惩治条例、兑换法币补充
办法》全宗号七六一，案卷号 597，1936年。 
中国第二历史档案馆《财政部电告巩固币制改善金融规定四项办法及取消各项法令清单等文书》，
全宗号一二（6），案卷号 3702。 
中国第二历史档案馆《财政部公债司关于统一公债换偿各债券办法、中签码单换发印花税票等案
与税务署、上海钱业监理会来往文书》，全宗号三（6），案卷号 9448。 
中国第二历史档案馆《中国农民银行救济农村金融之进行》，载《中央党部国民经济计划委员会
主编<十年来之中国经济建设>》，全宗号四，案卷号 33912，1937 年。 
中国第二历史档案馆《经济部商业司拟具华侨可投资事业说明书及有关文书》全宗号四，案卷号
35183，1937 年 6 月。 
章乃器《中國貨幣金融問題》，生活書店 1936 年版。 
周伯棣编《白银问题与中国货币政策》，中华书局 1936 年版。 
张素民《白银问题与中国币制》，商务印书馆 1936年版。 
杨荫溥《中国金融研究》，商务印书馆 1937年版。 
高事恒《南洋商業考察團報告書》，中華工業國外貿易協會 1937年版。 
何炳賢《中國的國際貿易》，商務印書館 1937年版。 
单岩基《南洋贸易论》，申报 1943 年版。 
严中平《中国棉纺织史稿 1289-1937：从棉纺织工业史看中国资本主义的发生与发展过程》科
学出版社 1955 年版。 
汪敬虞《中国近代工业史资料》，科学出版社 1957年版。 
中国人民銀行上海市分行編《上海錢莊史料》，上海人民出版社 1960 年版。 
上海市工商行政管理局《上海民族机器工业》，中华书局 1979 年版。 
王業鍵《中國近代貨幣與銀行的演進》，中央研究院經濟研究所 1981 年版。 
杨建成主编《三十年代南洋华侨侨汇投资调查报告书》中华学术院南洋研究所 1983年版。 
杨建成主编《侨汇流通之研究》，中华学术院南洋研究所 1984 年版。 
杨建成主编《中国国民党与华侨文献初编》，中华学术院南洋研究所 1984年版。 
游仲勲、楊建成《華僑政治經濟論》，中華學術院南洋研究所 1984年版。 
黄苇、夏林根编《近代上海地区方志经济史料选辑》，上海人民出版社 1984 年版。 
177 
 
郑友揆、程麟荪《中国的对外贸易和工业发展》，社会科学院出版社 1984年版。 
上海通社《上海研究资料》，上海书店 1984年版。 
李国卿《华侨资本的形成和发展》福建人民出版社 1985年版。 
杜恂诚《日本在旧中国的投资》，上海社会科学院出版社 1986 年版。 
杨建成主编《泰国的华侨》，中华学术院南洋研究所 1986年版。 
杨建成主编《英属马来亚华侨》，中华学术院南洋研究所 1986 年版。 
张公权《中国通货膨胀史》，文史资料出版社 1986年版。 
中国近代经济史丛书编委会编《中国近代经济史研究资料》，上海社会科学院出版社 1987 年版。 
上海社会科学院经济研究所《上海对外贸易》，上海社会科学院出版社 1989 年版。 
洪葭管、张继凤《近代上海金融市场》，上海人民出版社 1989 年版。 
中国第二历史档案馆、中国人民银行江苏省分行、江苏省金融志编委会：《中华民国金融法规档
案资料选编》，档案出版社 1989 年版。 
上海市丝绸进出口公司、上海社会科学院经济研究所《中国近代缫丝工业史》，上海人民出版社
1990 年版。 
杜恂诚《民族资本主义与旧中国政府》，上海社会科学院出版社 1991 年版。 
中国人民银行总行参事室《中华民国货币史资料：1921-1927》第二辑，上海人民出版社 1991
年版。 
中国银行总行《中国银行行史资料汇编》，档案出版社 1991 年版。 
迈克尔·罗素《院外集团与美国东亚政策：30 年代美国白银集团的活动》，复旦大学出版社 1992
年版。 
夏杖《近代廣東省僑匯研究(1862-1949)》，新加坡南洋學會 1992年版。 
陈争平《1895-1936年中国国际收支研究》，中国社会科学出版社 1996年版。 
潘君祥、张今华《中国近代国货运动》，中国文史出版社 1996 年版。 
徐新吾、黄汉民主编《上海近代工业史》，上海社会科学院出版社 1998年版。 
郭梁《东南亚华侨华人经济简史》，经济科学出版社 1998年版。 
聂德宁《近现代中国与东南亚经贸关系史研究》，厦门大学出版社 2001年版。 
林远辉、张应龙《新加坡马来西亚华侨史》，广东高等教育出版社 2008年版。 
刘克祥、吴太昌主编《中国近代经济史：1927~1937》，人民出版社 2010年版。 
周天度等《中华民国史》第八卷·下，中华书局 2011 年版。 
刘大钧《上海工业化研究》，商务印书馆 2015年版。 
 
Journals: 
樊卫国《论进口替代与近代国货市场》，载《上海社会科学院学术季刊》1995 年第 3 期。 
聂德宁《近现代中国与东南亚经贸关系史研究》，厦门大学出版社 2001 年版。 
黄凤志《太平洋战争爆发前英美远东政策的比较研究》，载《内蒙古民族大学学报》2002 年第 3
期。 
刘慧宇《中央银行与国民政府货币现代化改革》，载《民国档案》2002 年第 2 期。 
刘咏华《论太平洋战争前 10 年的日美关系》，载《东北师大学报》2003 年第 6 期。 
李宇平《1930 年代初期東亞區域經濟重心的變化：日本擴張輸出與中國經濟蕭條》，載《近代史
研究所集刊》(43)，第 57-116 頁。 
刘巍《中国的货币供求与经济增长(1927—1936 年)》，载《中国社会经济史研究》2004 年第 1 期。 
张赛群《抗战前期上海对南洋的贸易研究》，载《华侨大学学报》2004 年第 4 期。 
仇华飞《1935 年中国币制改革与中美金银交换》，载《学术研究》2004 年第 8 期。 
徐锋华《近二十年来法币改革研究综述》，载《民国档案》2007 年第 3 期。 
178 
 
管汉晖《20 世纪 30 年代大萧条中的中国宏观经济》，载《经济研究》2007 年第 2 期。 
杜恂诚《货币、货币化与萧条时期的货币供给——20 世纪 30 年代中国经济走出困局回顾》，载
《财经研究》2009 年第 3 期。 
戴建兵《白银与近代中国经济（1890-1935）》，复旦大学 2011 年博士论文。 
王丽《走向统一的广东省货币金融：国民政府法币改革的区域性案例分析》，载《暨南学报》2014
年第 10 期。 
 
Old Newspaper and Journals in Republic of China times(1912~1949)： 
吴半农《日煤倾销中之国煤问题》，载《社会科学杂志》1932年第 4 期。 
顾毓瑔《日货倾销问题》，载《劳工月刊》1932年第 6期。 
《日货倾销后我工商业大受打击》，载《国货评论刊》1933年第 3期。 
李紫翔《外煤倾销与我国煤工业之前途》，载《申报月刊》1933年第 11期. 
《華僑消息：國貨在南洋滯銷之原因》，載《華僑半月刊》1933年第 34期。 
《南洋華僑抵貨運動之檢討（續）》，載《華僑周報》1933年第 38期。 
《南洋華僑失業歸國：去年六月起數逾廿八萬》，載《興華》1933 年第 17 期。 
《日人對於南洋華僑商業排擠之計劃》，載《美亞期刊》1933年第 130期。 
《日貨傾銷之南洋概況：巨港華洋商人均受影響》，載《美亞期刊》1933 年第 131期。 
《日本積極侵奪南洋華僑地位》，載《海外月刊》1933 年第 8期。 
蘇鴻賓《日本織物在南洋傾銷之影響》，載《南洋情報》1933年第 10期。 
林勁草《日本的南進政策與南洋華僑經濟的危機》，載《華僑半月刊》1934年第 42期。 
郭振裘《南洋華僑經濟日趨衰落之原因》，載《华侨半月刊》1934 年第 43 期。 
鄧峙冰《從經濟上日本人之南洋華僑觀》，載《中南文化》1934年創刊號。 
《华商纱厂联合会报告书（二）》，载《纺织时报》1935年第 1188期。 
《许建屏谈南洋侨商经济衰落原因：受日货倾销影响》，载《时报》1935年 1月 18日。 
《菲岛华侨零售生意被日夺尽》，载《贸易》1935 年第 63期。 
陳公博《我對於南洋貿易籌劃的經過》，載《中央周報》1935 年第 379期。 
何炳賢《發展南洋貿易的基本工作》，載《文化月刊》1935 年第 16期。 
鄭季楷《世界恐慌中日本與華僑在南洋貿易的成敗》，載《僑務月報》1935年第 1期。 
《南洋市塲與我國貿易》，載《實業季報》1935 年第 1期。 
《國際貿易局將開會議：推銷國產輸入南洋》，載《新闻报》1935年 3月 8日，第 10版。 
《美國會白銀派分爲三派》，载《银行周报》1935年第 40期。 
陳克英《日本南進政策與南洋華僑》，載《時論(南京)》1936 年第 13 期。 
尼維 《日本經濟南侵與南洋華僑商戰的危機》，載《禮拜六》1936年第 651期。 
吳學慰、王柳舒等《法幣與國際貿易（附表）》，载《新民》1936年第 51期。 
《法幣施行後一年來之對外貿易》，載《中央時事周報》1936年第 46期。 
《法幣政策實施後我國對外貿易之動向(附表)》，載《金融周報》1936年第 21期。 
《我國法幣政策與對外貿易之展望》，載《外交評論》1936年第 1期。 
《各國對南洋貿易之競爭》，载《外论通信稿》1936 年第 1509期。 
《國貨在南洋銷路之促進》，載《中行月刊》1936年第 4期。 
《國貨商擬向南洋發展貿易》，載《實業部月刊》1936 年第 2期。 
《開拓南洋國貨市場之檢討》，載《僑務月報》1936年第 3期。 
《經濟資料：南洋市場華貨轉機》，載《錢業月報》1936年第 12 期。 
《滬金融界籌組中聯公司，拓展菲洲南洋貿易》，載《國際貿易情報》1936年第 31期。 
高事恒《中国与南洋贸易的展望》，载《南洋商业考察团专刊》1936年第 7 期。 
179 
 
《華僑經濟：南洋考察團的收獲》，載《僑務月報》1936年第 7-8期。 
《法幣與國民經濟》，載《中央時事周報》1936 年第 46 期。 
《法幣政策實施後我國的金融》，載《交易所周刊》1936年第 20 期。 
《荷盾貶值後南洋貿易繁榮：國際貿易局函各國貨團體乘機推進對南洋貿易》，載《時報》1937
年 3月 1日。 
《棉布畅销南洋》，载《国际贸易情报》1937 年第 12 期。 
馬寅初《我國預算法幣與工業之連鎖關係》，載《銀行周報》1937 年第 18 期。 
《法幣政策實行後華貨運紐激增》，載《國際貿易情報》1937年第 14期。 
邓葆光《日本最近之贸易入超问题》，载《时事月报》1937年第 2期。 
 
● Case Three ：The Phibun Administration 
(1) Thai 
- ราชกิจจานเุบกษา（Government Gazette）:พระราชบญัญติัเงินตราพทุธศกัราช ๒๔๗๑（the Currency Act）. ราชกิจจา
นเุบกษา เลม่ ๔๕ หน้าท่ี ๒๕ - ๓๙ วนัท่ี ๑๕ เมษายน พ.ศ. ๒๔๗๑. 
http://www.ratchakitcha.soc.go.th/DATA/PDF/2471/A/25.PDF. 
- ราชกิจจานเุบกษา（Government Gazette）:พระราชบญัญติัเงินตรา แก้ไขเพ่ิมเติม พทุธศกัราช ๒๔๗๕（Currency Act 
Amendments in 1932）,๔๙๐ก๑๑พฤษภาคมพ.ศ.๒๔๗๕. 
http://www.ratchakitcha.soc.go.th/DATA/PDF/2475/A/102.PDF. 
- ราชกิจจานเุบกษา（Government Gazette）:พระราชบญัญติัเงินตรา (ฉบบัท่ี ๕) พทุธศกัราช ๒๔๘๒（Currency Act in 
1939）, http://www.ratchakitcha.soc.go.th/DATA/PDF/2482/A/805.PDF. 
- ราชกิจจานเุบกษา（Government Gazette）:พระราชบญัญติัวา่ด้วยการน าเงินตราต่างประเทศเข้ามาในราชอาณาจกัร พทุธศกัราช ๒๔๘๒
（Act on the Entry of Foreign Currency into the Kingdom of Thailand in 1939），
http://www.ratchakitcha.soc.go.th/DATA/PDF/2482/A/818.PDF. 
- ราชกิจจานเุบกษา（Government Gazette）:ค าแถลงการณ์ เร่ือง เก่ียวแก่การประกาศสงครามต่อบริเตนใหญ่และสหรัฐอเมริกา
（Statement on declaring war on the United Kingdom and the United States）, 
http://www.ratchakitcha.soc.go.th/DATA/PDF/2485/A/005/247.PDF. 
- ราชกิจจานเุบกษา（Government Gazette）:พระราชบญัญติัเงินตราในภาวะฉกุเฉิน พทุธศกัราช ๒๔๘๔（Currency 
Emergency Act in 1941）, http://www.ratchakitcha.soc.go.th/DATA/PDF/2484/A/1786.PDF. 
- ราชกิจจานเุบกษา（Government Gazette）:พระราชบญัญติัเงินตรา ในภาวะฉกุเฉิน (ฉบบัท่ี ๒) พทุธศกัราช ๒๔๘๕（Currency 
Act In the Emergency, No. 2, 1942）, 
http://www.ratchakitcha.soc.go.th/DATA/PDF/2485/A/023/811.PDF. 
-  ราชกิจจานเุบกษา（Government Gazette）:กฎกระทรวงการคลงั ออกตามความในพระราชบญัญติัเงินตราในภาวะฉกุเฉิน พทุธศกัราช 
๒๔๘๔（Ministerial Regulations Issued in accordance with the Currency Act of 1941）, 
http://www.ratchakitcha.soc.go.th/DATA/PDF/2484/A/1961.PDF. 
- National Archives of Thailand, บก. สงูสดุ 2.6.3/7, การเจรจาเศรฐกิจท่ีกรุงโตเกียว(Economic Negotiations 
in Tokyo), ปึกท่ี 1, Understanding on Basic Items of Trade Agreement (Confidential), 
1942.04.09. 
- National Archives of Thailand, บก. สงูสดุ 2.6.3/7,  การเจรจาเศรฐกิจท่ีกรุงโตเกียว(Economic Negotiations 
in Tokyo), ปึกท่ี 1, Counter-Proposal (Confidential), 1942.04.10. 
- National Archives of Thailand, บก. สงูสดุ 2.6.3/7, การเจรจาเศรฐกิจท่ีกรุงโตเกียว(Economic Negotiations 
in Tokyo), ปึกท่ี 1, Understanding on Basic Items of Trade Agreement (Confidential), 
1942.04.21. 
- National Archives of Thailand, บก. สงูสดุ 2.6.3/7, การเจรจาเศรฐกิจท่ีกรุงโตเกียว(Economic Negotiations 
180 
 
in Tokyo), ปึกท่ี 1, Understanding on Trade (Counter-Draft, Confidential), 1942.04.22. 
- National Archives of Thailand, บก. สงูสดุ 2.6.3/7, การเจรจาเศรฐกิจท่ีกรุงโตเกียว(Economic Negotiations 
in Tokyo), ปึกท่ี 1, Oral Statement, 1942.04.22. 
- National Archives of Thailand, บก. สงูสดุ 2.6.3/7, การเจรจาเศรฐกิจท่ีกรุงโตเกียว(Economic Negotiations 
in Tokyo), ปึกท่ี 2, Explanatory Notes: to Accompany Thai Counter-Draft of Understanding 
on Trade ,1942.06.10. 
- National Archives of Thailand, บก. สงูสดุ 2.6.3/7, การเจรจาเศรฐกิจท่ีกรุงโตเกียว(Economic Negotiations 
in Tokyo), ปึกท่ี 3, Understanding on Trade(Draft, Confidential),1942.06.27. 
-National Archives of Thailand, บก. สงูสดุ 2.6.3/7, การเจรจาเศรฐกิจท่ีกรุงโตเกียว(Economic Negotiations in 
Tokyo), ปึกท่ี 3, Minutes,1942.06.28. 
- ดิเรก ชยันาม. (1970) ไทยกบัสงครามโลกครัง้ท่ี 2. กรุงเทพฯ : ไทยวฒันาพานิช. 
- ธนาคารแห่งประเทศไทย(1972) ประวติัและการด าเนินงานของธนาคารแห่งประเทศไทย(History and Operations of the Bank 
of Thailand ). 
- อบุล จิระสวสัด์ิ,(1974) สภาวะทางการเมือง เศรษฐกิจ และสงัคมของประเทศไทย ในระหวา่งสงครามโลกครัง้ท่ีสอง. จฬุาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลยั. 
- ทวี ธีระวงศ์เสรี. (1981) สมัพนัธภาพทางการเมืองระหวา่งไทยกบัญ่ีปุ่ น. กรุงเทพฯ : ไทยวฒันาพานิช. 
- กอบเกือ้ สวุรรณทตั-เพียร (1989) นโยบายต่างประเทศของรัฐบาลพิบลูสงคราม พ.ศ. 2481-2487 (Foreign Policy of Pibul 
Songgram Government B.E. 2481-2487), สถาบนัไทยคดีศึกษา มหาวิทยาลยัธรรมศาสตร์. 
- จาง ห ยิ ่ว ซิว-, & อาทร ฟุ้ ง ธรรมสาร. (1994) “การ เป็น พนัธมิตร และ การ ต่อต้าน ญ่ีปุ่ น ของ ไทย ระหวา่ง ค. ศ. 1941-1945”. วารสาร 
ญ่ีปุ่ น ศึกษา (Japanese Studies Journal), Vol.11. No.2. 
- ณรง พว่งพิศ. (1998) “ปัญหาเงินเยนพิเศษระหวา่งประเทศไทยกบัประเทศญ่ีปุ่ น (พ.ศ. 2484-2505)”. วารสารประวติัศาสตร์. 
- สมุยัวดี เมฆสตุ, กมลวรรณ สาลีคงประยรู. (2010) ธนบตัรไทย: ระหวา่งสงครามโลกครัง้ท่ี 2 ในเอเชีย พ.ศ. 2484-2488. ธนาคารแห่งประเทศ
ไทย. 
 
(2) English 
-東京大学社会科学研究所蔵: The Bangkok Times Weekly Mail. (Microfilm) 
The Bangkok Times Weekly Mail. (1941.1.14) A Kite Flown in Japan: Britain, America 
and Thailand. p.8. 
The Bangkok Times Weekly Mail. (1941.1.15) A Secret Pact: Some Japanese 
Commitments. p.15. 
The Bangkok Times Weekly Mail. (1941.1.17) Control of Gold. p.21. 
The Bangkok Times Weekly Mail. (1941.7.17) Britain and Thailand：Japanese Allegations. 
p.11.  
The Bangkok Times Weekly Mail. (1941.7.18) Currency Reserve: Some Months Compared. 
p.16. 
The Bangkok Times Weekly Mail. (1941.7.30) A Thai Government Communique about the 
Policy in Foreign Relations. p.10. 
The Bangkok Times Weekly Mail. (1941.12.6) The National Assembly: Gold Coins for 
Thailand. p.23.   
-Batson, B. A., Asada, S. (1990) The Tragedy of Wanit : A Japanese Account of Wartime 
Thai Politics. Singapore: National University of Singapore. 
-Bangkok Times. (1942). Newspaper. 
-Bangkok to Tokyo, RG 457(Records of the National Security Agency/Central Security 
Service, 1917 - 1998), United States National Archives. 
-Saigon to Bangkok, RG 457(Records of the National Security Agency/Central Security 
181 
 
Service, 1917 - 1998), United States National Archives. 
- C. Kasetsiri, (1974) “The First Phibun Government and its Involvement in World War 
II.” Journal of the Siam Society. Vol.62. No.2. 
- D. Chaiyanām (2008) Thailand and World War II. University of Washington Press.  
- E. B. Reynolds (1994). Thailand and Japan's Southern Advance: 1940-1945. New York: St. 
Martin's Press.  
- E. Murashima (2005) The Thai-Japanese Alliance and the Overseas Chinese in Thailand. 
Creation of New Contemporary Asian Studies, Working Paper. 
- P. G. Warr, B. Nidhiprabha (1996) Thailand's Macroeconomic Miracle: Stable Adjustment 
and Sustained Growth, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
- S. Manurungsan (1989) Economic Development of Thailand: 1850-1950. Thailand: 
Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University. 
- Thamsuk noonnon. (1977) Thailand and the Japanese Presence, 1941-1945. Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 
- Thamsook Numnonda. (1978) Pibulsongkram’s Thai Nation-Building Program during 
the Japanese Military Presence 1941-1945. Journal of Southeast Asia Studies(9). 
p.234-247. 
- W. L. Swan (1989) “Thai-Japan Monetary Relations at the Start of the Pacific War.” 
Modern Asian Studies. Vol.23. No.2.  
- Warren S. Hunsberger, The Yen Bloc in Japan's Expansion Program, Far Eastern Survey, 
Vol.7, No. 22 (Nov. 9, 1938). 
 
(3) Japanese 
愛知揆一（1942）『最近に於ける泰国の一般事情』、全国経済調査機関連合会、1942 年。 
朝日盤古特電（1942）「タイ国の通貨政策再編成」『日本タイ協會々報』第 27 号。 
『アメリカに於ける金及銀の問題』（1941）世界経済調査会。 
大蔵省外資局総務課（1943）『マライ及シャンニ於ケル通貨金融事項ノ処理』。 
大蔵省昭和財政史編集室（1963）『昭和財政史第 13 巻:国際金融･貿易』東洋経済新報社。 
大蔵省百年史編集室（1969）『大蔵省百年史･下巻』大蔵財務協会。 
大藏省理財局『金融協定等關係集』早稲田大学図書館蔵。 
荻原弘明、和田久徳、生田滋著（1983）『東南アジア現代史８：ビルマ・タイ』山川出版社。 
『限りなき魅惑のまと「金」の将来はどうなる』（1942）中山経済研究所。 
外務省外交資料館『大東亜戦争関係一件／「タイ」国問題／進駐軍軍費問題』、アジア歴史資
料センター。 
外務省外交資料館（1941）『日本国「タイ」国間同盟条約関係１』アジア歴史資料センター、
B02032441700。 
外務省外交資料館（1942）『タイ国現行通貨条例の件』アジア歴史資料センター、
B08060918600。 
外務省外交資料館（1942）「タイ国国民議会ニ於ケルピ総理ノ施政演説要点」『暹羅国ノ部 第
二巻：昭和16年12月19日から昭和17年6月25日』アジア歴史資料センター、B02031580000。 
外務省外交史料館『特別円ノ意義ト其の発展』アジア歴史資料センター、B08060390100。 
木村禧八郎（1938）『「金」の経済知識』千倉書房。 
『金輸出再禁止後の我国金融事情』（1936）金融研究会。 
国立公文書館『昭和財政史資料第 4 号第 203 冊 イーヤマークの意義』、アジア歴史資料セン
182 
 
ター。 
国立公文書館『経済週報特輯 金問題を繞る内外の主張』アジア歴資料センター、
A06031110000。 
国立公文書館（1934）『御署名原本・昭和九年・法律第四四号・日本銀行金買入法』アジア歴
史資料センター、A03021926700。 
国立公文書館（1937）『産金ノ管理並産金ノ奨励ニ関スル件ヲ定ム』アジア歴史資料センター、
A14100611600。 
国立公文書館（1937）『御署名原本・昭和十二年・法律第六〇号・金準備評価法制定昭和七年
勅令第四号』アジア歴史資料センター、A03022075700。 
国立公文書館（1941）『米泰国愈々緊密微妙 桑港英語放送十一月二十八日』アジア歴資料セ
ンター、A03024787500。 
国立公文書館（1941）『対泰国経済発展ノ為ノ施策ニ関スル件』アジア歴史資料センター、
A03023596300。 
国立公文書館（1941）『泰、日本の扈従たるを欲せず』アジア歴史資料センター、A03024770600。 
国立公文書館（1941）『泰国を中心とする極東戦争は不可避』アジア歴史資料センター、
A03024782200。 
白石昌也（2015）『第二次世界大戦期のインドシナ・タイ、そして日本・フランスに関する研
究蓄積と一次資料の概観』早稲田大学アジア太平洋研究センター。 
白鳥敏夫（1941）『転換日本の諸政策：高度国防国家の確立より世界新体制の建設へ』興成書
房。 
鹽谷醇（1943）「タイ國幣制の戰時體制」、」『日本タイ協會々報』第 33 号。 
「戦時態勢強化：泰内閣の新政策」、『朝日新聞』1942 年 3 月 17 日（日刊）。 
曾野峻輔（1942）「共榮圈貨幣の統一に就て」『南方資料』第 10 号。 
第一銀行調査部『金ブロック崩壊後に於ける英国為替市場及金塊市場の動向』第一銀行調査部。 
「タイ中央銀行設立」『日本タイ協會々報』第 27 号。 
「坪上大使、ピブン首相と要談」、『朝日新聞』1942 年 3 月 4 日（夕刊）。 
「坪上大使、ピブン首相と会見：経済問題懇談」、『朝日新聞』1942 年 3 月 7 日（日刊）。 
「坪上大使、ピブン首相と懇談」、『朝日新聞』1942 年 3 月 26 日（日刊）。 
高石末吉（1970）『覚書終戦財政始末第 4 巻:戦費の調達と大陸各地の銀行』大蔵財務協会。
高橋亀吉（1942）『金融・財政の再編成』千倉書房。 
多田井喜生（1983）『続現代史資料 11･占領地通貨工作』みすず書房。 
東亜研究所（1942）『仏領印度支那の幣制と金融事情』東亜研究所。 
東京朝日新聞経済部（1935）『経済新話.上巻』経済知識社。 
東京日日新聞（1941）「タイ米英と断交」」『日本タイ協會々報』第 26 号。 
東京日日新聞（1942）「タイ貨圓リンクに」『日本タイ協會々報』第 26 号。 
東洋経済新報社（1937）『日本経済年報.第 29 集』東洋経済新報社。 
内閣情報局（1942）「タイ国へ二億円借款供與」『日本タイ協會々報』第 29 号。 
『南方経済対策･改訂版』（1943）大東亜省連絡委員会第一部会。 
「日泰、圓決済取極成る：圓中心金融圏愈々擴る」、『朝日新聞』1942 年 5 月 3 日（日刊）。 
「日泰経済の一体化」（1942）『日本経済年報』第 50 輯。 
「日泰の圓決済」、『朝日新聞』1942 年 7 月 5 日（日刊）。 
西野順治郎（1978）『日・タイ四百年史』時事通信社。 
日本国際政治学会太平洋戦争原因研究部（1963）『太平洋戦争への道: 開戦外交史 6』朝日新
聞社。 
183 
 
日本銀行（1948）『満州事変以後の財政金融史』日本銀行調査局特別調査室。 
日本銀行百年史編纂委員会（1984）『日本銀行百年史･第四巻』日本銀行。 
日本政治研究室（1944）「泰国における戦時経済の進展」『世界政治年報』第 1 輯。 
日本青年外交協会研究部（1942）「太平洋経済戦の将来」『太平洋読本』。 
野村合名会社調査部（1942）『大東亞共榮圏建設の構想』野村合名調査部。 
原朗（1976）「大東亜共栄圏の経済的実態」『土地制度史学』4 月号。 
橋爪明男『国際金融論：橋爪明男先生講義プリント』。 
パーンコーク發同盟（1942）「タイ新金本位制を採用す」『日本タイ協會々報』第 27 号。 
パーンコーク發同盟（1942）「円バート等価共同声明」『日本タイ協會々報』第 28 号。 
パーンコーク・クロ二クロ「タイ大蔵省の通貨新規定」『日本タイ協會々報』第 29 号。 
パーンコーク發同盟（1942）「タイ国円貨を法定準備に」『日本タイ協會々報』第 29 号。 
ベンジャミン･バトソン （1990）「タイのナショナリズムと対日関係の展開」、杉山伸也（編
著）『戦間期東南アジアの経済摩擦:日本の南進とアジア・欧米』同文館出版。 
防衛省防衛研究所（1941）『日本国軍隊ノ「タイ」国領域通過ニ関スル日本国「タイ」国間協
定』アジア歴史資料センター、C12120131500。 
防衛省防衛研究所（1942）『南方諸地域に対する通貨金融制度の基本方針並に泰国及仏印に対
する措置に関する件』、アジア歴史資料センター。 
防衛省防衛研究所（1942）『日泰協同作戦協定締結の件』アジア歴史資料センター、1942 年、
C01000028000。 
防衛省防衛研究所（1942）『日泰為替協定に関する件』、アジア歴史資料センター。 
防衛省防衛研究所（1942）『軍費銖貨調達に関する件』、アジア歴史資料センター。 
村嶋英治（1992）「日タイ同盟下の軍費交渉:1941～1944」『東南アジア:歴史と文化』第 21 号。 
村嶋英治（1996）『ピブーン：独立タイ王国の立憲革命』岩波書店。 
森七郎（1986）『日本通貨制度論』文人書房。 
山本有造（1997）「「大東亜金融圏」論 (1940 年代日本植民地帝国の諸相)」、『人文學報』第
79 号。 
矢代不美夫（1942）「円バート等価協定の成立と日タイ経済関係の新展開」『日本タイ協會々
報』第 28 号。 
吉川利治（2001）「忘れられた対日協力機関：日本軍の進駐とタイの対応」『南方文化』第 28
号。 
吉川利治（2010）『同盟国タイと駐屯日本軍:「大東亜戦争」期の知られざる国際関係』雄山閣。 
横浜正金銀行調査部（1943）「南方の通貨・金融便覧」『調査報告』第 136 号。 
横浜正金銀行調査部（1943）「泰國の通貨･金融史概説」『調査報告』第 141 号。 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
184 
 
APPENDIX 
 
Figure 1 Railway Network of the Northeast China around 1930
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Figure 2 China and Japan's Railway Plans in the Northeast China567 
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